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 The objective of this research was to resolve an academic challenge to extend the 
predictive capabilities of the transaction cost economics (TCE) model to address the 
theoretical issues of governing high value, complex industrial projects executed across 
international borders. This extension of TCE has been achieved by political governance 
and indirect vertical integration to complement governance mechanisms for international 
transactions. The propositions for an extension of the TCE model and its applicability were 
explored by field investigation using three case studies complemented by interviews of 
industry professionals. 
 The comparative institutional analysis of the three case studies examined the 
outcome of transactions which were subject to varying levels of political hazards and 
property rights safeguards. The empirical evidence demonstrated that the relative hazards 
created by the behaviour of the host country government and institutional regimes will 
have an overriding impact on transactions for major international projects. In this case, 
compelling political requirements may require firms to select governance mechanisms in a 
non-transaction costs economising way. 
 The contribution made to knowledge by this research is to demonstrate support for 
the potential of an extension to the basic TCE model developed for predicting optimum 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
1.1 Introduction and Research Issues 
1.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research by outlining the research issues, defining 
objectives of the research, scope and format of the research process.  This research focuses on 
the academic challenge of developing an applicable extension to the new institutional 
economics (NIE), and specifically to the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory.  The 
purpose of this extension is to address theoretical issues of the challenges of governing high 
value, complex industrial projects executed across international borders.  For this purpose, 
governance mechanisms advocated by new institutional economics were examined.  The 
result was concentration on TCE in order to develop this extension.  The justifications for this 
selection are given in this chapter.  The proposition of the basic TCE model originates from 
the discriminating alignment hypothesis, according to which characteristics of transactions 
that differ in their attributes of asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty (i.e. independent 
variables) need to be aligned with the intervening variable of governance mechanisms in a 
discriminating (mainly transaction cost economising) way. The governance mechanisms 
which differ in their costs and competencies are the market, vertical integration or a hybrid of 
the two.  The outcome (i.e. dependent variable) is the efficiency of transactions (Williamson, 
1991).  To counter the criticism that this proposition is a static concept taking impact of the 
moderating variable of institutional environment as neutral, this research explored the 
argument (illustrated in Figure 1.1) that the TCE reasoning should be extended. The 
introduction of moderating variables of political hazards, enforcement measures for 
protection of property rights, and the addition of political governance mechanism as an 
intervening variable, resulted in an extended TCE model for prediction of governance 
mechanisms for international transactions. This model is illustrated in Figure 1.1.  
	 2	
 
Figure 1.1 - Variables of an Extended TCE Model 
A review of the causes and consequences of the failures of transactions of major 
international projects highlighted the need to rethink the process of managing such projects.  
For this, it was found necessary to move beyond neoclassical economics which considers the 
firm as a production function (i.e. a technological construction) to new institutional 
economics (NIE), which considers the firm as a governance structure.  The word 
‘governance’originates from the Greek word ‘kubernaein’, which means ‘to steer’.  Based on 
its etymology (i.e. the study of the true and original sense of words), governance refers to the 
manner of steering or governing with authority for directing and controlling a group of 
people or a state.  
The new institutional economics emerged from neoclassical economics combining 
economics, law, organisation theory, political science and sociology. NIE proposes that the 
combination of institutions and organisations can reduce transaction costs and also achieve a 
higher efficiency in economic performance. In the context of NIE, institutional environment 
is composed of the rules of the game, that is to say, the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction. Institutional arrangements are the 
guidelines that facilitate exchanges, contracts and governance mechanisms including the 
market, vertical integration by firms and a hybrid of the two.  
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These governance mechanisms are implemented by organisations as the collective 
players of the game (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1985; North,1990).This conceptual model 
(illustrated in Figure 1.1)provides an extension (i.e. a shift parameter) to the TCE theory for 
the prediction of governance mechanisms for international project transactions. 
1.1.2 Research Issues 
Major international projects are normally carried out by a consortium of firms by 
executing several transactions in successive steps that are required to achieve set objectives.  
In this case, the desired outcome is a large infrastructure of very high capital asset which is 
required to function as stated, to generate revenue for a few decades as discussed in the 
research conducted by Morris (1986) and Winch (2002,2008).  As discussed later in this 
section, historically many of these projects fail to meet their set objectives resulting in 
excessive capital cost, inadequate performance standards and long delays in their completion 
schedules. A common way to measure the success of executing such projects is by 
determining whether the project stayed within budget, was completed as per the schedule and 
met specified performance standards.  This is commonly known as the iron triangle of project 
management (Dewitt, 1988; Caniels et al., 2012; Sanderson, 2012).  Many existing 
explanations for these failures focus on procedures and techniques used to execute projects, 
and are thus operationally focused with insufficient focus on behaviour of the participants 
and their relationships (Olsen et al., 2005).   
The argument is made that the need for governance exists every time a group of 
people come together as a transient organisation to accomplish an end goal, such as executing 
a major project.  In addition to participation of several actors, these major project transactions 
can be subjected to high levels of novel technical challenges and commercial complexities 
indicated in the studies conducted by McKenna et al. (2005).  In the case of international 
projects, behaviour of the host country’s political and legal institutions may cause additional 
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challenges.  This creates the requirement for including specialised (i.e.political) governance 
mechanisms to cope with the hazards associated with transactions between the host country 
institutions and investors (Dixit and Pindyck,1994 ; Olsen et al., 2005).  There is also the 
possibility that these challenges can be compounded by the opportunism that may arise due to 
the high value nature of the transactions, causing conflicts and failure in relationships 
between participants in the transactions ( Dixit, 2007 ;Winch, 2008).  
The growing number of failures in the management of large complex international 
project transactions to achieve their targets leads to an intellectual problem (Miller and 
Lessard, 2000; Atkinson et al., 2006; Merrow, 2012). This is whether there are limitations to 
the way in which projects are managed that need to be resolved in order to minimise the ex-
post execution regret of such transactions.  In this case, it could be considered whether there 
should be rethinking of project management with a greater focus on the implementation of 
appropriate governance mechanisms (Williamson, 1995; Sanderson, 2012).  Operationalising 
governance entails two processes: decision-making and implementation of the decision. In 
broad terms, decision-making refers to the process by which a person or group of persons, 
guided by socio-political structures, arrive at a decision involving their individual and 
communal needs and wants.  A governance mechanism is the implementation that logically 
follows the decision; it entails the actualisation or materialisation of the plan or decision. 
Governance is not just decision-making because decision without implementation is self-
defeating.  Neither is it just implementation because there is nothing to implement without a 
decision or plan.  Thus, the two processes necessarily go hand-in-hand, and are constitutive 
of governance (Williamson, 1985; North,1990; Atkinson et al., 2006). 
This approach of advocating governance mechanisms for managing transactions is 
rapidly becoming a powerful concept to resolve challenges faced by major international 
complex and high value transactions.  In this case, a theoretical framework is required for the 
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prediction and application of the most appropriate governance mechanisms aligned with the 
characteristics of the transactions (Miller and Lessard, 2000; Winch, 2002; Atkinson et al., 
2006; Sanderson, 2012).  The above arguments make the case for investigating governance 
mechanisms created by new institutional economics (NIE) and other forms such as 
relationships and trust. 
The remainder of this chapter presents the following sections. The causes of failures 
of major international project transactions are examined in Section 1.2.  From the findings, 
the need for rethinking the management of project transactions (i.e. application of governance 
mechanisms) is introduced. Section 1.3 then discusses the main alternative governance 
mechanisms of principal agency theory (PAT) and TCE advocated by NIE for transactions. 
The limitations of PAT for the economic governance of major transactions are identified, 
reinforcing the justification for focusing on TCE for developing the theoretical framework to 
comply with the research objective.  Finally, Section 1.4 presents the sequence of the 
research process and the format of this research thesis. 
1.2 Execution of Major Project Transactions 
1.2.1 Introduction 
 The capital costs to execute major international projects such as offshore oil and gas 
production developments are measured in billions of pounds, and achievement of the end 
result can take about eight to ten years (Barlow, 2000; McKenna et al., 2005; Olsen et al., 
2005).  A common way to measure the success of executing such projects is by determining 
whether the project stayed within budget, was completed as per the schedule and met 
specified performance standards. Publicly available statistics of project performances vary 
dramatically in their estimates and do not include confidential data from private corporations, 
and therefore are not an entirely reliable guide to performance of many major projects.  Yet, 
there are some common causes of project failure found in industry literature. These can be 
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summarised as poorly defined project objectives and scope, ineffective leadership, inadequate 
competency of project management personnel due to lack of experience and training, lack of 
effective communication, lack of comprehensive project plans with inaccurate time and effort 
estimates and lack of detail in the progress monitoring. These causes of poor project 
performance are related to operational causes, with inadequate attention to strategic 
considerations (Chapman and Ward, 2003; McKenna et al., 2005). 
Historically, it has been found that despite well-set objectives, diligently planned 
project execution activities and experienced project management teams, a significant number 
of major projects have failed to meet their objectives.  The project completions come in late, 
over budget with underperformance, thus failing to meet the objectives set by the project 
management (Morris, 1986; Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C.K., 1989: Winch, 2002).  These 
difficulties have been illustrated by the performance of many major project executions over 
the years.  A representative global cross industry project performance survey of 438 projects 
covering private and public industries indicated that only 27% of all projects met their 
original budget, 22% were on time, while 51% met the desired specifications (Merrow, 
2012).  These findings and results support the findings of the International Program in the 
Management of Engineering and Construction (IMEC) survey carried out in 2007 which 
found that of 60 engineering and construction projects with an average capital value of $1 
billion undertaken between 1980 and 2000, 18% had severe budget overrun and 40% had to 
be restructured or abandoned.  These surveys also found that larger first-of-a-kind and one-
of-a-kind projects exhibited worse performance (Wood Mackenzie, 2010; Merrow, 2012).  
In management literature, the role of project management is essentially to execute a 
set of processes in an effort to ensure that a project meets its predetermined objectives, 
assuming that these processes can be executed without any impediment (Miller and Lessard, 
2000; Winch, 2002). In this case, the question is, whether failures in executing projects can 
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be attributed to the deficiencies in the present processes for executing such projects?  The 
literature and empirical records were reviewed by the researcher to ascertain whether the 
traditional project management process including formulation of objectives, concept 
definition, planning, execution and monitoring alone can be expected to cope with the 
consequences of hazards faced by major projects or not? If not, are there any fundamental 
strategic issues that need to be explored? (Miller and Lessard, 2000; Winch, 2002, 2008; 
Chapman and Ward, 2003; Turner, 2005; Misund and Mohn, 2009;Merrow, 2012). The 
findings of this literature review identified some fundamental causes which can lead to 
performance failures of traditional project management processes. The findings of this 
literature review are summarised in the next section.  
1.2.2 Causes of Failures of Project 
 In the case of long term major projects, information about the future state of affairs 
can often be limited, usually unreliable and predictions available regarding possible 
alternatives and their consequences can be inaccurate.  Project actors are unable to provide a 
sufficiently flexible and robust response to inevitable turbulence (Anderson, 1999;Chapman 
and Ward, 2003; Atkinson et al., 2006; Misund and Mohn, 2009;). Such limitations can be 
compounded by bounded rationality of managers as the human mind has only limited 
capacity to evaluate and process the information that is available. In several cases the amount 
of time available to make crucial strategic decisions may be constrained. Therefore, even 
individuals who intend to make rational choices are bound to make satisficing (rather than 
maximising or optimising) choices in complex situations (Simon, 1960,1982; Chapman and 
Ward, 2003). This can result in attempting to manage transactions without envisaging 
challenges due to political, economic, sociological or technological (PEST) hazards that are 
typically associated with these major long duration projects.  Incomplete information can 
result in underestimating the causes and consequences of uncertainties and risks caused by 
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these hazards impacting transactions (Morris, 1986;Miller and Lessard, 2000;; Winch, 2002, 
2008). In such situations, the term‘risk’ which can be quantifiable can be used 
interchangeably and without differentiation with the term ‘uncertainty’which is a subjective 
probability. Decision-makers see project outcomes as risks, but only in the sense that they 
lack the necessary reference data to undertake a calculation of the statistical probability of the 
uncertainty (Keynes, 1921,1937: Knight, 1957). These limitations can make it nearly impossible 
to draw up contracts that cover every contingency therefore necessitating reliance on rules of 
thumb (Chapman and Ward, 2003; Atkinson et al., 2006; Misund and Mohn, 2009).  
 Another underlying root cause of project underperformance is the pre-planned 
opportunistic behaviour by key vested interests leading to the approval of non-viable projects 
with unrealistic objectives. The actors with a vested interest in seeing such projects 
undertaken are corporate management and/or politicians who have strong influence and 
motives to get these projects approved. The corporate management resort to such intentional 
short-term behaviour for personal gains including enhancing their position with shareholders 
of the firm and other stakeholders. The political actors expect to gain significant political and 
personal capital from the contracts that will materialise from such project approvals. Such 
project sanctions may be done without ex-ante consideration of the human and material 
resources required to execute the tasks to meet the set objectives. This behaviour can also 
encourage under-estimating project costs, over-estimating project benefits and resorting to 
unrealistic project planning. Due to the long time period required for the development and 
implementation of major projects, the corporate management and/or the political actors 
involved in the project sanctions are often no longer in office when the outcome of the 
project can be assessed. As such, these participants in the sanctioning of non-viable projects 
can no longer be held accountable for the underperformance of the project execution 
(Flyvbjerg, 2003; Misund and Mohn, 2009; Sanderson, 2012). 
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 In some cases, such behaviour of the corporate management can be compounded by 
the inadequate expertise of the project management team to execute the transactions to meet 
unrealistic demands (Olsen et al., 2005; Misund and Mohn, 2009). The cumulative outcome 
of these actions can result in deficient technical specifications and incomplete commercial 
contracts.  In this situation, the established procedures and practices of outsourcing the 
execution of main project activities, such as engineering and construction, using contracts 
may no longer be sufficiently comprehensive enough to handle the complexities of major 
long term projects (Winch, 2002, 2008; Chapman and Ward, 2003). 
Another significant cause of the underperformance of major project transactions is 
that important strategic issues such as impact of relationships between the project participants 
can be underestimated in the execution of the activities.  In this situation, the argument can be 
made that conventional project management is too concerned with operational planning and 
fails to adequately address the relationships between the participants of the project, and 
whether there is potential for opportunism, guile and behavioural uncertainty (Atkinson et al., 
2006; Dixit, 2007; Sanderson, 2012). Major projects are typically characterised by several 
and diverse participants with conflicting motives rather than by a singular shared objective. 
This means that the different actors within a project understand the requirements and 
expectations from the project in very different, incomplete and often competing ways. An 
example observed in practice is that the contracts and agreements used to define and co-
ordinate the roles and responsibilities of the project actors are often lacking clarity in their 
intentions. This situation requires an expansion of the focus from the purely technical and 
operational tasks that need to be executed to achieve the project objectives. A much greater 
effort is required in formulating and implementing relationship arrangements between the 
various actors responsible for executing the project tasks. If project participants are not able 
to construct a relatively stable atmosphere, which encourages constructive co-operation 
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between different participants, there is a greater chance of project underperformance. This is 
due to projects being subject to often competing objectives, and motives of the participants 
can cause insurmountable difficulties in implementing management activities (Clegg et al., 
2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Atkinson et al., 2006). 
In addition to causes of project transactions discussed above, it has also been found 
that potential for such failures is more prevalent when project transactions have to be 
conducted across national boundaries (McKenna et al., 2005; Wood Mackenzie, 2010).  The 
internationalisation of project transactions brings new actors into play.  This can cause new 
challenges in the form of potential opportunistic intervention by the host government and 
inadequate institutional arrangements for protection of property rights of organisations 
responsible for execution of the project (Olsen et al., 2005; Scott et al., 2012).  An example 
of this is transactions required to execute offshore oil and gas exploration and production 
(E&P) projects by international oil and gas companies (IOCGs) as indicated by industry 
journals (Wood Mackenzie,2010; KPMG, 2011). 
 The conclusions to be drawn from the discussions in the earlier sections are that in 
addition to technical and operational complexities, the causes for project failures can be 
summarised as incomplete information on the future state of affairs causing non-quantifiable 
uncertainties, bounded rationality of the decision-makers and opportunistic behaviour of 
participants in transactions. In the case of international projects, additional challenges can be 
posed by the political and institutional context of the host country.  The failure of major 
projects to meet their targets can be due to inappropriate or undeveloped governance 
arrangements that are incapable of mitigating the emergent turbulence inevitably connected 
with the exogenous and endogenous challenges associated with these projects. Conscious 
design and creation at the front-end of the project of governance capacity or ‘governability’ 
appropriate to the particular context of the project is required to mitigate turbulence that 
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emerges over the life of the project and to ensure co-ordinated behaviour of the participants 
(Miller and Lessard, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Atkinson et al., 2006). In general, these 
governance mechanisms are required to formulate and implement stronger, more co-operative 
and more flexible relationships between project participants. There is also an explicit 
recognition, however, that the governance mechanisms selected and designed must be 
appropriate to the particular context and characteristics of a project (Atkinson et al., 2006; 
Winch, 2008). 
 In the case of major international projects there is the need for the identification of the 
required governance mechanisms to ensure that the relationships between the host country 
institutions and participants of the project are organised and managed effectively (Dixit, 
2007; Misund and Mohn, 2009).  
1.2.3 Rethinking Management of Major International Projects 
 Orthodox project management has typically focused on those with a direct and formal 
role and responsibility for managing the project. This is because the project is given a priori 
status as an object, a property of the organisations carrying it out, with pre-specified content 
(objectives, designs and methods). It is therefore a thing to be managed by a discrete group of 
actors, called project managers, who are deemed to have the necessary knowledge, wisdom, 
experience and expertise (Atkinson et al., 2006). However, the underlying causes of failures 
of major international complex projects support the proposition that there is a requirement for 
rethinking management of such projects.  This is in line with the proposition that companies 
will be required to change their strategies if the industry in which they are operating 
experiences significant structural changes, as is the case with internationalisation of major 
projects (Porter, 1980, 1996: Ansoff, 1990).  This rethinking of the management of 
international projects requires appropriate governance mechanisms to provide the dimensions 
of authority, decision-making and accountability, taking into account specific characteristics 
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of the transactions to be executed. In addition, such governance mechanisms will be required 
to steer and direct the different actors to encourage an alignment of objectives and behaviours 
(Williamson, 1995; Miller and Lessard, 2000; Dixit, 2007;Sanderson, 2012;).   
 Williamson defined a governance structure as an “Institutional framework in which 
the integrity of a transaction or related set of transactions is decided” (2005, p. 11).  Thus, 
governance structures need to determine who has power, who makes decisions, how other 
players make their voice heard and how the account is rendered specifically. Governance thus 
consists of formal structures and rules that enable project transactions to be carried out in an 
economising manner (Williamson, 2005).  
 In a broad sense, all main causes of project failures require that actors should prepare 
with farsightedness for the future. This is only possible if actors are sufficiently farsighted to 
consciously design an ex-ante collaborative project culture that will effectively handle likely 
events in a project. Thus, the ex-post transaction problems can be more effectively addressed 
if the experience and judgment of the actors is farsighted enough to know the range of 
possible future events, to rank them based on subjective probability, and prepare appropriate 
governance mechanisms ex-ante to manage those events during the transactions. In this case 
the emphasis on project governance is as a form of organisation that can be consciously 
designed ex-ante and the performance problems are a result of misaligned or underdeveloped 
governance mechanisms. These propositions provide some vital insights for building 
organisational infrastructure, capabilities and culture, what might broadly be called 
governance capacity, to facilitate trusting and collaborative behaviours in the face of 
uncertainty to enhance project performance (Williamson, 1985, 1996; Clegg et al., 2002; 
Atkinson et al., 2006).  
The arguments presented above provide the basic requirements of a conceptual model 
for predicting governance mechanisms for managing major transactions across national 
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borders. The predictive capabilities of this model are required to align the most appropriate 
governance mechanisms with the economic and political characteristics of the international 
transactions. To develop this framework an evaluation was carried out of the alternative 
governance mechanisms discussed by new institutional economics and mechanisms required 
to manage political hazards caused by host country institutions. 
1.3 Development of the ResearchApproach 
1.3.1 Theory of the Firm and Governance Mechanisms 
 The focus of this research was developed in the earlier sections as the formulation of 
an extension to existing theory on governance mechanisms to manage the transactions of 
large international projects subject to PEST challenges.  For this purpose, it is necessary to 
evaluate the competing theories of NIE to examine the strengths and limitations of 
governance mechanisms proposed by them to minimise ex-post regret due to the potential 
failures of transactions identified in Section 1.2.   
 The new institutional economics (NIE) is an interdisciplinary approach combining 
research from the fields of economics, law, social and political sciences, organisation theory, 
and strategic management.  As such, NIE goes beyond the conception of the firm as a black 
box production function and considers the firm as possessing an internal governance structure 
(Coase, 1937, 1960; Klein, 1989).  NIE focuses on institutions which define the rules of the 
transactions and on how institutions interact with organisational arrangements.  Thus, the 
theoretical framework of the new institutional economics introduced and combined the 
concept of transaction costs with the role of institutions, to propose that institutions are a 
medium not only for reducing transaction costs but also for achieving increased efficiency in 
economic performance.  For this, NIE has used two approaches: one to develop a micro 
analytical approach to the nature of organisations and another to generate a macro analytical 
approach that investigates the relationships between institutions and economic performance, 
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as well as institutional change processes. The new institutional economics has utilised these 
approaches, which are mutually inter-related, to investigate institutions and how institutions 
interact with organisational arrangements within an economy to carry out all such 
transactions that would result in social efficiency gains (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1975; 
North, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  The firm is thus understood by NIE as an 
institution created by economic actors in order to reduce market failures and transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937, 1960).   
 The microanalytical approach in NIE has two main strands. The first is the principal 
agency-theoretic (PAT) component,which views the firm as a nexus of contracts between a 
principal and several agents to produce value. Second, the transaction cost economics (TCE) 
component which considers the firm as a set of institutional and contractual arrangements 
(Williamson, 1984; Cheung, 1987; Eggertsson, 1990). In the discussion that follows, the 
strengths and limitations of each of these components for understanding the management of 
complex international project transactions are examined. The key underlying assumptions of 
each theory are discussed. The thesis is interested in how far each of these approaches to 
transaction governance might be useful for interpreting the challenges of managing complex 
projects across borders and for suggesting potential solutions to these challenges. 
1.3.2 Principal Agency Theory and Major Transactions 
 Principal agency theory (PAT) defines the economic exchange relationship between 
two parties: the principal and the agent, where the principal hires the agent to carry out a task.  
The principal-agent relationship, in which the principal delegates work to the agent, is based 
on contracts, which is the focal point of agency theory. The PAT has separated ownership 
and control and has extended the neoclassical model by adding agents to the firm. The 
agency theory objective is to determine optimal contracts between the principal and agents. 
For this, PAT assumes that participants in the transactions possess the necessary expertise, 
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capabilities and facilities to handle the scope and activities of the transactions with which 
they are faced. The agent tries to maximise personal gains by satisfying the principal's 
economic objectives and the agent's commitment level is the function of perceived reward 
value for satisfying those objectives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Hendrikse, 2003). 
 A basic feature of PAT is the assumption that the two parties to a contract can have 
different motives which could be in conflict; it thus assumes diverging goals of the 
cooperating parties. The principal always wants more for less and the agent wishes to deliver 
the minimum possible effort that he or she can get away with. The principal wants to 
maximise his/her benefits while minimising reward to the agent who also wants to maximise 
his/her benefits. In a situation where the principal delegates work to the agent, level of reward 
to the agent usually depends on the principal's interest in realisation of the assigned mission. 
A benefit to the agent, in the form of reward, represents cost to the principal, while the 
agent's effort brings benefits to the principal (with an assumption that higher effort is directly 
related to better results), and at the same time cost to the agent. The problem here is that the 
principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately and cannot monitor every 
action that the agent undertakes. The collection of this information by the principal may also 
be costly, if at all possible (Wieland and Ulbrick, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Stiglitz,1987; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendrikse, 2003).  
 Overall, the domain of agency theory is based on relationships that relate to the 
principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative behaviour, despite differing goals and 
differing attitudes toward risk. Because the unit of analysis is the contract governing the 
relationship between the principal and the agent, the focus of the theory is on determining the 
most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship. In this case, the principal 
uses a contract either as a basis for monitoring the agent’s behaviour or, if monitoring is too 
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costly, to incentivise the agent to reveal what they are doing (Wieland and Ulbrick, 1973; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 The assumptions in market transactions are that economic agents seldom have full 
information about the goods or services being bought or sold, and full information about each 
other. These assumptions describe a market where there is imperfect information for reasons 
such as accurate information being too costly, or impossible to obtain, for important decision 
characteristics. This imperfect information in a market transaction may be only one sided, or 
may impact both parties. Therefore, information can be seen as a valuable economic factor in 
contracts and the level of uncertainty that can ultimately determine the outcome. In this 
situation, imperfect information can be due to information asymmetry, and/or incomplete 
data. Information asymmetry occurs when one party knows more than the other about their 
capabilities and behaviour. The incomplete data results in uncertainty when both parties are 
to some extent unsure about what might happen in the future (Stiglitz, 1987; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Nicherson and Bigelow, 2008). 
 Asymmetric information is a situation in which economic agents involved in a 
transaction have different information. In such situations, information that is distributed 
asymmetrically between economic agents will influence economic behaviour and operation 
of the market. Two forms of asymmetric information are categorised as ex-ante (pre-
contractual of the transaction), or ex-post (post-contractual of the transaction). In the analysis, 
ex-ante asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection,and ex-post asymmetric 
information can result in moral hazard (Stiglitz,1987;Eisenhardt,1989; Nicherson and 
Bigelow, 2008). 
 Adverse selection is a situation where one party in a transaction knows something 
about its own characteristic that the other party does not know. Adverse selection is often 
referred to as a hidden information problem in a market, where the agent may know more 
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about the requirements of the transaction than the principal and vice versa.  Adverse selection 
also refers to the situation where the principal is not able to determine ex-ante if the agent has 
the expertise and resources to carry out the activities in line with the contractual terms 
(Shapiro, 1989: Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendrikse, 2003;). 
 Moral hazard refers to situations where one side of the market cannot observe the 
actions of the other is sometimes referred to as a hidden action problem.  Moral hazard occurs 
under a type of information asymmetry where the risk-taking party to a transaction knows 
more about its intentions than the party paying the consequences of the risk. In such 
situations moral hazard occurs when one party makes the decision about how much risk to 
take or takes more risks because the other party bears the consequences if things go badly 
(Krugman, 2009). Thus, a moral hazard may occur where the actions of one party may 
change to the detriment of another after a transaction has been initiated.  Moral hazard also 
arises in a principal-agent relationship where one party usually has more information about 
his or her actions or intentions than the other party. Thus, moral hazard can occur when the 
party with more information about its actions or intentions has a tendency or incentive to 
behave inappropriately from the perspective of the party with less information.  An example 
is when the agent may have an incentive to act inappropriately (from the viewpoint of the 
principal) if the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned and the principal 
cannot completely monitor the agent. Thus, the results of moral hazard are an increased 
probability of undesired outcomes for one party, post-contractual (Wieland and Ulbrick, 
1973; Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 1989; Hendrikse, 2003).  
 When the contracts are complete and enforceable, the transactions can be executed 
in the most economical way with minimum intervention by the principal, as discussed by 
different researchers (Eisenhardt, 1989; Klein, 1989; Whittington, 2001).  
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However, potential contractual hazards can arise due to information asymmetry. Thus, when 
there is information asymmetry,problems of adverse selection and moral hazard are 
inevitable. In such situations, the PAT resorts to managing the risks in the contract by 
utilising resources to control the price, output and incentives (Wieland and Ulbrick, 1973; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Shapiro, 1989; Hendrikse, 2003).  
 The imperfect alignment of the agency contract due to information asymmetry 
inherently leads to an encouragement of moral hazard. In such situations, in order to curb 
moral hazard, the principal has to supplement PAT arrangements by the use of monitoring 
and incentive contracts. As a result, the principal will incur additional transaction costs in 
order to monitor the agent’s performance and ensure compliance with the contract, as once 
the contract is signed the principal’s monitoring availability may be limited. In such cases, 
the principal will not know whether the agent is acting in accordance to the principal’s 
interest once the contract has been entered. It can be expected that the self-interested agent 
will shirk on the contract and carry out actions that are not in the interest of the principal 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Klein, 1989; Shapiro, 1989;Hendrikse, 2003). 
 Where it is not possible to monitor the agent effectively, it may still be possible to 
assess the agent on the basis of outcome.  Under these circumstances, the principal may need 
to adjust the agent’s reward or impose penalties according to performance.  However, 
rewards and penalties for transactions can only be adjusted according to the relative power of 
the participants (Klein et al 1978; Hendrikse, 2003).  Thus, existence of asymmetric 
information explains why the principal offers incentive and reward contracts to agents in 
addition to monitoring the behaviour of agents to ensure return on their capital. The extent of 
the monitoring and incentives required will depend on the potential of the agents for 
opportunistic behaviour and the costs and benefits related to its implementation. Contractual 
conflicts need to be mitigated by introducing a compensation scheme, in the form of a risk 
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premium, where rewards are based on outcome. These strategies try to alleviate the effects of 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems from informational asymmetries, where costs to 
address these information deficiencies are too expensive or impossible (Klein, 1989;  
Shapiro, 1989; Hendrikse, 2003).  The increases in the agency costs for major transactions to 
curb the impact of information asymmetries will depend on the ability of the principal to find 
mitigating solutions to measuring performance of the agents and determining effective 
incentives to limit opportunistic behaviour (an inclination in the human) and moral hazard. 
These mitigation measures by the principal often turn out to be grossly expensive 
arrangements, since each possibility cannot be adequately determined for long term contracts 
or even known, and it will be costly to resort to legal means (Klein, 1989; Hendrikse, 2003). 
 In the case of major complex international transactions, there are many unknown 
contingencies that either cannot be determined in advance at all or cannot be determined 
efficiently, due to asymmetry of information (Klein, 1989; Whittington, 2001). Also, there is 
the possibility that in this case either future contingencies cannot be probability mapped or, at 
the very least, possibility sets cannot be identified or assigned in the contractual 
arrangements.  Consequently, faced with such a dilemma, it is not always possible to draft 
complete contracts for transactions, and it is possible that whatever actors cannot envisage 
before making a choice, later becomes an issue and causes contractual conflicts (Raiffa, 
1968; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Based on the limitations of the PAT and the consequences 
discussed in this section, the proposition can be made that principal agency contractual 
arrangements are not the most economical way of managing the increasing commercial and 
technical hazards faced by major long duration projects. The challenges faced by the 
international projects can be dominated by the political hazards and issues of property rights 
protection of the host country.  These challenges represent more known uncertainties than 
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risks to the transactions and will require specialised governance mechanisms, as discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
1.3.3 Research Focus on Transaction Cost Economics 
 The causes for the underperformance of major international project transactions when 
carried out by several participants in a joint venture were discussed in Section 1.2.  The 
identified causes of failures of major projects support the proposition for rethinking 
management of international projects.  In this case, the focus is on appropriate governance 
mechanisms proposed by NIE to provide necessary dimensions of authority, decision-making 
and accountability for such international projects, taking into account host country 
institutional arrangements ( Chan and Hwang,1992).  This will be required to steer and direct 
the different actors to encourage an alignment of behaviours and objectives. In order to 
achieve this aim, a theoretical framework is required for the prediction and application of the 
most appropriate governance mechanisms aligned with the characteristics of the transactions 
(Williamson, 1995; Miller and Lessard, 2000; Atkinson et al., 2006; Sanderson, 2012). 
 As discussed in Section 1.3, PAT (one major component of NIE) is based on 
assumptions of rationality and quantifiable risks and uses contracts as the vehicle for 
governance of transactions. However, limitations of the PAT may cause information 
asymmetry and the consequences (including incomplete data as discussed in Section 1.4) led 
to the proposition that agency contractual arrangements are not the most economical way of 
managing major long duration projects. 
 Transaction cost economics (the second major component of NIE) revises the 
traditional definition of a firm from a generation capacity to an organisational form of 
governance arrangements. The TCE model advocates use of characteristics of the transaction 
as the criterion to predict appropriate governance mechanisms.As transactions incur costs, 
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these transactions must be governed based on the characteristics of the transactions to be 
executed; some governance arrangements lead to better outcomes than others. 
         In order to develop this TCE framework, Williamson proposes two assumptions which 
can cause conflicts in transactions and classifies these as: human and environmental 
(Williamson, 1975, 1995). For the human factors, the first cause is bounded rationality when 
human behaviour has only limited knowledge, even though at times it is considered to be 
completely rational. As such, people do not have complete knowledge or have limited data 
available to predict and plan with reasonable confidence for all the different possibilities that 
may emerge (Simon, 1960; Mintzberg, 1994). The second human factor is opportunism 
where self-interest is practiced with guile. The role of opportunism in the context of TCE is 
that some participants to transactions might try to further their gains by their opportunistic 
behaviour, either with guile or with stealth, or more aggressively in a blatant manner. The 
problem is that such opportunistic behaviour cannot be anticipated before contracts are 
agreed because it is not easy to determine who among the transaction participants are 
opportunists (Williamson, 1981,1996; Hart and Moore, 1999). Among environmental factors, 
uncertainty and complexity refer to conditions, unlike known risks, where it is not possible or 
becomes very expensive to predict the events that can impact transactions and the outcome. It 
will be extremely difficult to negotiate and draft contracts that include contingencies allowing 
for events which the contracting parties do not expect or have not experienced before (Raiffa, 
1968; Williamson, 1981, 1996). It was identified that the factors that contribute to the 
underperformance of long duration major international projects include bounded rationality, 
limited data available to predict and plan all the different eventualities, opportunism, 
uncertainty and incomplete contracts that can impact transactions and the outcome. As such, 
it was deemed that TCE, which addresses all these issues, is more related than PAT to this 
	 22	
research, which is to formulate a conceptual governance prediction model to manage the 
transactions of large international projects. 
 For this, Chapter Two presents the findings of the literature review carried out to 
ascertain the theoretical basis, capabilities and limitations of TCE to predict governance 
mechanisms for the execution of such projects.  
1.4 Format of the Thesis Report 
 The research process and format for the thesis is illustrated below in Figure 1.2.  The 
objective and scope of the research (covered in this chapter) is the extension of the basic 
transaction cost economics (TCE) model for the prediction of governance mechanisms in 
managing the commercial, technical and political challenges faced by major international  
projects. 
Chapter Two presents a summary of the capabilities and limitations of the basic TCE 
model. This TCE model, developed by Williamson (1975, 1981, 1985), advocates the use of 
characteristics of the transaction as the criterion to predict appropriate governance 
mechanisms. The limitations of this basic TCE model to address the impact of political 
hazards and property rights issues on transactions are discussed. 
Chapter Three examines how the challenges faced by major projects multiply in the 
international context with unpredictable institutional environments. These are due to potential 
hazards caused by behaviour of the host government, issues due to protection of property 
rights and increasing demand for local content in transactions. It then focuses on the 
theoretical explanation of these challenges to project governance arrangements.  Political 
governance mechanisms identified by comparative institutional analysis are developed to 
mitigate the consequences of the challenges posed by politically motivated hazards.   
 In Chapter Four, findings of the earlier chapters from the examination of related 
literature are used to develop an extension to the TCE basic model. This extended TCE 
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governance model is developed to show how the consequences of the hazards caused by 
political context of the host country and the level of protection of property rights might be 
mitigated. Research exploratory propositions are defined to explore the applicability of this 
extended TCE governance model to address the theoretical limitations of the basic TCE 
model for managing major projects executed across international borders.  
 Chapter Five presents the research philosophy and design for the field investigation to 
explore the applicability of the extended TCE governance model.  This investigation 
evaluates three case studies which are all based on major offshore oil and gas projects.  Semi-
structured interviews were held with industry project management specialists and their 
responses were used to develop the case study findings. 
Chapter Six presents the scope, specific features and execution aspects of a major 
offshore oil and gas development project, which is the common basis of the three case 
studies. 
Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine present the findings of the three case studies 
augmented by the interview responses.  The case studies are oil and gas developments of 
equivalent economic scale and with similar technical issues but carried out under varying 
conditions (i.e. low/medium/high) of political hazards caused by government intervention 
and protection of property rights.  The changes to the ex-ante governance mechanisms that 
were required to successfully complete the project transactions and the theoretical 
implications of the empirical evidence are discussed.    
Chapter Ten summarises the findings on the applicability of the extended TCE 
governance model to predict the governance mechanisms for high value, complex industrial 
projects executed across international borders.  Conclusions are drawn as to how the 
extended TCE model addresses the critique that the basic TCE theory is a static concept and 
is not sufficiently sensitive to differences in political and institutional context. From the 
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outcome the contributions to academic knowledge and industry practice are formulated.  The 
thesis concludes with proposals for further research on the subject. 
	
 








































Chapter 2 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS FOR MAJOR PROJECT 
TRANSACTIONS 
	
2.1 Theoretical Concepts of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
 This chapter presents the findings of the literature review carried out to ascertain the 
theoretical basis, capabilities and limitations of TCE to predict governance mechanisms and 
manage the execution of major projects.  Such a project is executed by several transactions 
over the project life cycle.  The transaction cost economics approach was developed by 
Williamson (1975,1981) expanding on the foundation laid by Coase (1937). The term 
‘transaction cost’ was initially proposed by Coase as relating to the costs incurred in 
obtaining a product or facility using the market facilities instead of having it created within 
the firm, i.e. vertical integration. Coase (1960) explains in his article “The Problem of Social 
Cost” the costs of executing transactions.  According to Williamson “the transaction is the 
appropriate unit of analysis, is that the unit of analysis needs to be dimensionalised, and that a 
discriminating alignment between transactions and governance structures plays a central role 
in the economics of organizations” (Williamson,1995, p.162).  In order to execute a 
transaction using the market, it is necessary to find out who the contractors are, then negotiate 
with them to obtain favourable terms, finalise the contract and then monitor the transactions 
to ensure compliance with conditions of the contract.   
 In essence, the fundamental concept is that the transaction cost consists of the cost for 
arranging a contract ex-ante and then monitoring and implementing it ex-post which does not 
include the production costs (Williamson 1981,1996, 2005).  As such, the transaction costs as 
include the following:- 
• Search and information costs which are required in establishing the product are 
available at the most minimal cost for the desired quality within the market 
considered. 
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• Bargaining costs which are required to negotiate acceptable terms with the agent, 
drawing up an agreement, and setting the agreement for execution.  
• Policing and enforcement costs which are the expenses incurred in verifying the 
compliance of the agent with the conditions of the contract and monitoring 
implementation of the necessary remedial measures. 
 
 Coase emphasises that the impact of the above costs must be understood to 
comprehend how the costs of transactions operate and the economic logic that drives them 
(Cheung, 1987). There are at least three main factors underlying the need for the above 
transaction costs.   
 The first point is that people can be constrained by bounded rationality as they do not 
have complete knowledge or have limited data available to predict and plan for all the 
different possibilities that may emerge (Mintzberg, 1994).  The second issue is that it is not 
possible to predict with reasonable confidence all the possible scenarios.  It will be extremely 
difficult to negotiate and draft contracts that include contingencies allowing for events which 
the contracting parties do not expect or have not experienced before.  Finally, even after 
protracted negotiations, the contract may be ineffective to such an extent that it cannot be 
implemented even by resorting to legal means. Thus, the overall conclusion reflects that 
contracts for major transactions can neither be completely drafted nor implemented in full 
(Alchian and Woodward, 1987; Klein, 1989). 
 In addition to the above issues, Williamson (1985) identifies the problem where 
transaction partners might deliberately exploit the weakness of other partners in a calculated 
opportunistic manner to enhance their rewards.  Although everyone will not act in this 
blatantly opportunistic manner, the prevalent state of bounded rationality discussed above 
will make it extremely difficult to identify such dishonest behaviour.  In order to protect 
against such blatant dishonesty, it is necessary to select transaction governance mechanisms 
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that can prevent excessive cost escalation in completing the transactions.  In view of these 
contractual pitfalls, the governance mechanisms must be selected which can vary in their 
organisation arrangements with regard to the required flexibility, procedures, and contract 
laws.  The coordination of such governance mechanisms required for specialised transactions 
can become extremely challenging (Klein et al 1978, Williamson, 1985, 2000; Klein, 1989). 
 In order to overcome the limitations of market mechanisms, TCE theory expands on 
the foundation laid by Coase (1937) and models internalising the transactions within the firm, 
i.e. vertical integration as an alternative to using the market.  In this manner, markets and 
firms are substitutable for executing transactions (Williamson, 1975, 1995).  The TCE theory 
concentrates on asset specificity which is inevitable in major transactions. The requirement 
for the firm is justified by TCE on the grounds that it effectively minimises costs by using 
vertical integration and purchase expenses by utilising accessible markets.  In this case, of 
greater asset specificity of the products, there is higher probability that the firm would 
generate them inside or obtain them through joint ventures and partnerships (Williamson, 
1975, 1981).   
An argument of Coase (1960), based on the proposition by Knight (1957), is that 
uncertainty and human behaviour are the reasons for increased cost resulting from market 
transactions. This leads to the argument that when we find that using the market for 
transactions turns out to be more expensive compared to internalising these arrangements, 
then such transactions need to be internalised.  However, internalising transactions within a 
firm also involves costs such as management and coordination costs.  Thus, we find a 
significant contribution made by TCE is to revise the traditional definition of a firm from a 
generation capacity to an organisational form of governance arrangements. As transactions 
incur costs, these transactions must be governed based on the characteristics of the 
transactions to be executed; some governance arrangements lead to better outcomes than 
	 28	
others (Hart, 1988; Hart and Moore, 1990).  This is a situation where boundaries of the firm 
are determined by the need to economise on transaction costs between using the market and 
those of internalising transactions, i.e. vertical integration (Williamson, 1975, 1981).  Thus, 
TCE emphasises that governance is the mechanism to ensure minimisation of conflicts in the 
transaction, in order to maximise the efficiency of the transaction.  
 In order to develop this framework, Williamson proposes two assumptions which can 
cause conflicts in transactions and classifies these as: human and environmental (Williamson, 
1975, 1995). For the human factors, the first cause is bounded rationality when human 
behaviour has only limited knowledge, even though at times it is considered to be completely 
rational (Simon, 1960). The second human factor is opportunism where self-interest is 
practiced with guile.  Among environmental factors, uncertainty and complexity refer to 
conditions, unlike known risks where it is not possible or becomes very expensive to predict 
the events that can impact transactions and the outcome (Raiffa, 1968; Williamson, 1981).  
These assumptions and their outcomes are discussed in the next section. 
2.2 The Applicability of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
2.2.1 TCE Assumptions and Variables 
 The main contribution of TCE is that it is an influential effort to define a hypothesis 
that relates the structure of firms to their transactions.  Literature has a tendency to regard the 
firm as a mechanism which turns inputs into outputs and the internal processes of which are 
not thought to be critical (Cheung, 1987).  In this situation, the basic principle adopted in 
TCE is that mechanisms of governance must be capable of handling any potential contractual 
hazards that can be encountered by the transactions.  Thus, if we use a straightforward 
governance mechanism to deal with a complex exchange this would risk contractual 
breakdown.  However, using a specialised governance mechanism to deal with a basic 
exchange would cause additional costs without any increase in benefits (Williamson, 1981, 
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1996; Hart, 1988).  As such, for the prediction of governance mechanisms for difficult and 
complex transactions, the governance mechanisms of market, vertical integration, and a 
hybrid of the two need to be considered.  These should not be analysed alone but should 
remain constantly in connection to each other for the purpose required (Hart, 1988; Caniels et 
al., 2012).  
 Williamson’s efforts are well within the envelope of economic logic as it assumes that 
firms are profit maximising and that profit maximisation is achieved by minimising the costs 
while producing the output.  Thus, TCE can be classified as an equilibrium theory that 
assumes participants of the transactions are subject to a prevalent state of bounded rationality 
and highlights transaction costs in addition to production costs.   
The production costs according to Williamson are equivalent to the costs of 
constructing and operating a perfect machine.  An analogy to this is that any engineer would 
confirm it is not always possible to achieve a machine which complies one hundred percent 
with the required performance specifications.  There can be operational defects such as 
friction between the components of the machine.  If we use this analogy for commercial 
transactions, an ideal machine would be a market in which all the necessary information is 
available to all parties with perfect competition to enable the market to function with 
maximum efficiency.  However, any variations from the ideal market, which are normally 
termed as ‘market failures’, will result in additional transaction costs to firms when they have 
to purchase or sell goods and services (Williamson, 1981, 1995; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  
 Considering the inevitable case of market failures, a theoretical approach has been 
developed (by Williamson) to make TCE operational in three steps.  The first step is to 
consider a transaction as a basic unit of analysis and define the characteristics of the 
transactions and their differences.  Williamson defines three variables of frequency, 
uncertainty and asset specificity that should be considered when deciding whether market, 
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hierarchy or a hybrid arrangement of the two will have the lower transaction costs in various 
circumstances.  The next step is identifying the strengths and limitations of alternative 
governance mechanisms.  Finally, the development is completed by the application of a 
discriminating alignment hypothesis, that transactions can be executed in the most 
economising way by aligning the governance mechanisms to the characteristics of the 
transactions.  There are two main assumptions that Williamson makes which underpin this 
theory: bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1981, 1996).  
 Bounded rationality refers to the fact that people have limited ability to store, retrieve 
and process all information and knowledge potentially relevant to decision-making.This can 
be compounded by inadequate data for evaluation to resolve issues that confront them in 
making decisions.  Participants to major transactions face this situation of limited rationality 
despite the fact they may have extensive experience and a high level of expertise.  However, 
they still cannot predict the potential outcome of alternative courses of action (Simon, 1960;  
Mintzberg, 1994). 
 The role of opportunism in the context of TCE is that some participants to 
transactions might try to further their gains by their opportunistic behaviour, either with guile 
or with stealth, or more aggressively in a blatant manner.  In this case, these participants are 
not transparent with their intentions and tend to take advantage of unexpected developments 
to the detriment of other participants to the transactions in order to enhance their own benefits 
(Winch, 2002, 2008; Dixit, 2007).  The problem is that such opportunistic behaviour cannot 
be anticipated before contracts are agreed because it is not easy to determine who among the 
transaction participants are opportunists (Williamson, 1981,1996; Hart and Moore, 1999).  
Based on the above assumptions, the impact of the variables of frequency, uncertainty and 
asset specificity on transactions are addressed in the next section. 
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2.2.2 Variables Impacting Transactions 
 The real explanatory power of TCE is derived from the three variables of frequency, 
uncertainty and asset specificity.  We find that transactions can be continuous or uncommon, 
subject to low or high uncertainty and include specific or non-particular resources.  The 
argument is that these variables should be used to determine whether transaction costs will be 
significantly reduced in a market or using vertical integration or a hybrid of the two, as a 
mechanism of governance (Williamson, 1975, 1985,1996).  
 Frequency is the most effectively managed variable.  We do not envisage a scenario 
in which a firm would need to coordinate vertically in order to generate in-house the 
provision of items and expertise that are seldom utilised (Williamson, 1975, 1985).  For 
example, oil and gas firms will not want to create their own facilities for production of 
complex and costly project components because they rarely purchase these projects, i.e. once 
in four or five years (Scott et al., 2012).  
 Uncertainty, the second variable, is more complex to handle.  The issue with this 
variable is the difficulty involved in predicting the consequences that may occur during the 
transaction.  One undeniable element that can cause uncertainty is the period of time over 
which the transaction will occur.  Transactions that occur on ‘spot markets’ will have 
generally little uncertainty in light of the fact that there is no need to predict the future.  
Transactions like EPCI contracts for the main components of a major project include an 
arrangement lasting three to four years which has varying degrees of commercial and 
technical uncertainties built in.  Both the clients and contractors are required to plan for the 
long-term duration of the contract (Chapman and Ward, 2003).   
 However, a long-term arrangement adds to the uncertainty.  The contractor may go 
bankrupt amid the life of the agreement, subsequently putting the completion of a major 
project in danger. Uncertainty can be caused due to the difficulty inpredicting all conceivable 
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consequences that may arise during the long project execution ( Morris, 1986; Mintzberg, 
1994; Olsen et al., 2005).  Problems due to uncertainty can also be caused because of the 
danger of opportunism on the part of the contractor during the project execution.  The client 
may not be able to trust the figures that the contractor presents.  These factors raise the 
question as to whether uncertainty will be lessened by vertical integration of the transactions.  
In deciding this, it is important to evaluate the benefits and additional efficiency that can be 
expected, which will justify the incremental expenses of having large project management 
teams (Morris, 1986; Williams, 1997; Winch, 2008). 
 The third variable of a transaction is asset specificity which deals with the question as 
to whether physical and human investments made for a particular transaction can be 
redeployed to other uses without limiting their functional value.   Four main types of asset 
specificity have been identified which involve‘site specificity’, ‘physical asset specificity’, 
‘human asset specificity’ and ‘dedicated assets’. If the specificity of an asset is high, the 
lesser is the possibility of it being redeployed for other uses which would also make sunk 
costs high.  In the case of major projects, significant long-term investment is required in 
specialised physical facilities and to provide necessary professional skills.  For long-term 
transactions with a high level of high asset specificity, the partners to the transactions are 
locked into the contract even if the transaction is impacted by adverse developments. Also, 
asset specificity variables can create issues, due to the bounded rationality and opportunism 
associated with the long duration of such contractual arrangements (Williamson, 1975, 1985; 
Alchian and Woodward , 1987). In this situation,there is the potential for the parties to the 
major transactions to be ‘tied-in’ in a two-way or multiple-way relationship in an unbalanced 
manner due to two possible causes (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004).  The first cause is 
when parties to a future transaction must make non-transferrable significant investments 
before the transaction takes place (Dixit, 2007). The second cause is that specific 
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requirements for the optimal transaction such as the complete scope, quality levels required 
and time of delivery cannot be determined with certainty beforehand for long-term contracts 
with a high level of asset specificity.  In this situation, formulating a complete contract is not 
often feasible for reasons of unforeseeable external factors, lack of trust, and asymmetric 
information.  Such incomplete contracts can lead to the requirement for post-contract 
renegotiations.When both these causes materialise in transactions, i.e. incomplete contracts 
and the high asset specificity of the investments, this makes the investors vulnerable to ex-
post exploitation. Thus, an unbalanced handling of asset specific investments generates a 
hold-up problem (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004).  
 In the situation of a hold-up problem, two parties may be able to work most 
efficiently by cooperating, but refrain from doing so because of concerns that they may give 
the other party increased bargaining power, and thereby reduce their own profits. When the 
initial contract does not cover the long-term situations and is incomplete, contract 
renegotiation will be required. In this situation, the party with lower sunk costs tries to use 
this as leverage and is able to threaten to hold-up the other and stop executing the contract to 
renegotiate more favourable terms (Klein, 1989; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004). 
 According to Williamson’s theory and ceteris paribus, when asset specificity is high, 
the potential for hold-up can be expected to be reduced by utilising vertical integration rather 
than using the market. This is because when contracts for high asset specific transactions are 
incomplete, the hazard of opportunism on the part of participants may likewise increase, 
advocating the need for more vertical integration (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Alchian and 
Woodward, 1987). 
 The next section presents the alignment predicted by TCE between transaction 
variables of asset specificity, frequency, uncertainty and the governance mechanisms to 
address the issues discussed in this section.  
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2.2.3 TCE Governance Predictions 
 As discussed earlier, the application of the different organisational forms of the 
governance mechanisms classified as market, vertical integration or hybrid modes, has to be 
determined on the basis of the characteristics of the transactions to be managed.  Hybrid 
governance can be considered as the mode between the use of the market and vertical 
integration for specific transactions and can include joint ventures and relational contracting 
(Williamson, 1975, 1981; Heide and John, 1990). Williamson (1975, 1995) formulated a 
theoretical concept for predicting the optimum governance mechanism to align with the 
characteristics of transactions.   
 The fundamental issue is the contractual problems which can arise when some 
opportunistic agents participate in transactions with technological complexities and 
commercial challenges that breach the limits of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982; 
Mintzberg, 1994). This scenario of some opportunistic agents using asymmetric data to their 
advantage will potentially lead to commercial disputes.The potential for these contractual 
hazards is higher in market environments with high levels of uncertainty (Williamson, 1995; 
Hart and Moore, 1990).  For such situations, vertical integration is one mitigating reaction to 
this shortcoming of market contracting.  Thus, a basic premise of transaction cost economics 
is that the particular governance mechanism chosen to implement the market arrangements or 
the strategy of vertical integration is mainly to prevent hold-up and achieve economic 
efficiency objectives (Williamson, 1981,1995; Hart, 1994; Caniels et al., 2012). 
 Major projects are subject to encounter all the issues of uncertainties and asset 
specificity as discussed above.  For such projects, TCE theory would propose that costs and 
problems associated with executing the transactions sometimes favour vertical integration or 
in-house production as the governance mechanism and at other times favour the markets.  
The intermediate mechanism of ‘hybrid’ between these two extremes has now become more 
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applicable due to transactions for major projects becoming more complex and thus requiring 
increased flexible governance mechanisms.  The basic model for predicting the optimum 
governance mechanisms based on the TCE theoretical arguments discussed above can be 
illustrated as shown in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
Figure 2.1 - TCE Model - Predictions of Governance Mechanisms 
Figure 2.1 shows that as uncertainty and asset specificity increases, and the potential 
for hold-up therefore increases,the demands of transaction cost economising mean that 
market coordination gives way to hybrid governance (at T1) which is in turn replaced by 
hierarchy at T2 (Williamson, 1981, 1996). The basic proposition developed from the review 
of the transaction cost economics is that all forms of governance arrangements, i.e. vertical 
integration, market and hybrid, require transaction costs that can be expected to increase with 
rising levels of asset specificity and uncertainty associated with the transaction.  In this 
context, we can expect firms to choose the most optimum mode of governance mechanism 
providing the minimum transaction costs for the given level of asset specificity and 
uncertainty, which depends on the properties and complexities of transactions (Williamson, 
1981, 1996).  The application of this basic TCE model to predict the governance mechanisms 






















2.3 Application of the Basic TCE Model 
 The earlier sections reviewed the capabilities of the governance mechanisms to cope 
with uncertainties and asset specificity associated with the transactions of a major project. 
This raises the question as to whether a coalition of governance mechanisms may be required 
to manage project execution, if the degrees of uncertainties and asset specificities of the 
transactions vary over the project life cycle (Raiffa, 1968; Nutt, 1997; Nickerson and 
Bigelow, 2008)).  The asset specificities  of the various transactions of a major project have 
to be evaluated on a case by case basis.  As such, in order to develop the basic TCE model for 
the governance of transactions for a major project, variations in the commercial and technical 
uncertainties and asset specificities of the main transactions over the project life cycle need to 
be evaluated.  For this purpose, the life cycle of a major project like an oil and gas 
development can be considered to consist of three main successive phases of front-end, 
execution and operations.  The front-end activities are connected with engineering and 
economic feasibility studies, project scope definition, formulation of project execution 
strategy, and sanction.  This is followed by the execution of contracts for engineering, 
procurement, construction and installation (EPCI) of the major components by contractors, 
selected after a tendering process.  The final phase is the completion of the project execution 
and operation of the facilities to produce oil and gas ( Miller and Lessard, 2000; Olsen et al., 
2005 
A review of major projects reveals that overall uncertainty of the project is very high 
during the front-end phase as the end product to be achieved is still in the development stage.  
In the next stage, when the EPCI contracts for main components are executed, information is 
still incomplete and the parties have to deal with known risks and some uncertainties (Miller 
and Lessard, 2000 Olsen et al., 2005;).  The asset specificity of the transactions over the 
project lifecycle can vary according to the specification and function of the components in 
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the overall project infrastructure. In this case, it may be necessary to resort to a hybrid 
governance arrangement for this phase. In the final phase, when more information is 
available and the more complex activities have been completed, the transactions have known 
risks and low asset specificity.  As such, the application of the market mechanisms will be 
cost economising for these end of project transactions. The decline in the overall uncertainty 
and asset specificity over the project life cycle makes the case for a coalition of governance 
mechanisms for the transactions of a major project (Winch, 2008).  Recent research into use 
of a coalition of alternative governance mechanisms in complex projects, such as an oil and 
gas field development in Norway, supports this argument (Caniels  et al., 2012). The 
application of the TCE governance model based on this concept for successive phases of the 

































The optimum governance mechanism is predicted by the TCE governance model depending 
on the level of uncertainty and asset specificity associated with the particular transaction.  
However, the question now arises as to the applicability of the basic TCE model in predicting 
the economising governance mechanisms of major international projects when 
unpredictability is caused by political and institutional factors in the host country.  To answer 
this question, the critiques of TCE found in the literature are addressed in the next section to 
ascertain these limitations and identify any extension required to the basic TCE model. 
2.4 Requirements for an Extension to the Basic TCE Model 
2.4.1 Introduction to Critiques of TCE 
The basic proposition of TCE originates from the discriminating alignment 
hypothesis, according to which transactions that differ in their characteristics of asset 
specificity, frequency and behavioural uncertainty must be aligned with alternative 
governance mechanisms, in a transaction cost economisingmanner (Williamson, 1975, 1996).  
The claim is made that this micro-analytical proposition is an empirical success story 
(Williamson, 2000; Ruester, 2010). More than 900 studies including published articles, book 
chapters and empirical papers test the propositions based on TCE. Most of them support the 
theoretical basis and predictions of TCE, thus providing considerable support for its central 
discriminating alignment hypothesis (Ruester, 2010).  However, several multi-disciplinary 
scholars have raised some fundamental critiques of TCE so that “the field continues to offer 
many opportunities to plant, grow, and harvest new and value-creating research” (Nickerson 
and Bigelow, 2008). 
This research is about extending the capabilities of the TCE model for predicting 
governance mechanisms for transactions of major international projects.  Such transactions 
can be impacted by the host country’s political and legal context.  
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The standard TCE model is not without its critiques, and it has been challenged by a 
number of researchers (Hodgson, 2003; Foss and Klein, 2010; Nickerson and Bigelow, 
2008). Such critiques can loosely be categorised as sins of commission and sins of omission. 
Section 2.4.2 concentrates on the sins of commission, i.e. micro-economic critiques of the 
basic TCE model, for the prediction of governance mechanisms for maximisation of 
economic efficiency of transactions. Section 2.4.3 then focuses on the sins of omission,i.e. 
additional critiques of TCE relevant to this research with regard to its applicability for major 
international transactions. 
2.4.2 Micro-Economic Critiques of TCE 
The TCE model concentrates on an economic organisation generically in terms of 
minimising transaction costs related to incentive conflicts usually involving hold-up.  A 
significant limitation of TCE is that it is focused on outcomes of economic processes, and 
assumes that production costs are given and do not vary according to the governance 
mechanisms utilised. Thus TCE fails to address comparative costs for producing the output of 
transactions using the market or utilising in-house resources and facilities. As such, TCE 
generally disregards coordination type problems; the problem is to align incentives rather 
than to coordinate actions.  It can be argued that coordination type problems in major projects 
can give rise to different production costs, and these cost differentials may crucially influence 
the choice of governance mechanism (Hodgson, 2003; Foss and Klein, 2010; Nickerson and 
Bigelow, 2008). In addition, complexity of the product can lead to the need for competence 
development in the production process.  As such, TCE can also be criticised for the neglect of 
differential capabilities of the participants, which can give rise to different transaction costs.  
These cost variations may have an overriding influence on the decision to use the market or 
internalise the transactions. The argument is made that firms can build specific capabilities 
and engage in learning efforts that markets may fail to do.  
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Thus, firms may internalise activities if they can carry out these activities with a 
significantly lower production cost even if this is done in a non-transaction cost economising 
manner (Hart,1988; Kogut, 1991;Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997).  
Operationalisation of TCE does not provide a methodology for the direct 
measurement of transaction costs but focuses on the variables of the characteristics of the 
transactions.  This lack of measuring transaction costs means it is necessary to depend on 
estimations of the relationships between observed characteristics and the governance 
mechanisms.  If researchers succeed in measuring transaction costs, structural form models 
can be developed to better estimate the costs associated with failing to align transactions and 
governance mechanisms (Hart, 1988; Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997; Hodgson, 2003). 
A significant criticism of transaction cost economics is its pre-occupation with 
uncertainty caused by opportunistic behaviour of the participants to the transaction exploiting 
asset specificity.  In this case the uncertainty found in transaction cost economics does not 
reflect all dimensions of uncertainty (Argyres, 1996; Dixit, 2007; Ruester, 2010). There is 
another critical strand in the literature which focuses on the gaps in TCE (sins of omission) 
notably the failure of the model to address the institutional context; by which we mean how 
the rules of the game and norms of acceptable behaviour will differ across national contexts. 
It is this gap (particularly as it relates to institutions) that this thesis seeks to address.These 
issues are developed in the next section, as they have a direct bearing on this research. 
2.4.3 Sins of Omission in TCE: the Institutional Deficit 
The research focus was an academic challenge to extend the predictive capabilities of 
the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory to address the theoretical issues of governing 
high value, complex industrial projects executed across international borders.  As such, the 
impact of the behaviour of the host country’s political and legal institutions and the 
relationships between them and the investors has a primary impact on transactions.  
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Hence, in this context, the main and well established criticism of the TCE proposition 
is that it is a static micro-analytical self-enforcing proposition, taking the impacts of 
institutional environment and institutional arrangements as neutral (Acemoglu, 2003;Ruester, 
2010).  This is despite the extensive research literature generated on the impact of institutions 
on economic activities, led by North, who is considered as a pioneer of the NIE (Acemoglu, 
2003; Dixit, 2007).  The argument made by North is that the role of the institutions and the 
way they operate shapes economic performance of transactions.  Institutions are the rules of 
the game and are formally devised constraints that impact human interactions.  As a 
consequence, they structure incentives in exchange whether political, social or economic.  
Institutions, together with the technology employed, determine the cost of transacting and 
producing.  A set of political and economic institutions that facilitate low cost transacting 
makes possible efficient factors. In addition, when political constraints are absent, the free 
market process restructures behaviour rules, reduces constraints, increases institutional 
incentives and so encourages the exchange. In the case of international transactions, political 
and legal institutions generate rules and constraints that can shape economic performance of 
transactions in different countries (North 1990;Dixit, 2007; Acemoglu, 2012). 
A significant criticism of the TCE proposition is that uncertainty presented in TCE 
does not cover exogenous uncertainties that can impact transactions (Dixit, 2007; Acemoglu 
et al,2004; Ruester,2012). Uncertainties can be caused, in particular to international 
transactions, by the political and legal environments of the host country (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994; Chapman and Ward, 2003; Acemoglu, 2003).  In this context, environmental 
uncertainty refers to unanticipated political, economic or social developments in the host 
country in which the transaction is carried out. The quantification of these uncertainties is 
another factor causing problems in the application of the TCE model. This can be due to the 
fact that environmental uncertainty is a two-dimensional concept that entails elements of both 
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unpredictability and changeability (Klein, 1989; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Lipshitz and 
Strauss,1997). The potential for unpredictability and changeability will depend on the nature 
of the political regimes of host countries (Scott et al., 2012). 
A further criticism made of TCE is its apparent lack of consideration of property 
rights issues for the prediction of governance mechanisms for transactions.  The allocation 
and enforcement of property rights can become a major concern, particularly if the role of the 
state in the transactions is not neutral. The costs of delineating property rights for major 
transactions are high and can be incompletely specified.  As a consequence, other variables in 
the cost of transactions become important.  Well defined and confirmed property rights are 
much easier to exchange than those that are insufficiently defined and uncertain.  As can be 
expected, ex-ante failure in delineation of property rights of the participants can lead to 
enforcement problems and ex-post transaction regrets. For international projects, these causes 
can have the overriding influence on outcomes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Acemoglu, 
2003; Kim and Mahoney, 2010) 
2.4.4 Considerations for an Extended TCE Model 
 Despite the critiques, the TCE hypothesis that transaction characteristics must be 
aligned with governance mechanisms which differ in their costs and competencies in a 
discriminating manner, remains the solid foundation for predicting governance mechanisms 
(Foss and Klein, 2010; Ruester, 2012).  To counter the criticisms discussed in earlier 
sections, Williamson introduced the ‘shift parameter framework’ in 1991, proposing the need 
for extensions of the TCE model. This extension is to investigate the optimal choice of 
governance arrangements in response to dynamics in the institutional environment 
(Williamson, 1991). In addition, Williamson (2000, 2005) admits that human behavioural 
factors must be integrated with institutional exogenous factors to understand failures of 
transactions. Researchers have proposed that complementary theories are required to extend 
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the predictive capabilities of the basic TCE model for international transactions. These 
complementary theories need to have an interdisciplinary approach to extend the universal 
application of the TCE theory (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Acemoglu, 2003; Dixit,2007; 
Ruester, 2010; Foss and Klein, 2010;). In this situation, investigation is required to reveal 
how the impact of institutional arrangements, the multi-dimensional nature of uncertainty and 
property rights issues may bring about the requirement for specialised governance 
mechanisms for international transactions (Henisz, 2002; Caniels et al., 2012). 
 In conclusion, the basic TCE model examined in this chapter for the selection of the 
governance mechanisms for successive phases of a major project requires an extension 
because of the limitations of TCE discussed in this chapter.  This extension to the TCE theory 
is required to address the impact of the political context, institutional arrangements and the 
property rights issues of the host countries. As a pre-requisite to develop an applicable 
extension to the basic TCE governance model, the literature on political hazards and property 
rights is reviewed and discussed in Chapter Three.  
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Chapter 3 IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND PROPERTY RIGHTS HAZARDS ON 
GOVERNANCE OF PROJECTS 
	
3.1 TCE and Challenges of International Transactions 
3.1.1 Limitations of TCE 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the basic proposition of the TCE model is that 
transactions that differ in their characteristics of asset specificity, frequency and behavioural 
uncertainty must be aligned with governance mechanisms which differ in their costs and 
competencies, in a discriminating (mainly transaction cost economising) way (Williamson, 
1975,1981).  Based on the critiques of TCE discussed in Chapter Two, the TCE model can be 
criticised for being a static concept that ignores the impacts of the political context, behaviour 
of institutions and the environmental conditions (Acemoglu, 2003;Dixit, 2007;).  In addition, 
uncertainty is limited to behavioural uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Ward and 
Chapman, 2003).  A further criticism of the TCE model is its lack of consideration of 
delineation and enforcement of property rights for the prediction of governance mechanisms 
for the execution of transactions.  As can be expected, ex-ante failure in delineation of 
property rights of the participants can lead to ex-post transaction regrets. The requirement for 
an extension to overcome the limitations of the basic TCE model to predict governance 
mechanisms for managing such hazards is identified in Chapters One and Two.  
In order to develop this extension to the TCE model, the challenges faced by 
international projects are summarised in the next section. This is followed by an examination 
of the nature of the political systems in Section 3.1.3, as this will have significant impact on 
the political and property rights issues faced by international projects. The impact of the 
political hazards and property rights issues on international transactions are then examined in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.  
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The findings of these reviews are used in Section 3.4 to formulate mitigation 
measures in the form of political governance mechanisms to counter the consequences of 
these hazards.  
3.1.2  Challenges to International Projects 
 Historically, the main challenges facing major infrastructure projects such as oil and 
gas field developments have primarily been technical and commercial.  These issues cause 
co-ordination and integration challenges which are influenced by the scale and complexity of 
the project.  These challenges can also be compounded due to the large number of 
participants involved, the project’s visibility and its innovativeness.  The length of time 
required for project development and anchoring can also increase the project’s exposure to 
uncertainties.  These can be due to international economic factors and a partner organisation 
encountering financial difficulties and restructuring (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Winch, 
2002,2008).  
 In several cases these major projects are carried out on a fast-track basis with high 
asset specificity producing a unique challenge.  In addition, management of these major 
projects can become more challenging than ever in the face of the requirement for a joint 
venture arrangement of several organisations to execute such projects.  This arrangement for 
unitisation in major projects has become an increasing requirement to ensure economic 
feasibility and to spread financial risk.  This is often achieved through shared ownership 
where two or more firms contribute financial resources, personnel expertise and facilities in 
the formal arrangement of a joint venture. However, these arrangements can create basic 
conflicts due to variations in the principles and practices of participating organisations.  In the 
case of international projects, another issue to consider is that contracts for major components 
of the projects are drawn up to be executed in different locations (Winch, 2002, 2008; Olsen 
et al., 2005; Kim and Mahoney, 2010).  
	 46	
 As such, these contracts need to be extremely specific and comprehensive to meet the 
demands of different legal systems, regulatory requirements and specific site conditions.  
These issues lead to problems with property rights which could manifest in the form of 
internal uncertainties (Williams, 1997; Winch, 2002, 2008; Olsen et al., 2005).  For major 
ventures, economic logic suggests the division of resource between the parties can be carried 
out in the form of a packet of property rights, which can be divided among the partners.  This 
can be a commercially efficient arrangement, provided the property rights are delineated 
(Kogut, 1991; Kim and Mahoney, 2010). 
In the case of international projects where contractual transactions need to be 
executed across national borders, these challenges can be overshadowed by hazards that may 
be caused by the behaviour of the state and political institutions of the host country (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994; Scott et al., 2012). A number of institutions and firms of the host country will 
be participants to the execution of the project.  In this case, the relationship between the 
actors is very rarely a binary one between a single project sponsor and a single governing 
body; instead, there will be coalitions within networks of relations (Libecap, 1989,1998; 
Olsen et al., 2005; Merrow, 2012).  In addition, project parties and local institutions will be 
required to interface with other stakeholders, some of whom may be supportive of the project 
and others who may not (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Williams, 1997). These interactions 
can be considered as a dynamic social network with differences in motivation and 
preferences among the participants causing increased issues regarding property rights 
(Haugland and Reve, 1994; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). As major projects become 
increasingly international, it is inevitable that the effectiveness of existing management 
arrangements can weaken based on the level of political and legal hazards (Miller and 
Lessard, 2000).  
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In literature and in practice, inadequate regulatory guidelines exist for adherence to 
foreign countries’ laws and political regimes.   
This unregulated environment, within which billions of dollars change hands, leaves 
the project management teams struggling to manage the day-to-day project activities in a 
difficult environment. Given the sums involved, opportunism, corruption, greed and 
misconduct all appear to further complicate the environment (Misun and Mohn, 2009).  This 
has created a wide gap in the project governance spectrum.  Hence, the requirement is a 
reliable platform for forming and establishing relationships among political authorities, 
stakeholders and foreign investors (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Scott et al., 2012). The new 
challenges discussed above impose significant constraints for major projects when complex 
technological issues have to be managed in a foreign country with limited resources (Scott et 
al., 2012).  An assumption made by the TCE model is that it will always be prudent to use the 
market because of extra costs required for vertical integration.  We can expect this 
assumption to become invalid when institutional regimes and legal institutions are too weak 
to prevent opportunistic behaviour and ensure protection of property rights of the investors 
(Kim and Mauborgne, 1993; Scott et al., 2012). The intervention of the government and its 
institutions in favouring loyal providers of political support can be a source of considerable 
uncertainty to investors seeking to do business in these markets.  In this situation, the nature 
of the host country’s political systems and self-interested behaviour of the political elite, 
including the demand for increased local content, can impact the transactions as discussed in 
the next section.  
3.1.3 Nature of the Political Systems 
 Segmentation of political systems is as old as political theory itself, perhaps the best 
early example being Aristotle’s division between government by many, the few and the one. 
Modern taxonomies, particularly those which adopt a political economic approach, draw 
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heavily on this early work (Barker, 1995; Lord, 2013). An example of this would be Olson’s 
distinction between democratic, authoritarian systems (government by few or one) and 
systems of anarchy, which precede the formation of states or arise where political authority 
crumbles or cannot be efficiently exercised. In anarchies and in pre-civil society there is no 
state and no law, except for certain natural precepts discovered by reason (laws of nature).  
As this research is about the impact of political and legal institutions on transactions, only 
established political systems are considered further. In this context, not all political systems 
are alike when it comes to their approach to the regulation of the markets and the activities of 
the firm, particularly to foreign firms. Political theory literature proposes that some political 
systems are more challenging to the firm than others. This can be summarised in the context 
of three regime norms that are relevant to the modern era (Olson, 2000; Dixit, 2007; 
Kamrava, 2008, Engdahl, 2009).These norms are: - 
1. The democratic state which is characterised by an established constitution, rule of 
law, representative political parties and regular elections for the population to make 
their choice of government.  In this case, a democratic state’s interests in ensuring 
stability in the markets and promoting economic growth are aligned with those of 
civil society through the mechanisms of electoral competition (Olson, 2000). 
2. An authoritarian democracy is a governing system in which, although elections take 
place and a constitution limiting government powers exists, those in power ignore its 
requirements, because an adequate legal constitutional framework of civil liberties 
does not exist.  As such, authoritarian democracies are democracies only in 
appearance, not in substance, as all the window dressings of democracy of 
constitution, political parties and regular elections are present.  Typically, in an 
authoritarian democracy, the separation between state and the general population is so 
wide to allow the state to operate without any attention to the population.  Because the 
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press is heavily regulated and due to the lack of civil liberties, citizens are cut off 
from knowledge about the activities of those who exercise real power.  Thus, an 
authoritarian democracy sits somewhere between democracy and authoritarian 
systems and has characteristics of both.  Like full democracy, it shares some of the 
trappings of popular participation, most notably competition between parties and the 
use of periodic elections.  However, competition between parties does not proceed on 
a level playing field and voters seeking alternatives have only imperfect access to 
information on the alternatives.  Thus, the political forum for the state and society 
interaction is in the form of a few dominant political parties based on personalities 
and not on ideologies.  Under authoritarian democracies, freedom and individual 
liberty are lauded in theory, but derogated in practice.  The state is portrayed as 
freedom-loving and a ‘beacon of democracy’.  However, when forces threaten the 
status quo, there is no hesitation about implementing institutionalised violation of the 
rights of the people and individual liberties under the pretext of preserving freedom 
and security. In this case, unmitigated elitism permeates the political system and 
judiciary to dominate the social and economic institutions (Olson, 2000; Acemoglu, 
2003; Dixit, 2007; Kamrava, 2008). 
3. An authoritarian state is a form of political system in which the state power and 
political authority is concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite whether elections are 
held or not.  The ruling elite might be distinguished by nobility, religious ideology or 
military control and monopolises political power using it in a blatant manner. The 
authoritarian state is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not 
contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty. As such, an authoritarian state 
accepts exclusive territorial sovereignty as its right. It retains full power of 
expropriation and full power of imposition (i.e. the right of control over everything 
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and everyone). Maintenance of such power, in the absence of full support of the 
citizenry, requires the forceful suppression of any dissenting element except that 
which the government purposely permits or organises (Talmon, 1960; Olson, 2000; 
Acemoglu, 2003;; Kamrava, 2008). In an authoritarian democracy, the state 
institutions and the judiciary are not neutral and are instruments of the regime. There 
is an absence of the influence of civil societies and the collective desires of the 
population are not part of the equation.  This is to further the selfish interests of the 
ruling elite at the expense of shrivelling any opposition such as civil societies or 
political parties.  The state institutions provide protection to firms and individuals 
only insofar as they increase the return to the ruling elite. This is the case where the 
state behaves like a resident bandit plundering the society in a selective and 
calculating manner (Olson, 2000; Acemoglu, 2003; Kamrava, 2008).  
In a democracy, a continuum of ideal types of relationship between the state and the 
market ranges from socialism at one end to extreme laissez–fairism at the other end. In 
between these two extremes, there are forms of demand management by the state including 
Keynesian economics for economic planning designed to overcome potential instability 
inherent in market economies, or to make market economies function properly in a desired 
fashion. This continuum reflects the changing levels of state involvement both in terms of 
ownership of organisations and control over the activities of these concerns. The nature of 
intervention will broadly depend on the political and economic ideology. Many socialists and 
social democrats are inclined to support interventionism, as an agent of social change, and 
seeing state economic interventions as an important means of promoting economic 
advancement and greater social welfare.  Political conservatives who advocate free market or 
laissez-faire economics generally view government interventions as harmful, due to their lack 
of confidence in the state’s ability to effectively manage economic problems and their 
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consequences. That said, even politically conservative industrialists and financiers do 
sometimes support state economic interventionism as a means of protecting the power and 
wealth of a country, particularly via advantages granted to industries seen as nationally vital 
(Cox et al., 1997; Karagiannis, 2001; Lord, 2013). 
 Moreover, the state, irrespective of its political system, tends to be highly partisan in 
that it favours those groups and interests from which it draws its core support. Such state 
behaviour could be expected to be more blatant and opportunistic in non-democratic 
countries. In such countries, those perceived as being political and economic outsiders may 
expect to face discrimination, but in particular from the perspective of this research, 
economic discrimination. This includes foreign firms, which may find it difficult to gain 
access to the markets unless they are prepared to contribute to the sustainability of the 
regime. International insiders, by contrast, may enjoy all of the advantages and protection of 
local firms (Karagiannis, 2001; Lord, 2013). 
 The discussion on the nature of political systems in this section leads to the 
proposition that major projects carried out in countries with authoritarian democratic or 
authoritarian political systems can be subject to unpredictable political intervention. The 
basis for this argument is that institutional behaviour and operation of regulatory structures in 
these countries can be far more unpredictable and liable to change to a greater extent than in 
democracies. The state intervention in transactions in these non-democratic countries is often 
to benefit the narrow interests of the ruling elite and their supporters, as discussed in the next 
section. These challenges are in addition to the state’s intervention in markets to implement 
their economic and fiscal policies (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Scott et al., 2012). 
3.2 Impact of Political Hazards to International Projects 
 The nature of the political system of the host country and the extent of the state 
intervention in transactions will determine the magnitude of hazards faced by international 
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projects.  These hazards could lead to delays in completing the project and might adversely 
affect its commercial viability.  These concerns apply to projects in both economically 
advanced democratic countries as well as non-democratic countries.  In both cases, state 
intervention in the markets can be exercised using several fiscal instruments, excessive taxes 
and stringent environmental protection requirements. In authoritarian and authoritarian 
democratic countries, there is the greater probability for the host country government to 
impose an adverse taxation regime, demand conciliatory payments for approving project 
plans, or limit repatriation of revenue. The states in these countries can resort to corrupt 
practices in sanctioning projects and approving licenses, and as such the foreign firms will be 
required to make monetary concessions to authorities for approving project plans. This state 
behaviour may be done by stealth or in a blatant fashion without any regard to the agreed 
arrangements.  The adverse behaviour of the non-democratic governments can also take the 
form of creeping expropriation that can reduce the anticipated profit from the project 
transaction or affect the costs of the project’s activities (Kobrin, 1979; Kim and Mauborgne, 
1983; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Kim and Mahoney, 2010). In such countries, historically, the 
worst case scenario is the host country government nationalising the project where the project 
partners lost all their investment.  Although there are some recent examples of such events 
(i.e. nationalisation of oil and gas projects in Venezuela and Congo) the potential for this 
hazard has receded significantly (Kobrin, 1979; Anderson, 1999; Wood Mackenzie, 2010). 
Under all political systems, the strength and efficiency of the host country’s 
bureaucracy will be an important aspect of the state intervention in the markets, as the state is 
inseparably connected with bureaucracy (Weber, 1919). It is beyond the capacity of the 
politicians to manage the state structure without bureaucrats. The political system can 
condition the motives and behaviour of the country’s bureaucracy in exercising the desires of 
the state in the relationships between the state and the market.  In a democracy, the 
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bureaucracy can be expected to abide by the rules and regulations established by the state to 
benefit the general population. The bureaucracies in non-democratic countries may not have 
these checks and hence have greater propensity to resort to adverse behaviour and corrupt 
practices to further the entrenched interests of the ruling elite, than to act to benefit the 
investors (Wren and Bedeian, 2009). 
 In non-democratic countries, any opportunistic actions by the host country’s 
government in making changes to the legislation and regulations without any consultations 
with the investors can invariably have an extremely adverse effect on the profitability and the 
execution of the project. Such adverse changes may not be adequately defined or practiced 
with the required transparency to ensure that project transactions can be completed as 
planned with respect to production or profit sharing arrangements (Acemoglu and Johnston, 
2004; Dixit, 2007; Scott et al., 2012).  Governmental concessions, licenses and permits need 
to be obtained to commence and execute the project and must be maintained during execution 
of the project.  In addition, these are required to obtain financing from project partners.  In 
non-democratic countries, the chances are greater, due to economic opportunism, for 
unexpected unilateral adverse changes by governments to the terms and conditions of 
concessions and licenses. Such acts can seriously damage the technical and financial 
performance of the project. Due to these difficulties, companies operating in non-democratic 
countries can be expected to make concessions above those required to comply with the 
regulations (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Winch, 2002; Wren and Bedeian, 2009; Scott et al., 
2012). 
In addition to the above concerns, it is more likely that adverse changes in regulatory 
requirements by the government, irrespective of the country’s political system, can be 
directed at foreign multinationals in industries such as oil and gas production and 
communications whose outputs are extensively used. This is because the host country’s 
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political authorities are often suspicious of these international firms operating in these high 
profile industries and their objectives. As such, governments and their agencies are now more 
directly intervening in major projects that are of vital importance to the national interest in 
developing the host country’s infrastructure and its resources. These interventions in non-
democratic countries are typically in the form of introduction of stringent regulations and 
restrictive controls, without prior consultation, for the economic benefit of the ruling elite 
rather than for the common good (Henisz, 2000, 2002; Scott et al., 2012; KPMG, 2013, 2014; 
Woodmackenzie, 2012).    
Due to the importance of the economic and public nature of major international 
projects, the expectation of the host country is that the foreign firms may be profiteering at 
the expense of local companies or people. As such, the host government intervention, 
irrespective of the political system, may introduce statutory requirements to demand high 
local content in the transactions. In order to comply with this requirement, the investors will 
be required to form joint ventures with local firms. Moreover, in non-democratic countries, 
especially with an authoritarian government, the foreign firm may be compelled to form joint 
ventures with local firms which may not have the necessary expertise and facilities to execute 
the required activities. In these kinds of political regimes, local firms are put forward as joint 
venture partners on the basis of political patronage rather than commercial and technical 
competence (Henisz, 2002; Scott et al., 2011).     
 The conclusion drawn from discussions in this section is that transactions between the 
government and a foreign private organisation will be subject to varying levels of state 
intervention. In the case of all types of political regime, democratic or non-democratic, the 
motives and the expected behaviour of the government and broader polity on which the 
government relies for support, must be explicitly incorporated into an investor’s choices 
about the appropriate form of governance to manage the transactions.  In this case, 
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consideration must be given to the fact that political hazards may originate once an 
organisation has committed the capital.  
      Major international infrastructure projects require large upfront investment that cannot be 
easily written-off or replaced (Moran and Ghoshal, 1999; Scott et al., 2012).  Moreover, in 
the case of non-democratic regimes, it is more likely that governments may at some point 
face incentives to renegotiate the terms of an investment in order to redistribute an investor’s 
returns to other groups, such as local suppliers and the workforce, which provide it with 
political support (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Henisz, 2002; Scott et al., 2012).  This is is a case 
of public theft replacing private theft which can cause an additional hazard to the transactions 
by infringing on the property rights of the investors. As pointed out in Chapter Two, a 
critique of TCE is that protection of property rights in transactions is not part of the equation 
of the basic TCE model for predicting governance mechanisms (Henisz, 2000; Klein and 
Robinson, 2011). To address this, the issues of delineation and enforcement of property rights 
in transactions are discussed in the next sections.  
3.3 Impact of Property Rights on Transactions 
This section examines the arrangements for the delineation and enforcement of 
property rights in transactions between private parties and how these arrangements can be 
impacted if the state intervenes in these transactions. Then, in the next section, the argument 
is developed that the political regime type of the host country (i.e. democratic or non- 
democratic) will be an overriding factor in the extent and impact of state intervention on the 
delineation and enforcement of property rights arrangements in transactions. 
3.3.1  Delineation of Property Rights 
Property rights are inherent in transactions which incur economic costs associated 
with the transfer, capture and protection of rights.   
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The concept of property rights enforcement used in economics and legal literature is 
similar, but in the economics literature the focus is on who gets to own and manage the 
goods.  In this context, property rights must be established, use of the goods must be 
monitored, and control of rights must be enforced.  Thus, a broad definition of property rights 
is the exclusive authority to determine how and by whom a particular resource is used.  Thus, 
property rights may be seen as a bundle of separate and distinct rights over a particular 
resource, including right of personal use and right to demand compensation as a pre-requisite 
for its use by other people. Furthermore, property rights include the transfer of any or all of 
these rights to others either permanently by sale or temporarily through some form of 
contractual arrangement (Anderson and Hill, 1975; Alchian, 2008; Klein and Robinson, 
2011).   
Governments, via their designated organisations (public ownership or public 
property) as well as by private individuals and non-governmental organisations (private 
property), exercise property rights (Libecap, 1986; Barzel, 1997; Alchian, 2008). In 
transactions, property rights delineation is essentially formed and enforced by those 
participating in transactions and reflects the conflicting economic interests and bargaining 
strength of these participants. In this case, implementation of property rights ranges from 
formal arrangements, including regulatory instruments and legal rulings, to informal 
conventions and customs regarding the allocation and use of property.  These arrangements 
can determine decisions regarding use of the resource and hence the economic mechanism 
and the outcome of transactions.  In such situations, enforcement of protection of property 
rights can become an issue depending on the strength of the judicial system (Libecap, 1986; 
Eggertsson, 1990; Alchian, 2008). 
However, due to the expense of fully defining all the parameters of an asset, property 
rights are never fully delineated and economic conflicts can arise (Barzel, 1997).  As a result, 
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property is consequently in danger of being misappropriated by other parties due to 
opportunism and free riding behaviour (Demsetz, 1967, 1988; Barzel, 1997).  In this case, as 
a rule, legal rights enhance economic rights, but legal rights are normally not sufficient for 
the protection of economic rights.  The rights people have over resources are not constant; 
they are a function of their own direct efforts at protection, of other people’s attempts to 
capture and of government protection (Libecap, 1986). 
Of the available economic alternatives for major projects such as extracting oil and 
gas from major offshore fields, unitisation is not merely one of many potential solutions, but 
rather has become the norm for major projects.  In this case, the partners of the project 
venture provide resources in line with their allocation of the property rights to develop and 
produce the oil and gas.  This allocation is normally until the end of the production life of the 
field and a share of the revenue is the reward for the partners. In this case, the co-ordination 
arrangements within this unitised venture must be robust enough to resolve any issues 
connected with the contract, due to conflicting interests of the partners.  In this, considering 
the permanent nature of the contract, the property rights for project execution and operations 
to produce oil and gas are allocated to the partner firm with the largest share in the venture 
and hence the one with the most to gain or lose.  The balance of property rights is divided 
into packages and each package is allocated to the partner firm with the most expertise to 
manage that particular package.  In this case, property rights provide the basic economic 
rewards arrangement that shapes the division of the resource (Libecap, 1988; Kim and 
Mahoney, 2010; Klein and Robinson, 2011). 
In the case of major projects carried out by a coalition, the main reason for 
implementing property rights is the aggregate (common pool) losses that may result when 
rights are not adequately defined.  In these circumstances, values of the resources decline for 
several reasons.  First, because property rights to the resource are not defined and participants 
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need not have to consider the implications of their activities.  In this case, participants may 
use the resource too rapidly without consideration of the costs.  In addition, when competitive 
pressures arise, any inadequate definitions of property rights can encourage short-term 
thinking in managing transactions.  In such situations, the motivation for investment declines 
as potential participants may not be confident that they will be able to benefit from the 
expected economic returns due to insecure property rights.  Second, values of the resource 
may decline because alternative use of the resource to obtain higher returns can turn out to be 
more expensive and less efficient if property rights are not functional. Even when property 
rights to the resource are defined adequately, the success of the transactions will require 
enforcement and defence of these rights (Libecap, 1986,1989; Klein and Robinson, 2011). 
3.3.2  Impact of the State on Property Rights 
In the case of projects carried out across national boundaries, the delineation of 
property rights discussed above can be significantly impacted by the political context (i.e. 
regime type of the host country), whether it is an established democracy or not.  The 
intervention of the host country state via their designated agents can have a crucial effect on 
the initial delineation of property rights and resource allocation. In this situation, negotiation 
costs and other transaction costs may block the re-assignment of rights (Eggertsson, 1990; 
Alchian, 2008).  Thus, the property rights approach is not complete without a theory of the 
state, in relation to the delineation and enforcement of property rights. It can be argued that 
property rights are formed and enforced by political entities and that property rights reflect 
the conflicting economic interests and bargaining strength of those affected.  In a democratic 
country, the state can be expected, by using its regulatory authority and legal institutions, to 
enable organisations and private individuals to enforce legitimate contracts, and thus lower 
the costs of exchange.  We cannot expect this in a non-democratic country when the state 
does not use its power to enforce contracts in a fair and consistent manner.  Thus, the 
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distribution of political power within a country and institutional structure of its legal 
institutions, are critical success factors in the protection of property rights for transactions 
(Eggertsson, 1990; Barzel, 1997; Alchian, 2008).  
Libecap emphasises that property rights are determined through the political process, 
involving either negotiations among immediate group members or the lobbying activities that 
take place at higher levels of government. When the state is non-democratic, the political 
process of delineating and enforcing property rights can be divisive because of the 
distributional implications of different property rights allocations.  In such situations, if 
influential parties cannot be sufficiently compensated to win their support, the potential 
economic gains fostered by the proposed arrangement will be foregone (Eggertsson, 1990; 
Libecap, 1986, 1989; Hart and Moore , 1990; Alchian, 2008). As a result, the conflicts among 
the interest groups over the distributional effects of property can negate the agreed property 
rights arrangement. The outcome that ultimately emerges may bear little resemblance to that 
which was initially formulated (Libecap, 1998; Eggertsson, 1990; North, 1990;). 
A conclusion drawn from the above discussion is that an economic problem arises 
when property rights in international transactions have not been fully delineated due to the 
adverse intervention of the state. An example is the division of the rights to the oil and gas 
reserves in an offshore field between the host country and the international oil and gas 
company (IOGC) developing the field.  In this instance, disputes can arise between the host 
country and the IOGC over access to a common property resource.  Once ownership over the 
resource is established, the economic problem can be resolved.  In the real business world, 
we often find that rights to valuable resources in international transactions are not fully 
delineated if the state intervenes in an opportunistic manner ignoring the accepted norms of 
democracy. Even when property rights to the resource are defined adequately, however, the 
success of the transactions will still require enforcement and defence of these rights (Hart and 
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Moore , 1990; Kim and Mahoney, 2010). The issue of enforcement of property rights is 
discussed below. 
3.3.3  Enforcement of Property Rights 
When significant resources are involved in transactions, property rights must be 
monitored and the possession of the rights must be enforced. In the absence of self-
enforcement, corruption can impact the transactions because it increases the cost of doing 
business and distorts markets.  In such cases, the reason why ownership and enforcement of 
property rights becomes important is the incompleteness of contracts, especially applicable 
for major complex transactions (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). The 
parties to the agreement are forced to rely on legal rules and standard patterns of behaviour, 
which cannot, for practical reasons, be established or confirmed by detailed negotiation.  
Typically, each person takes for granted a set of rules and norms, and assumes that the other 
party does the same (Durkheim, 1984). 
The concept of property rights is closely related to the legal apparatus of recognition, 
enforcement and adjudication of property rights. Legal or quasi-legal apparatus, however 
rudimentary, is necessary to enforce and defend property rights in transactions. The 
preservation of property rights requires protection against public and private theft or fraud.  
Furthermore, in the case of disputes, the contracts rely upon legal systems and the judiciary 
for adjudication, often using written records of precedents and rules (Hart and Moore, 1990; 
Hart, 1994).  For private property to be relatively secure, a requirement is a pluralistic state 
with separation of powers, backed up by powerful and multiple interest groups in civil 
society. Most constitutional theories require that the judiciary is separate from and 
independent of the government, in order to ensure the rule of law - that is, to ensure that the 
law is enforced impartially and consistently no matter who is in power, and without undue 
influence from any other source (Knight and Sened, 1995). In established democratic states, 
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the doctrine of the ‘separation of powers’ has traditionally proposed that the state is divided 
into the separate and distinct arms of Executive, Legislature and Judiciary, whereby each arm 
acts as a ‘check and balance’ on the others.  With such a balance of power, a framework of 
constitutional law could be established, in which the interests of both the state and the 
population of the country could be protected to some degree. Thus, the legal institutions of 
the state are expected to enable organisations and private individuals to enforce legitimate 
contracts, and thus lower the costs of exchange.  We can expect this in democratic countries 
when the state does not use its power to prevent the legal institutions from enforcing 
contracts in a fair, systematic and consistent manner (Knight and Sened, 1995; Hodgson, 
2003). In established democratic countries with strong and independent judiciary the rule of 
law prevails, laws are part of socio-economic reality backed with the powers of the state legal 
system. The courts can be used to enforce the execution of contracts or to enforce the 
collection of damages for non-performance ( Sened, 1997; Hodgson, 2003). 
 In both authoritarian states and authoritarian democracies, by contrast, state power 
will often be used by the ruling elite to control the judiciary. Invariably, the legal 
enforcement personnel in these countries are dependent on the ruling elite for their survival 
and progress in office.  In an authoritarian state, control of the judiciary is exercised in a 
blatant manner, while an authoritarian democratic regime will resort to stealth and subtle 
means to influence the judiciary.  As such, legal relations in transactions in these countries 
can become mere fiction lacking the strength of enforcement (Sened, 1997; Hodgson, 2003).  
In conclusion, adequate enforcement of protection of property rights for international 
transactions will depend on the independence and strength of the legal system of the host 
country. Thus, the weakness and lack of independence of legal institutions in non-democratic 
countries are critical factors to be addressed in the protection of property rights for 
international transactions. Legal relations do not constitute the whole story, but they are 
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nevertheless vital. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, economics determines the allocation of 
property rights and the law is used to enforce these rights.   
As such, there is a difference between an economist's concept of property rights and 
the role of the law, but both have to work together to reach the final goal of securing and 
maintaining property rights (Sened, 1997; Hodgson, 2003). 
3.3.4   Dimensions and a Measurement Scale for Political Hazards and Property Rights 
 The arguments developed in the earlier sections demonstrate that the hazards caused 
by adverse host country government intervention in the market and judicial process can 
directly affect the governance of international project transactions.The discussions above lead 
to the proposition that major projects carried out in countries with authoritarian or 
authoritarian democratic political systems can be subject to significant unpredictable state 
intervention and property rights issues. These challenges are in addition to the state’s more 
typical interventions in markets to implement their monetary and fiscal policies 
(Kobrin,1979; Acemoglu  et al., 2004 ; Scott et al., 2012).  An important step in 
understanding the extent to which these hazards might impact on the governance of 
international project transactions, is to define the various dimensions of the hazard and to 
develop a scale for measuring these dimensions. This is presented in Table 3.1 below.  The 
likelihood and potential negative consequences of each hazard dimension are scaled as low, 
medium and high. 
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Scale of Hazards and their Consequences 
Low Hazard: Democratic Regime 
The state is characterised by an 
established constitution, rule of law, 
representative political parties and 
regular elections with electoral 
competition.  
Medium Hazard: Authoritarian 
Democratic Regime 
A governing system in which an 
adequate legal constitutional 
framework of liberties does not exist. 
High Hazard: Authoritarian Regime 
The state practices exclusive territorial 
sovereignty as its right. It retains full 
power  of expropriation and full power 
of imposition (i.e. the right of control 
over everything and everyone). 
Political:  




Intervention state in the markets for 
economic planning is to prevent market 
failures and markets function in the 
desired fashion. Alternatively, the role 
of the state can be neutral causing free 
market conditions.  
Governments and their agencies may 
take an approval role in major projects 
that are of vital importance to the 
national interest in developing the host 
country’s infrastructure and its 
resources. Such actions can cause minor 
delays in obtaining project approvals. 
High level of proven trust between the 
state institutions and investors, and 
promoting economic growth.  
 
Established and fair state bureaucracy 
which can be expected to abide by the 
rules and regulations established by the 
state to benefit the general population.  
Opportunistic intervention by state 
institutions in markets to benefit the 
narrow interests of the ruling elite and 
their supporters. 
 
Unpredictable political intervention 
by stealth in project transactions due 
to economic opportunism. State 
institutions can demand conciliatory 
payments for approving project plans. 
Potential for intervention by 
governments and their agencies in the 
award of major contracts for projects 
for developing the host country’s 
infrastructure and its resources.  
 
The competency and behaviour of the 
state bureaucracy is unpredictable. 
Greater propensity to resort to adverse 
behaviour and corrupt practices to 
further the entrenched interests of the 
ruling elite than to act to benefit the 
investors. 
State exercises exclusive territorial 
sovereignty as its right. It retains full 
power of expropriation and full power of 
imposition. As such, predictable high 
level of blatant opportunistic 
intervention by government in 
transactions to benefit self-interest and 
the interests of supporters. 
 
The adverse behaviour of the host 
country’s government can take the form 
of creeping expropriation that can reduce 
the anticipated profit from the project 
transactions.  
 
Blatant corrupt practices by the state 
bureaucracy and institutions in 
sanctioning projects and approving 
licenses to implement the desires of the 
state.  Investors need to make monetary 
concession to authorities to progress 





Processes by which new 
legislation and regulatory 
changes are introduced.  
 
Established procedures with  
consultative process for introduction of 
new legislation.  
 
Intervention in transactions exercised 
by well-established, fair and clear 
regulations to maximise the benefits to 
the population and the environment. 
 
Limited and fair introduction of new 
taxes. 
Potential for adverse changes to the 
rules of the game not necessarily 
backed by new legislation. This 
represents opportunistic behaviour by 
stealth to exploit foreign investors. 
 
Probability for the host country 
government to impose an adverse 
taxation regime for major foreign 
investments without warning or 
consultation. 
Blatant opportunistic actions by the host 
country’s government in making 
changes to the legislation and 
regulations without any consultations 
with the investors.  
 
Predictable intervention in projects by 
host country government to impose 
adverse taxation regime. High potential 
for unexpected unilateral adverse 
changes by governments or their agents 
to the terms and conditions of 
concessions, and licenses. In some cases, 
these changes may not be adequately 
defined or practiced with the required 
transparency to ensure that project 
transactions can be completed as 
planned. This will invariably have an 
extremely adverse effect on the 
profitability and the execution of the 
project.  
 
Due to these difficulties, companies can 
be expected to make concessions above 





State behaviour towards 
major foreign investment 
in infrastructure projects 




Introduction of statutory requirements 
to demand local content in the 
transactions. The foreign firms allowed 
the freedom to select local partners to 
form joint ventures to comply with this 
requirement. 
 
Governments and their agencies directly 
intervening in major projects that are of 
vital importance to the national interest 
in developing the host country’s 
infrastructure and its resources. This 
intervention carried out in consultation 
with the foreign firms. 
 
 
Introduction of unpredicted legislation 
or subtle moves to increase local 
content demands and benefits to local 
pressure groups.  
As a result requirement to form joint 
ventures with local firms to execute 
some minor transactions.  
 
Governments and their agencies may 
more directly intervene in major 
projects that are of high economic 
value. These interventions in the form 
of restrictive controls without prior 
consultations for the economic benefit 
of the ruling elite rather than for the 
common good. 
Opportunistic actions by the host 
country’s government in making adverse 
changes to the legislation and stringent 
compliance regulations related to foreign 
investments without a consultative 
process.  
Introduction of statutory requirements to 
demand high local content in major 
transactions. The foreign firm may be 
compelled to form joint ventures with 
local firms which may not have the 
necessary expertise and facilities to 
execute the required activities. 
The authoritarian democratic 
governments may at some point face 
incentives to renegotiate the terms of the 
investment in order to redistribute an 
investor’s returns to other groups, such 
as local suppliers and workforce, which 
provide it with political support. 
Property Rights: 
Role of the state in initial 
allocation. 
The government plays no role in the 
allocation of property rights between 
the participants in a transaction.  
 
Probability of state intervention by 
stealth to influence allocation of 
property rights to ensure that the 
narrow self-interest of special-interest 
groups is served.  
 
Property rights not fully delineated if 
the state intervenes in an opportunistic 
manner ignoring the accepted norms 
of democracy.   Then an economic 
problem arises regarding the property 
rights in transactions.  
High opportunistic intervention of the state 
in the initial partitioning of property rights. 
This will have important consequences for 
the outcome of the transactions.  
 
When the state is authoritarian, the 
delineation of property rights influenced 
by the political process, reflecting the 
conflicting economic interests and 
bargaining strength of the participants.  As 
a result, the conflicts among the interest 
groups over the distributional effects of 





Independence and strength 
of judiciary for enforcing 
measures. 
Established, strong and independent 
legal institutions to enforce contracts.  
 
The state can be expected, by using its 
regulatory authority and legal 
institutions, to enable organisations and 
private individuals to enforce legitimate 
contracts, and thus lower the costs of 
exchange.   
Established judicial system but may 
not have been tested by the industry. 
Hence, could be unpredictable, due to 
pressure from influential local vested 
interests. Pseudo democratic regimes 
will resort to stealth and subtle means 
to influence the judiciary.  As such, 
the state may not use its power to 
enforce contracts in a fair and 
consistent manner. 
 
Established legal system but under 
authoritarian democracy the state control 
of the judiciary is exercised in a blatant 
manner. 
 
State power can be used to control the 
judiciary, as invariably, the legal 
enforcement personnel in these countries 
are dependent on the ruling elite for their 
survival and progress in office. As such, 
legal relations in transactions in these 
countries can become mere formalities 




The discussions above lead to the proposition that in a world of positive transaction 
costs, political hazards and the assignment and enforcement of property rights do affect 
economic efficiency (as well as income distribution).  In this situation, the question arises 
as to what extent the mitigation of political hazards and ensuring the complete delineation 
of property rights is of benefit to transactions.  The answer depends on the magnitude of 
common pool losses caused by these factors and the increase in transaction costs for 
mitigating political hazards and defining and enforcing property rights (Alchian, 2008; 
Klein and Robinson, 2011).  Considering the discussion in this chapter thus far, there are 
compelling reasons for the extension of the basic TCE model to address political hazards 
and property rights arrangements for a major international project.  The mechanisms for 
this extension have to be based on political governance theory as discussed in the next 
section. 
3.4 Application of Political Governance Theory 
3.4.1 Requirement for Political Governance 
This section examines the theory of political governance that can provide an 
applicable extension to the TCE model, to address politically motivated institutional 
hazards and property rights issues. In order to address the difficulties caused to 
international transactions by the nature of the host country’s political and legal system, 
Henisz and Zelner (2010) advocate applying the logic of comparative institutional analysis 
to the governance of such transactions. Comparative institutional analysis is pursued by 
comparing the impact of the hazards due to the behaviour of political and legal institutions 
and their activities. This analysis considers the host country institutional environments and 
different levels of national checks and balances available in each case.  
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The analysis identifies political and institutional hazards that need to be addressed 
in the selection of specialised governance mechanisms for international transactions. In this 
context of political hazards, two important parameters are the levels of controls and 
mitigation measures inherent in the formulation of host country legislation.  These 
parameters will determine the extent to which opportunistic political actors are able to 
formulate the legislation and rules to benefit the narrow interest groups they serve rather 
than accommodating the interests of the majority of the population (North, 1990; Grant, 
1991,1996; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
As discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, when the role of the host country state is 
neutral and the judiciary is strong and neutral, the firm or project coalition can rely on the 
existing political process and legal institutions for executing the transactions.  On the 
contrary, if the host country political hazards are significant and/or judiciary is weak, the 
investor or project coalition will be required to resort to additional ‘specialised’ 
governance (i.e. political governance) (Acemoglu, 2003; Dixit, 2007).  In this situation, we 
can expect the controls and safeguards of the host country’s political and legal systems to 
determine the extent of specialised governance mechanisms required. These special 
mechanisms will be required to complement governance mechanisms selected based on the 
characteristics of frequency, asset specificity and uncertainty that can create contractual 
hazards (Henisz, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Dixit, 2007).  
We find that when contractual hazards in the transactions are sufficiently low, 
market arrangements will be adequate without the development of a specialised 
governance mechanism (Williamson, 1995).  Similarly, where political hazards are 
sufficiently low and with availability of strong property rights, the participants can turn to 
short-term political arrangements and compromises based on commercial incentives. 
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 However, as political opportunism increases and the protection of property rights 
becomes weaker, the project organisations need to include in their evaluations current 
policies of the government and any potential changes in policy, in order to safeguard their 
interest (Desai et al., 2004; Dixit, 2007; Henisz and Zelner, 2010).  
The conclusion to be drawn is that if the available inherent controls and checks 
against adverse political and institutional behaviour are strong, project transactions less 
frequently require the added benefits of specialised political governance.  Conversely, if 
the political and institutional hazards can endanger the success of transactions, the project 
management has to complement project governance with political governance (Acemoglu, 
2003; Dixit, 2007).  For this, additional governance mechanisms that can be applied as 
mitigation against political and property rights hazards are discussed in the next section. 
3.4.2  Transaction Cost Politics and Project Governance 
 A crucial insight which distinguishes transaction cost politics from transaction cost 
economics is the ability of the former to allow for the case of a problem stemming from the 
broader policy that is not represented in the initial phase of contract negotiations. As a 
result, if a firm can complement economic governance with political governance, this 
could be an important source of strategic advantage over its competitors.  Based on the 
propositions in literature, the political governance process for extending the predictive 
capabilities of the basic TCE model can be defined as consisting of the following steps 
(Acemoglu, 2003; Dixit, 2007; Henisz,2000; Henisz and Zelner, 2010): 
• Search and data gathering to establish the nature and impact of the hazards to 
the transactions caused by the political and legal institutions functioning in the 
host country.  
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• The findings from the search and data gathering to be used to determine how 
the impact of the hazards on the transactions identified may be mitigated by the 
following political governance mechanisms:  
1. Negotiations and formulation of agreements with provision of commercial 
concessions to ensure their acceptance by the local institutions.  
2. Building long-term relationships with host country institutions, lobbying 
of influential political actors and creating social networks to influence 
participants to the transactions.  
3. Management of joint ventures with local firms to meet the local content 
demands. 
3.4.3  Search and Data Gathering 
According to Weber (1919) the modern state is a public organisation with a system 
of administration and law which guides the collective actions of the executive staff; the 
executive is regulated by statute and claims authority over inhabitants and over all 
activities taking place in the territory over which it exercises domination. Thus, the state is 
a collective legal body which has the authority to impose coercive power. When project 
transactions involve political actors it is necessary to ascertain the nature of the host 
country’s regime (i.e. whether it is a democratic state or not and identify the influential 
political actors).As such, foreign investors in major transactions need to obtain sufficient 
data to address the following questions and issues to ascertain the nature and behaviour of 




(1)  Nature of the state and the role of political leaders in performing collective 
actions to benefit the general public of the community and not for a particular 
group of people. 
(2)  Independence, strengths and weaknesses of the legal systems in 
administration of law to settle contract disputes with international firms. 
(3)  Main political actors and their domination in the decision-making process for 
selecting preferences and implementation of major investments, and their role 
in regards to enhancing benefits to local organisations (i.e. local content). 
(4)  How and to what extent does the state use force legitimacy? Except for the 
state, no other political organisation is authorised to use force. Hence the 
force or violence is an important element of the state. 
(5)  The strength and efficiency of the host country’s bureaucracy. Weber’s theory 
of the state is inseparably connected with bureaucracy. It is beyond the 
capacity of the politicians to manage the state structure without bureaucrats. 
The advance of the state towards more and better administration and efficient 
organisation is closely associated with the superiority of the bureaucratic 
organisation. In fact, the bureaucracy becomes more indispensable because 
without bureaucracy the complex economic structure of society cannot be 
managed or administered. 
	 If the search and data collection confirms that the host country’s regime is 
democratic with established regulations with the necessary consultative processes in place, 
the foreign investors can rely on the existing political process and legal institutions for 
maintenance and enforcement of beneficial relationships in transactions. However, if the 
nature of the political regime is non-democratic, then we can expect the need to counter the 
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potential political hazards facing international projects. Thus, the findings from the data 
collection on the above issues need to determine the additional mechanisms of governance 
to mitigate the impact of any adverse actions of the state institutions in transactions. In this 
case, the scope of the specific mechanisms of influence that can be exerted by firms and 
their costs will differ according to the structure of the political institutions and the motives 
of the personnel controlling them (Dixit, 2007; Henisz and Zelner, 2010).  
3.4.4  Negotiations and Formulations of Agreements 
Irrespective of the nature of the state, the foreign investors have to negotiate and 
formulate agreements with the state and their agents before commencing the transactions. 
The formulation of these agreements needs to make allowance for the effectiveness of the 
host country regulations that can be implemented and strength of legal redress available in 
case of contractual conflicts.  In practice, some firms use professional political risk 
analysts to evaluate the impact of such hazards and identify possible mitigation measures 
(KPMG, 2011; Wood Mackenzie, 2011, 2012).  
 As such, the negotiations between the foreign firms and the host country’s 
government institutions to formulate acceptable agreements and working relationships for 
execution of transactions can turn out to be a long drawn out affair.  In this case, there is a 
requirement for long-term political strategic measures to address any adverse impacts that 
the existing or any potential future legislation might have on the transactions (Dixit, 2007). 
Broadly speaking, the requirement is for a “management process by which the foreign 
organization for political purposes, through purposeful communication and action, 
establish, build, and maintain beneficial working relationships with the government to help 
its goals” (Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2013, p.5). As such, commercial concessions have to 
be provided by the foreign firms to obtain acceptable terms with the government on 
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compliance requirements for finalising the agreement for execution. Thus, negotiations 
need to address the short-term and long-term orientation and motives of political 
organisations. As a result, foreign firms need to influence governmental and public sector 
agencies, think tanks, unions, commercial businesses, as well as other interest groups that 
are engaged in influencing outcomes of the transactions (Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2013).  
 When the political regime is not an established and fair democracy, it is a difficult 
task to identify and mitigate against ex-ante political behaviour and malpractice.  In this 
case, IOGCs investing in major projects in some of the world’s fastest-growing oil and gas 
industries, such as in Nigeria and Angola, need to formulate contingency measures to 
manage the challenges associated with working in these countries. In such situations, the 
project organisations may be compelled to expend more resources to influence the political 
actors to prevent implementation of policies that might affect their transactions. This 
requires the investors to commission political, legal experts and local ‘Godfathers’ in their 
dealings with the government to mitigate the impact of any potential adverse changes in 
policy and practice (Scott et al., 2012; Wood Mackenzie, 2011, 2012). Thus, for the 
agreements with host country institutions to function as agreed, the foreign companies are 
required to budget for transaction costs systematically being higher in political transactions 
than in economic ones. The reasons explaining the higher level of transaction costs in 
exchange between the state organisations and firms are: (a) the parties to the political 
agreements cannot be perfectly defined, (b) many political agreements are neither explicit 
nor formal and rest on verbal and even tacit agreements (containing vague and 
uninterpretable terms), (c) property rights are subject to strong constraints and become 
unsafe due to political interactions, and (d) the world of politics is opaque, unclear and it is 
difficult to observe the different factors of political performance (Caballero and Soto-
Onate, 2006; Henisz and Zelner, 2010; Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2013). In addition to the 
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above reasons, we must also add the fact that transaction costs sometimes increase due to 
the short-term horizons of political actors, who manipulate use of government authority for 
their benefit (North, 1990; Caballero and Soto-Onate, 2006; Pierson, 2006).	  
 In addition to the challenges discussed above, formulating complete agreements for 
political transactions can be extremely complex and subjective as situations of asymmetric 
information are prevalent in political transactions. In addition, political activities lack a 
measurement formula like the price system in economic markets, as action promises are a 
fundamental exchange unit in political agreements. Agreements with such promises are 
typically not subject to a compliance mechanism; there is not an effective ‘third party 
enforcement’ in politics (Dixit, 2007; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). 
Considering the above points, the foreign companies must be prepared to expend 
significant financial resources, technical and legal expertise in the process of formulating 
and implementing agreements with the host country’s government institutions.  
3.4.5  Relationship Building and Lobbying 
In executing projects in foreign countries, relationship building and lobbyingthe 
political actors, legislators and members of regulatory agencies have become an essential 
part of the project management. For this, it will be necessary to commission lobbyists 
whose business is trying to influence legislation, regulation, or other government decisions, 
actions, or policies on behalf of a group or individual who hires them. The requirement for 
such lobbying can be expected to be higher in countries with non-democratic regimes. This 
is as a result of the political authorities in these countries possibly requiring greater 
persuasion and encouragement to make decisions favourable to foreign firms (Epstein and 
O’Halloran, 1999; Pierson, 2006; Caballero and Soto-Onate, 2006).  
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In addition to lobbying, it will be necessary to build relationship networks with not 
only the key political actors but also with members of parties and committees, staffers of 
government agencies, and decision-makers’ contacts who all have a say on issues 
concerning the transactions. This multi-agent relationship network structure implies that it 
is also necessary to influence political actors indirectly (i.e. through the decision-maker’s 
network of direct and indirect contacts). For this purpose, the optimal strategy should be to 
determine the key actors to maximise influence in political networks and how to minimise 
wasteful relationship building efforts in such multi-agent policy environments (Pierson, 
2006; Caballero and Soto-Onate, 2006). 
The ethics and morality of lobbying and networking are dual-edged and often 
spoken of with contempt, when the implication is that organisations with inordinate 
economic power are corrupting the law (twisting it away from fairness) in order to serve 
their own interests. In contrast, this may not be the case when major infrastructure projects 
have to be carried out in countries which lack the required checks and balances to 
safeguard the property rights of the investors. In addition, the successful completion of 
such projects will benefit the population of the country. Thus, in this case, lobbying and 
networking are essential for making sure that the interests of the foreign firm and the 
public good are duly defended against corruption and ensuring that minority interests are 
fairly defended against vested interests (Pierson, 2006; Caballero and Soto- Onate, 2006). 
An additional measure for building relationships with the local population is in the 
form of welfare measures implementing sustainable development projects. These normally 
include improving the infrastructure and facilities for local communities like building 
roads, schools and hospitals. Such developments, which can reduce any antagonism of the 
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population against major foreign firms, are becoming common for oil and gas projects 
carried out in countries like Nigeria and Angola (Wood Mackenzie, 2012, 2013).  
3.4.6  Management of Joint Ventures and Local Content 
 There are a number of economic drivers for forming joint ventures (JVs) for the 
execution of major projects which can be too capital intensive and where the scope can be 
too big for a single company. The risk profile of such investments can be so large that no 
single company may wish to take full exposure. In the case of international transactions, 
the regulatory requirements of some countries require foreign companies to partner with 
local entities if they are to enter that market (Chin and Hwang,1992). Earlier in this 
chapter, it was suggested that a cumulative impact of host country high political hazards 
and adverse property rights issues is an ever increasing demand for local content in 
transactions.  An inevitable outcome of this political demand is the need for foreign 
investors to form JVs with local companies. Foreign firms entering into JVs with local 
companies can benefit from improving the local resources, reducing the risks due to local 
logistical issues and easily adapt to the culture and local employees (Meyer and Peng , 
2011; Wood Mackenzie,  2012).   
Joint ventures are based on long-term contracts such that one of the JV partners 
cannot simply abandon the relationship. Moreover, any strategic decision in the JV 
requires mutual agreement between the partner firms. In the case of international 
transactions, even if a foreign firm owns a substantial majority equity stake, they need the 
co-operation of the local partner to implement proposed strategic actions (Meyer and Tan, 
2011). When JVs have to be formed due to host country political compulsion, the local 
partner attains influence well beyond what is due through its equity stake. This is due to 
the patronage of the government and through relationships with external stakeholders (say, 
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trade unions or government officials). In such situations, the foreign firm has to resort to 
implementing indirect vertical integration for transactions subject to high levels of 
uncertainty and/or high asset specificity. To implement this dominating role, the foreign 
firm will have to make economic concessions to the local partners and their political 
patrons.  Without these measures, the JV becomes a highly inflexible mode of operating, 
because the foreign firm will be constrained in making strategic changes to react to internal 
and external challenges (Madhok, 2006; Meyer and Peng, 2011). 
 Another factor to be considered is that the design and construction of a major 
infrastructure project invariably requires the use of high and often novel levels of 
technology, skills and expertise.  If the host country partners lack the expertise to meet 
these requirements, the foreign firm has to provide the necessary technology transfer to the 
host country firms where they are involved in JVs. The possibility of such situations can be 
expected to be higher when foreign firms are compelled to form JVs with local partners 
imposed on them by political authorities (Hennart,1988: Meyer and Peng, 2011; Wood 
Mackenzie, 2012).   
The idea that a foreign majority firm in a JV enjoys full control is very far from the 
realities of JVs carried out in countries where adverse government intervention can be 
high. This situation can apply both in countries with democratic and non-democratic 
political regimes. Regulatory ambiguity and any corruption in the host country tend to 
increase costs in operating JVs, as extra management and monitoring arrangements by the 
client firm are necessary to prevent co-ordination failures (Meyer and Peng, 2011; Lu, 
2012). 
Considering the above difficulties that can be encountered in JVs for international 
transactions, there will be an increased requirement for the foreign firm to direct the 
transaction activities (i.e. vertical integration and provide incentives to the local partner to 
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prevent poor performance and delays).  In addition, the foreign client firm has to 
implement relational aspects by allowing concessions in the contractual terms and provide 
financial benefits to the local partners and their political patrons. These measures, along 
with increased monitoring and expertise transfer activities can be expected to cause 
significantly increased transaction costs (Kogut,1991; Barlow, 2000, Meyer and Tan, 
2011).   
3.5 Conclusions 
 The literature review presented in this chapter leads to the conclusion that major 
projects carried out across national borders can be subject to significant political hazards 
and property rights issues.  A host country government playing an approval role can take 
arbitrary action that directly or indirectly influences the outcome of transactions including 
the imposition of high local content demands. Political hazards created by host country 
institutional arrangements can determine the extent of risks and uncertainties facing firms 
undertaking projects in foreign countries.  Protection of property rights can become an 
issue depending on the strength of the judicial systemin the host country.Various 
dimensions of these hazards and a scale for measuring these dimensions are presented in 
Table 3.1. The likelihood and potential negative consequences of each hazard dimension 
are scaled as low, medium and high. 
In this situation, several questions arise regarding the impact of both political and 
property rights hazards on the TCE model. To what extent will these factors shift the point 
at which it is no longer efficient to use a market governance strategy for a given level of 
asset specificity? Will high political hazards and weak arrangements for the protection of 
property rights require organisations to resort to vertical integration or hybrid arrangements 
at lower levels of asset specificity than is suggested by the basic TCE model?  Will the 
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extent to which specialised political governance mechanisms are required depend on the 
nature of the political and legal environment of the host country and the level of hazards 
presented by those factors? 
These questions suggest the need for an extension to the basic TCE model by 
incorporation of political governance mechanisms to mitigate the impact of political 
hazards and weak legal regimes.  
A framework resulting from the summary of the literature review and the 
propositions derived in Chapters Two and Three is illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. This 
framework is used as the basis in Chapter Four to develop an extension to the basic TCE 
model. This extension is for the incorporation of specialised political governance 




















Chapter 4 - Extending theTCE MODEL TO INCORPORATE THE IMPACT OF 
POLITICS 
	
4.1 Introduction and Synthesis of Literature Review 
4.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter initially synthesises and then integrates the findings of the literature 
reviews and theoretical arguments made in Chapters One, Two and Three.  The argument 
is then developed to show that political governance mechanisms are required to mitigate 
the consequences of the political hazards and property rights issues on major international 
transactions.  Theoretical propositions of the political governance mechanisms are used to 
extend the predictive capabilities of the basic TCE model.  For this, the political 
governance mechanisms to be implemented, depending on the dimensions and scale of 
political hazards and strength of property rights protection that impact the project 
transactions, are examined. The extended TCE model developed and the exploratory 
research propositions derived from these arguments are presented.  Exploratory research to 
investigate the applicability of the extended TCE model is proposed to provide the scope 
and direction for conclusive research aimed at providing final answers to the research 
problem.  This field investigation is an exploration of how different levels of political 
hazard are handled in international oil and gas production projects, and whether the 
approach used is consistent with the reasoning of the basic TCE model or whether an 
extension to TCE, as proposed by this research, is justified. 
4.1.2 Synthesis of LiteratureReview 
The growing number of failures of large complex international project transactions, 
subject to PEST challenges to achieve their targets, leads to an intellectual problem.  
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Thus, the focus of this research was to develop an applicable extension to the 
transaction cost economics (TCE) theory to address theoretical issues of predicting the 
governance mechanisms for such projects. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the discussions in the earlier sections are that in 
addition to technical and operational complexities, the causes for failures of major projects 
can be summarised as incomplete information on the future state of affairs causing non-
quantifiable uncertainties, bounded rationality of the decision-makers and opportunistic 
behaviour of participants in transactions. In the case of international projects, additional 
challenges can be posed by the behaviour of the political institutions and the role of the 
judiciary of the host country.  These identified causes of failures of major projects support 
the proposition for rethinking management of international projects.  In this case, the focus 
needs to be on appropriate governance mechanisms proposed by NIE to provide necessary 
dimensions of authority, decision-making and accountability for such international 
projects. These mechanisms are required to mitigate the political as well as economic 
turbulence that can emerge over the life of the project and to steer and harmonise the 
behaviour of the participants. 
To achieve this aim, a theoretical conceptual model was found to be required for 
the prediction of the most appropriate governance mechanisms for managing major 
international transactions.  The predictive capabilities of this model are required to align 
the governance mechanisms with the economic and political characteristics of the 
international transactions.  For this purpose, the two main strands of the micro-analytical 
approach component of NIE, the principal agency-theory (PAT) and transaction cost 
economics (TCE), were evaluated.   
Based on the limitations of the PAT and the consequences identified, the argument 
was made that agency contractual arrangements are not the most economical way of 
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managing the increasing commercial and technical hazards faced by major long duration 
projects.  TCE makes two assumptions for the causes of conflicts in transactions and 
classifies these as: human and environmental.  The human factors are bounded rationality 
of the participants and opportunism where self-interest is practiced with guile.  Among 
environmental factors, uncertainty and complexity refer to conditions where it is not 
possible or becomes very expensive to predict the events that can cause incomplete 
contracts.  These are factors that were identified as contributing to the underperformance of 
long duration major international projects.  As such, it was deemed that TCE, which 
addresses all these issues, is more related than PAT to formulate a conceptual governance 
prediction model to manage the transactions of large international projects.  However, in 
addition to the micro-economic critiques of TCE, the main criticism of TCE in the context 
of this research is that it is based on the concept of self-enforcement and considers the role 
of institutions to be neutral in transactions.  In addition, uncertainty presented in TCE does 
not cover exogenous uncertainties due to political, economic or social developments in the 
host country that can impact transactions.  A further criticism made of TCE is its lack of 
consideration of the allocation and enforcement of property rights which can become a 
major concern, particularly if the role of the state in the transactions is not neutral. 
Chapter Three examined how the challenges faced by major projects multiply in the 
international context. The proposition was that major projects carried out in countries with 
authoritarian democratic or authoritarian political systems can be subject to significantly 
higher hazards than those carried out in liberal democratic countries.  These are due to 
opportunist intervention of the host government and inadequate protection of property 
rights due to a weak judicial system. In addition, an inevitable requirement for 
international projects would be the need to form joint ventures with local companies to 
comply with the increasing demand for local content in transactions.  
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Political governance mechanisms were identified to mitigate the consequences of 
these challenges.  These measures were construed to provide the required theoretical basis 
for extending the predictive capabilities of the basic TCE model.  The argument to develop 
the extended TCE model and the exploratory research propositions to examine its 
applicability are presented in the following sections. 
4.2 Argument for an Extension of the TCE Model by Political Governance 
4.2.1 Impact of Regime Types on Political Governance Requirements 
Incorporation of political governance for extending the predictive capabilities of the 
basic TCE model was defined as consisting of the following steps:- 
• Search and data gathering to establish the nature and impact of the hazards to the 
transactions caused by the political and legal institutions functioning in the host 
country.  
• The findings from the search and data gathering to be used to determine how the 
impact of the hazards on the transactions identified may be mitigated by the 
following political governance mechanisms:  
4. Negotiations and formulations of agreements with provision of commercial 
concessions to ensure their acceptance by the local institutions.  
5. Building long-term relationships with host country institutions, lobbying of 
influential political actors and creating social networks to influence participants 
to the transactions.  
6. Management of joint ventures with local firms to meet the local content 
demands. 
A conclusion drawn from Chapter Three is that the scope of the political 
governance mechanisms to be implemented will depend on the dimensions and scale of 
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political hazards and strength of property rights protection that directly impact the 
governance of the project transactions.  The dimensions of the political hazards are defined 
in Table 3.1 as the nature of the host country regime, processes by which new regulatory 
changes are introduced and how demand for local content requirements can increase due to 
political pressure.  Protection of property rights is dimensionalised in Table 3.1 as the role 
of the state in initial allocation of these rights and the independence and strength of the 
judiciary in enforcing the protection of property rights.  The dimensions of these hazards 
that directly impact the project transactions are scaled as low, medium and high. This 
dimensioning and scaling of political hazards and protection of property rights is integrated 
to generate Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 - Relationship between levels of Political Hazard and protection of property rights under 
three different Regime types 
Zone A represents transactions carried out in countries with a low level of political 
intervention and a high level of protection of property rights.  This can be the case of 
strong, established, democratic countries with stable and known political conditions.  
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There will be a high level of proven trust between the state institutions and 
investors. State intervention in foreign investments is exercised by well-established and 
fair regulations with reasonable demand for local content.  The state bureaucracy functions 
efficiently and in a fair manner.  The government takes no part in the allocation of property 
rights between the participants in a transaction. Established, strong and independent legal 
institutions are in place to enforce contracts. For transactions carried out with such low 
political intervention and safeguarded by strong independent judiciary, the basic TCE 
governance model as discussed in Chapter Two should suffice for the prediction of 
economising governance mechanisms. 
Zone B represents transactions subject to a medium level of political hazards and 
medium level of protection of property rights.  This represents transactions executed in an 
authoritarian democratic state with the potential for adverse political intervention by the 
state with stealth in transactions, due to increasing economic opportunism to exploit 
foreign investors.  There is the potential for changes to the rules of the game by subtle 
moves made by the state institutions.  These can include influencing the award of contracts 
and increased demands for local content in transactions to benefit local pressure groups 
and political supporters.  The state can also be expected to interfere in the allocation of 
property rights due to narrow self-interest.  This can cause substantial output losses to the 
investor.  Even though judicial systems are present, they may not have been tested by the 
foreign investors.  Hence, they could be unpredictable due to pressure from local vested 
interests.  
Zone C represents transactions subject to predictable high levels of opportunistic 
political intervention and a very low level of protection of property rights.  These will 
apply mostly to transactions carried out in a country with an authoritarian regime, with the 
state power concentrated in the hands of the ruling elite.  The state can be expected to 
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exercise its authority in a blatantly opportunistic manner with corrupt practices to benefit 
self-interest and the interests of its supporters.  These corrupt practices by the state 
bureaucracy and institutions require monetary concessions to be made by the investors to 
these authorities in order to progress transactions.  The host country’s government could be 
expected to make adverse changes to the legislation and regulations related to foreign 
investments.  In some cases, these changes may not be adequately defined or practiced 
with the required transparency.  Stringent legislation backed by arbitrary direct actions of 
the authorities can result in the demand for high local content in transactions.  
Opportunistic intervention of the state in the initial partitioning of property rights may have 
important consequences for the investors.  The delineation will be controlled by influential 
political actors restricting the bargaining strength of the investors.  The judiciary is not 
independent or fair due to the blatant intervention of the government. 
4.2.2 Application of Political Governance for an Extension of the TCE Model 
The theoretical propositions developed in Chapter Three would dictate that for 
transactions represented by Zones B and C, the basic TCE model needs to be extended 
with the incorporation of the necessary political governance mechanisms.  
In the case of transactions carried out under Zone B conditions, data gathering on 
the expected behaviour and motives of the host country political and legal institutions may 
produce unreliable and often conflicting evidence.  This will be due to the difficulty in 
distinguishing between honest behaviour and opportunism with stealth on the part of the 
host country authorities.  As a result, the outcome of the negotiations and formulations of 
agreements with the host government may turn out to be as not agreed ex-ante.  Building 
long-term beneficial relationships with host country institutions and the influential political 
parties may turn out to be laborious if the selfish expectations of the host country actors 
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should increase during the transactions.  As such, contingency planning is required by the 
foreign firms to address any possible changes in the behaviour of these institutions and 
how their impact on the transactions may be mitigated. 
In the case of transactions carried out under Zone C conditions, data gathering will 
confirm without any doubt the blatantly opportunistic intervention of the state institutions 
in transactions and their corrupt practices to benefit self-interest.  In this case, negotiations 
and formulations of agreements will be dominated by the state bureaucracy and institutions 
and the foreign firms will be required to make significant commercial concessions to them.  
In addition, the foreign firms may have to resort to unethical practices to form and 
maintain mutually beneficial long-term relationships with the host country institutions and 
the influential political actors.  Implementing such mitigating measures and the resulting 
increases in the transaction costs will not be registered in the project reports, due to reasons 
of confidentiality.  
In Chapter Three, it was identified that a cumulative impact of host country high 
political intervention and adverse allocation of property rights is an ever-increasing 
demand for local content in transactions.  Hence, for transactions represented by both 
Zones B and C the investors will be compelled to form joint ventures (JVs) with local 
firms, which may not necessarily have adequate expertise and facilities to execute the 
required activities.  This can lead to complex project transactions being carried out in 
difficult environments, both literally and politically.  In such cases, the foreign firm 
responsible for the transactions must take into consideration the need for relational aspects 
with the JV partner firms and how these are to be developed to ensure trust and more 
information sharing to reduce opportunism.  Thus, the extension to the TCE basic model 




4.3 An Extension of the TCE Governance Model 
The conclusions drawn from the literature are that challenges created by political 
and institutional hazards will prevent project transactions being carried out in an 
economising manner.  This is due to firms requiring either to incur higher transaction costs 
for the market arrangements for a given level of asset specificity, or requiring them to 
select hybrid governance with higher vertical integration arrangements at lower levels of 
asset specificity.  In this case, the TCE governance model cannot be implemented in its 
pure form to predict which transactions could be handled by market contracts and which 
would require additional safeguards in the form of vertical integration or hybrid 
arrangements.  
The findings presented in earlier sections support the proposition that an extension 
to the TCE model is required with a coalition of political governance for these projects.  
This extension of the TCE governance model must also make allowance for the fact that 
weak contract enforcement causing property rights issues will affect transaction costs with 
non-self-enforcing exchanges.  
The coalition of TCE and political governance needs to be based on the basic TCE 
proposition that the client firm must perform the activities they can do best and go to the 
market for transactions that can be done more cost effectively and efficiently by the 
market.  In Chapter Two, the argument is developed that a coalition of governance 
mechanisms of the market, vertical integration and hybrid arrangements are required for 
the successive life cycle phases of a major project.  In the case of major international 
projects, the client firm (e.g. the IOGCs) must handle the transactions subject to political 
intervention, regulatory issues and high commercial problems.  
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This will call for the client firm to be responsible for the measures to mitigate the 
increasing economic demands of the host government, implemented by increased statutory 
requirements for granting the necessary sanctions for major projects. 
Based on the arguments made, the following propositions are used to formulate 
extensions to the TCE model to predict the governance mechanisms for international 
transactions: 
1. Client firm should be responsible (i.e. vertical integration) for project management, 
political governance mechanisms, formulating and awarding the engineering, 
procurement, construction and installation (EPCI) contracts for the major 
components of the project.  This will require higher ‘front end’ loading by the 
client in countries with non-democratic regimes due to the extra effort and expenses 
in building relationships and carrying out lobbying of the state authorities.  
2. In the case of the transactions subject to adverse host government political 
intervention or transactions subject to high commercial uncertainty and asset 
specificity, it would be necessary for the client firm to use hybrid arrangements.  
This needs to be in the form of joint ventures with the EPCI contractors or local 
firms.  Such hybrid form of governance can be dominated either by the client firm 
or the contractor, depending on the characteristics of the particular transaction.  
Dominance and/or direct intervention by the client firm in transactions can be 
considered to be an indirect form of vertical integration (IVI) required from a TCE 
perspective to ensure that the resulting hybrid governance was as robust as a pure 
VI arrangement. 
3. Market governance based on standard contracts can be used when the political 
hazards, uncertainty and asset specificity variables of the transactions are low, 
known and manageable. 
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Hence, the need for use of an extended governance arrangement of market, political 
governance mechanisms and indirect vertical integration for transactions, should be 
determined on a case by case basis depending on the extent to which the particular 
transactions are subject to political intervention and property rights hazards.  This extended 
hybrid governance arrangement needs to be introduced at a lower level of asset specificity.  
The application of this logic leads to the extension of the basic TCE model as illustrated in 
Figure 4.2 below. 
 
Figure 4.2 - An Extension of TCE Model for International Projects 
In Figure 4.2, the lines M, H and V represent the predictions of the basic TCE 
model where market governance gives way to a hybrid arrangement and then to vertical 
integration with increasing uncertainty and asset specificity of the transactions.  
The predictions due to the extended TCE model are represented by lines M, HE and 
V, where the line HE represents the extended governance arrangement with the requirement 
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to incorporate political governance and indirect vertical integration mechanisms in the 
hybrid arrangement.  This extended hybrid arrangement represented by HE is implemented 
at a lower level of asset specificity depending on the extent of political and institutional 
intervention in transactions.  In this case, ΔTCEE represents the increase in transaction 
costs due to the need to extend the TCE model to mitigate the political and property rights 
hazards. 
The extended TCE model thus represents relationships between concepts in areas 
of study of extremely complex systems dealt with by politics and economics.  In such 
cases, valid hypotheses can rarely be made as an experimental test would be prohibitively 
expensive or difficult (Sandhursen, 2000).  The literature review carried out has 
demonstrated that research into extending the predictive capabilities of TCE for 
international transactions subject to intervention by political and legal institutions is very 
limited (Caballero and Soto-Onate, 2006; Ruester, 2010; Foss and Klein, 2010).  In this 
case, it is necessary to carry out “an exploratory research that tends to tackle new issues on 
which little or no previous research has been done” (Brown, 2006, p. 45).  The exploration 
of new phenomena in this way may help to ascertain the feasibility of more extensive 
conclusive research and the best methods to be used.  The difference between exploratory 
and conclusive research is that exploratory studies result in a range of causes and 
alternative options for a solution to a specific problem, whereas conclusive studies identify 
the final information and the only solution to an existing research problem (Sandhursen, 
2000). The development of exploratory propositions of this research, examined by field 
investigation, is presented in the next section. 
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4.4 An Exploration of the Extended TCE Model 
4.4.1 Exploratory Propositions 
Exploratory research, as the name states, does not aim to provide the final and 
conclusive answers but is the initial research which forms the basis of more conclusive 
research.  In other words, exploratory research design explores the research propositions, 
providing the scope and direction for conclusive research which aims to provide final 
findings for the research problem (Sandhursen, 2000).  For this purpose, theresearch 
exploratory propositions can be interpreted to be logically conjectured relationships 
between two or more variables to be examined through an appropriate analysis using 
industry field investigation (Sekaran, 2000).  In the case of this research, the propositions 
are to examine the applicability of the extended TCE model to predict the governance 
mechanisms to manage the impacts of political hazards and property rights issues on major 
international transactions.  Thus, the field investigation of this research is an exploration of 
how different levels of political hazard are handled in international oil and gas production 
projects, and whether the approach used is consistent with the reasoning of the basic TCE 
model or whether an extension, as proposed by this research, is justified.  Based on the 
theoretical arguments developed, the exploratory propositions (Ps) for this research are 
defined as: 
P1 – The relative hazards created by behaviour of the host country government and 
weak institutional regimes will affect governance of project transactions in a non- 
economising manner.  Such non-self-enforcing exchanges cause the firm either to incur 
higher transaction costs due to the need to implement political governance mechanisms for 
a given level of asset specificity, or to select higher vertical integration arrangements at 
lower levels of asset specificity. 
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P2 – Any adverse state intervention in transactions including increased demand for 
local content will affect the protection of property rights of the firm.  This will require the 
firm to select governance mechanisms in a non-transaction cost economising way, 
particularly if there are compelling political requirements to form joint ventures with local 
firms. 
In order to explore these research propositions, model representations of the basic 
and extended TCE models are formulated and presented in Section 4.4.2.  The variables in 
these models are established based on the contextual issues identified from the review of 
the literature in earlier chapters.  These are:  
• The asset specificity, frequency and uncertainties associated with the transaction 
costs (i.e. characteristics of the transactions). 
• The impact of the political intervention in transactions and the strength of the 
judiciary to protect property rights.  
• The mitigating impact of the political governance mechanisms used on the outcome 
of the project transactions. 
The representation of the relationships of the above variables for the TCE model 
and the extended TCE model are developed in the following sections. 
 
4.4.2 Variables of a Model 
The component variables in a theoretical model can be described as: (i) dependent, 
(ii) independent, (iii) moderating, and (iv) intervening.  The relationship between these 




(Source: Sekaran, 2000) 
Figure 4.3 - Relationship between the component variables of a model 
A dependent variable is one which defines the outcome of the model, and as such is 
the variable of primary interest as it lends itself as a viable factor for investigation and is 
influenced by the value of the independent variables.  An independent variable will 
increase or decrease a dependent variable, and as such the variance in the dependent 
variable is accounted for by the independent variables.  
A moderating variable is the one that has a strong contingent effect by modifying 
the original independent-dependent relationship.  Moderating variables include inherent 
factors that operate in the environment in which the independent-dependent relationship is 
executed.  An intervening variable can be introduced into a model that has a time 
dimension, and is one that is applicable between the times when the independent variables 
and moderating variables operate to influence a dependent variable.  Thus, the application 
of an intervening variable can be expected to further influence the final outcome on the 
value of the dependent variable (Sekaran, 2000). 
4.4.3 Variables of the TCE Models 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) proposes that the optimum governance 
mechanisms must be selected for transactions based on their characteristics.  The costs of 
executing transactions vary based on characteristics of the transaction in question 
(Williamson, 1981,1996).   
Thus, inherent characteristics of uncertainty, frequency and degree of asset 





that these factors are mainly determined by the nature of the project transactions and hence 
are not within the sphere of control of the firm executing project transactions.  The choice 
of governance mechanisms is the intervening variable, as this choice is made by the firm, 
normally with the intention of economising on transaction costs.  For example, TCE theory 
suggests that transactions subject to high uncertainties and that occur frequently with 
requirement for transaction-specific investments will be performed most efficiently by 
vertical integration.  The outcome of the execution performance of the transactions is the 
dependent variable, represented by cost of managing the transactions (not CAPEX of the 
project) to complete the project to meet specified performance requirements within an 
acceptable time schedule. These variables are represented as elements of the basic TCE 
model in Figure 4.4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 - Variables of the Basic TCE Model 
In the basic TCE model, impact of inherent political context and behaviour of the 
host country institutions on transactions is considered to be neutral.  In this case, the basic 
TCE governance prediction model has no moderating variables.   
In the case of major transactions carried out in a host country with a non-
democratic regime, unpredictable political behaviour and a weak judiciary inadequate for 























Hence, these factors due to political and legal contexts of the country where the 
project transactions are carried out are classed as moderating variables.  In this case, an 
addition to intervening variables of the TCE model will be needed in the form of political 
governance. This is to mitigate the impact of moderating variables on the independent-
dependent variables relationship.  The introduction of these moderating variables and an 
intervening variable lead to the representation of the extended TCE model for prediction of 
governance mechanisms, as illustrated in Figure 4.5 below.   
 
Figure 4.5 - Variables of an Extended Model 
To explore the applicability of the extended TCE model based on the research 
propositions, three case studies were selected to represent the Zones A, B and C of political 
hazards and protection of property rights spectrum as illustrated in Figure 4.1.  These three 
case studies are major offshore deep water oil and gas projects with similar scope and 
technical complexities.  However, for this comparative analysis each case study represents 





























The argument is developed in this chapter that political governance is required to 
extend the predictive capabilities of the basic TCE model to mitigate the consequences of 
the political hazards and property rights issues on major international transactions.  The 
extent of the political governance mechanisms to be implemented will depend on the 
dimensions and scale of political hazards and strength of property rights protection (i.e. 
Zones A, B and C in Figure 4.1) that impact the transactions.  For this, a theoretical 
conceptual model was developed for the prediction of the most appropriate governance 
mechanisms to align with the economic and political characteristics of the international 
transactions.  The outcome was the need for introducing an extended hybrid governance 
arrangement of market, political governance mechanisms and indirect vertical integration 
at a lower level of asset specificity, for transactions subject to political intervention and 
property rights hazards.   
Exploratory research propositions were formulated to explore the applicability of 
the extended TCE model to predict the governance mechanisms for major international 
projects.   
The objective of this research is to formulate the basis of a more conclusive 
research aimed at providing final findings for the research problem.  The field investigation 
of this exploratory research is a comparative analysis of how different levels of political 
hazard are handled in international oil and gas production projects, and whether the 
approach used is consistent with the reasoning of the basic TCE model or whether an 
extension, as proposed by this research, is justified.  The research philosophy, research 




Chapter 5 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY, METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
	
5.1 Chapter Introduction and Research Philosophy 
Most researchers agree that the research questions to be resolved should determine 
the selection of the paradigm that establishes the research strategy and process to be 
adopted.  The term ‘paradigm’ is classified in literature as a philosophical belief that leads 
and governs an investigation of individuals with regards to their position in the world and 
the range of possible relationships they have to it and to its parts.  The research paradigm 
or the philosophy employed basically shapes the entire process by providing the direction 
and principles concerning the approach, methodology and the design for conducting the 
research (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Sanders et al., 2007).  The research philosophy is thus a 
conviction about the process that should be used for investigating the causes and 
consequences of a phenomenon and then drawing out conclusions.  In this context, the 
term epistemology is used for what is known to be true in contrast with ontology which is 
what is believed to be true.  The purpose of research, therefore, is the process of converting 
things believed to things known; ontology to epistemology.  
The literature on research methodology and design provides evidence of an 
extensive and constant debate concerning the best approach.  In the main, two approaches 
have emerged which are defined in the convention as positivist (also termed scientific) and 
phenomenological or interpretivist (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
The following general definitions and questions will be used within this chapter to develop 




Research Methodology – The process by which the research will be carried out. 
This will be the centre of the selected research philosophy in order to address the 
theory, values, cultural protocols and ethics that will inform the methodology. 
Research Design– The tools that will be used for gathering data and evidence. This 
will consider the survey measurements, interviews, participant observations and 
industry (case study) records, all of which will be used to test the research 
propositions. 
This thesis, based on the definitions and the processes advocated by Hussey and 
Hussey (1997), will conduct the research, for reasons given in this chapter, in a positivist 
manner using a combination of empirical, non-empirical, qualitative and quantitative 
methods.  This approach allows the process to be considered as applied research. The 
issues covered by the exploratory propositions to be tested are within the general area of 
management research and particularly related to governance mechanisms of international 
transactions.  
This chapter reviews the alternative research components and then defines the 
selection of the research philosophy, methodology and design. Each section will provide a 
brief justification of the component of the research process and the rationale for the chosen 
component. The alternative research philosophies, methods and techniques which were 




Figure 5.1 - The Research Philosophy and the Methodology Selection Process 
5.1.1 Formulation of the Research Philosophy 
 Research into governance mechanisms for major international project transactions 
subject to political hazards and weak safeguarding of property rights is relatively recent 
(Acemoglu, 2003; Dixit, 2007).  Hence, there could be concern about the validity of the 
research process used to justify the claim that value has been added to the body of 
knowledge.  As such, the research process used should not be seen as inflexible and solely 
an objective construct, rather it should be viewed as a framework, the final version of 
which is determined by the external forces impacting the project transactions (Cresswell 
and Clark, 2002; Sanders et al., 2007).   
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 There is also extensive acknowledgment that there can be a difference between the 
methodological approach and the aims formulated at the commencement of a research 
journey, and those that ultimately materialise. In the quest to reveal the validity and 
reliability of the collected data and the results offered, it was necessary to critically 
appraise the actual research process that must be embarked on (Sekaran, 2000).  This 
requires flexibility and as such this research used a blend of quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques with the intention of evaluating the impact of alternative governance 
mechanisms on the major project transactions carried out across national boundaries. 
 Considering the above requirements, an overall research philosophy was 
established following a review of the primary alternatives, of positivist and the 
phenomenological schools, and a combination of the two.  The works of a number of 
authors, in highlighting the main strengths, weaknesses and differences between the two 
alternatives, was used in arriving at a final selection (Sanders, 2002). 
 Positivists propose that reality is a permanent feature and can be viewed and 
explained from an objective perspective without impeding on the phenomena being 
evaluated.  They argue that phenomena should be singled out and that observations should 
be replicated.  This often involves manoeuvring reality by changing the values of only one 
independent variable in order to identify constancy in, and form associations between, 
certain constituent elements of the phenomena being investigated.  In addition, the 
positivist paradigm,which is rooted in natural science, focuses on using findings of 
scientific investigations to demonstrate the causes and consequences of events.  The 
positivist school considers that our existence is governed by broad principles and that 
society and people can be studied scientifically using statistics (Cresswell and Clark, 2002; 
Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). 
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 On the other hand, the phenomenological philosophy, with its humanistic approach 
emphasises the importance of gathering overall and qualitative data to explain 
developments in society.   
 This offers an interpretivist view to the effect that the social world possesses an 
uncertain ontological status and the truth is socially formed.  This suggests that the best 
way to understand the social world is from the point of view of the ‘Investigated 
Participant’ that can help in obtaining a full understanding of life and experiences.  The 
study of observable facts in their usual surroundings is key to the interpretivist philosophy, 
together with the recognition that scientists cannot evade impacting on the phenomena they 
study.   Interpretivists acknowledge that there may be many explanations of reality, but 
uphold that these interpretations are in themselves a part of the scientific information they 
are chasing.  Interpretivism has a convention that is no less celebrated than that of 
positivism, nor is it more concise (Sekeran, 2000; Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). The features 
of these two research philosophies presented in the literature are compared in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 - Comparative Analysis of Research Philosophies 
Criterion Positivist philosophy Phenomenological philosophy 
Basic premise The world is external and objective. The world is socially constructed and 
subjective. 
Observer is independent and makes 
conclusions on the basis of the data 
collected. 
Observer is part of what is observed 
and hence may not be independent. 
Science is value-free and objective. Science is driven by human interests. 
Research 
methodology 
Focus on the facts collected. Focus on the meanings of the events. 
Look for causality and fundamental laws. Try to understand what is happening. 
Reduce a phenomenon to its simplest 
elements. 
Look at the totality of each situation. 
Formulate hypotheses or exploratory 
propositions and then test them through field 
investigations. 




Formulate concepts so that they can be 
measured by field investigation data. 
Use multiple methods to establish 
different views of a phenomenon. 
Data collection Take large samples. Small samples are investigated in 
depth or over time. 
(Source: Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Sanders et al., 2007) 
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As is evident from the comparison above, positivism takes a reductionist approach 
by identifying and simplifying the environment in which variables exist by stripping out 
some of the complicating features, thereby generating a model that can represent data 
obtained from field observations (Sekaran, 2000; Sanders et al., 2007). 
In contrast, the phenomenologist looks beyond the details to understand the essence 
working behind the variables in order to construct meaning from them on the 
understanding that the world is not composed of a single objective reality, but rather a 
series of multiple realities that should be taken into account holistically.   
This results not only in a study of the variables, but also of their context, thus 
enabling a still-photograph to be taken so that complicated situations may be examined 
(Remenyi et al., 2002; Sanders et al., 2007). 
The literature recognises that positivism and phenomenology can be mixed and 
matched in the research process, in order to better understand difficult issues and to 
validate the findings within a single research project (Remeneyi et al., 2002; Sanders, 
2002).  Given the context of the exploratory propositions to be investigated (presented in 
Chapter Four) it was decided to adopt a positivist approach for this research based on the 
above comparative analysis.  Following this the research methodology and design to be 
used were investigated. 
5.2 Research Methodologies and Design 
5.2.1 Research Methodologies 
It is usually recognised that the character of scientific research is too varied and as 
such it is not acceptable to claim an optimum research methodology.  In addition, the 
character of scientific research itself lends to differing classifications and descriptions.  
The general classification for scientific research methodologies within the social sciences 
has been the difference between both qualitative and quantitative and empirical and non-
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empirical methodologies (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  Miles 
and Huberman (1984) also stressed the importance of the link between empirical and non-
empirical approaches in order to achieve greater validity in the overall results, as well as 
contributing to theory.  Thus, the strategy for gathering evidence is crucial as it determines 
the methods for collecting and evaluating the relevant data. Consequently, a combination 
of both non-empirical and empirical approaches has been deemed appropriate for this 
research for the reasons discussed in the next section. This research selectively used both 
non-empirical and empirical research approaches.  
For instance, the findings of the literature review, which is non-empirical, were 
used to develop the research exploratory propositions.  These propositions were used to 
structure and execute the empirical research in order to test the applicability of the 
extended Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) model. 
5.2.2 Non-Empirical Research Component 
Some research works are dependent entirely on non-empirical methods, and are 
more usually known as probing and reviewing the existing literature.  The starting point of 
this research is an examination of the pre-existing body of knowledge of previous research 
and relevant theory concerning governance mechanisms and political economics.  This 
literature review, as the non-empirical research component, has been employed in this 
research both to develop the research topics and to define the research exploratory 
propositions, as can be seen in the following chapters: 
• The research problem is defined in Chapter One. 
• The key academic theories appear in Chapters Two, Three and Four. 
• A demonstration of the researcher’s knowledge of the subject and the industry for 
the field enquiry appears in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Six. 
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• The interaction of the research with earlier available studies is described in 
Chapters One and Ten. 
• An appraisal of the potency and frailty of earlier work, including exclusions and 
bias perceived in the arguments, appears in Chapters Four and Ten. 
Clear referencing to the relevant literature on research issues is provided at the end 
of each Chapter to enable readers to identify the original work. 
5.2.3 Empirical Research Component 
In both theory and practice the four classifications of empirical research approaches 
are employed: Exploratory, Descriptive, Analytical and Predictive.  Whatever the purpose 
of the research, empirical evidence is required and consists of data collected by field 
investigations or observation or experience.  This data collection can consist of several 
methods, such as case studies, surveys, interviews and discussions (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997).   
 The importance of collecting empirical data by surveillance or experience was also 
identified by Easterby-Smith et al. (2002), who used the term ‘fieldwork’, which they 
defined as ‘the study of real organisations or projects’.  They also stated that researchers 
may use a combination of positivist or phenomenological methods. Empirical research, 
therefore, is dominant in current management research because of the philosophical 
assumption that evidence based empiricism, as opposed to thought or discourse, will make 
a greater satisfactory claim to the body of knowledge (Remenyi et al 2002).  The literature 
identifies three primary dimensions of empirical research for the collection, analysis of the 
data and the formulation of the findings in order for conclusions to be drawn from the 
investigation.   
These dimensions which constitute the research design are: 
• Qualitative or quantitative. 
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• Deductive or inductive. 
• Subjective or objective. 
Due to the interactive character of the issues, these dimensions do not necessarily 
symbolise simple ‘either/or’ options, rather they should be considered as the degree to 
which rudiments of each aspect apply to the research process (Sekeran, 2000). Each 
dimension was reviewed for its particular applicability to this research and the findings are 
summarised in later sections.  
5.2.4 Research Design 
This section summarises the selection of the research design method for the field 
study undertaken in order to gather and evaluate the data, and provide convincing answers 
to the research questions posed.  Taking into consideration the need for empirical data 
collection and analysis as an imperative, a selection had to be made as to whether to use a 
quantitative or qualitative method or a combination of the two methodologies for this 
research. 
Quantitative research approaches, initially developed in the natural sciences and 
now also accepted in the social sciences, consist of survey methods, interviews, laboratory 
experiments and the use of mathematical techniques.  Qualitative research methods 
originated in the social sciences in order to make it possible for researchers to study social 
and cultural occurrences. The qualitative methods include action research and case study 
research.  The data collection methods common to both quantitative and qualitative 
research include: (a) field surveys, (b) interviews and (c) documentation (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997; Cresswell and Clark, 2002).  The research design alternatives include 
methods such as the creation of an experiment or evaluation of case studies.  These were 
reviewed in order to understand their strengths and limitations, and the findings are 
categorised in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 - Research Design Alternatives 
Research Design Main Features and Application 
Experimental This method is common in pure scientific research and is often used where large 
volumes of data are involved and quantitative methods of analysis are used to derive 
the research outcomes. 
Surveys and/or 
Interviews 
This method, including questionnaire-based interviews, can be used for social 
science research and also in pure scientific surveys. It is often employed where data 
involves quantitative methods of analysis. 
Case Study These can be used to understand social phenomena within a particular setting. They 
can be built up from several complementary sources of data, including 
documentation, observations and interviews. This approach, as justified in later 
sections, best suits this research. 
Grounded Theory This is generated by observations rather than being developed from a review of the 
literature. 
Action Research The research takes the form of a field experiment, with the participation of the 
researcher. It is inevitable that it will apply to a certain degree to this study because 
of the researcher’s long-term involvement with the industry. 
Operational Research This evaluates activities and their relationship, often with a particular emphasis on 
operational efficiency. 
Modelling  This represents the relationships between the variables of the phenomenon 
investigated, where particular models are developed as the focus of the research 
activity.  
(Developed from: Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Leedy and Ormrod, 2005) 
The dichotomy of quantitative versus qualitative data as it applies to the research 
design might not be as incompatible as purists, who support the differentiation of the two 
approaches, have argued.  Studies using mixed-method data gathering have shown that the 
integration of these traditions within the same study can be seen as complementary.  This 
research seeks to answer questions regarding the governance for the execution of capital 
projects subject to political hazards.  Therefore, it may be considered to be found in the 
area of social sciences. Consequently, the data collection and analysis were intended to 
draw some general conclusions on the effectiveness of political governance mechanisms to 
minimise the consequences of the political hazards on the project execution (Cresswell and 
Clark, 2002; Leedy and Ormrod, 2005). 
Based on the rationale discussed in this and earlier sections, a mixed research 
design consisting of empirical, non-empirical, qualitative and quantitative methods was 
adopted.  Considering the reasons discussed in the next section, this in turn led to research 
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design based on case studies and responses to semi-structured interviews used in order to 
triangulate the findings.   
Triangulation, which increases the quality and validity of the results obtained 
through one method of data collection and analysis, is designed to avoid researcher bias; 
either through his or her influence on the behaviour of participants or through the conduct 
of the research.  However, it must be admitted that while triangulation reduces bias, it does 
not totally eliminate it (Yin, 1989; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Stake (1995) proposed that 
the methods that can be used for triangulation include data triangulation from other 
sources, investigator triangulation through the input of observers (i.e. interview 
participants) and methodological triangulation by using multiple sample types and 
sources.Triangulation was used in the analysis of the empirical data in an effort to test the 
consistency of the case study documentation resulting from different sources involved in 
the project.  As such, it was considered that interviewing industry personnel connected 
with the case studies would increase the chances of controlling, or at least assessing, 
potential causes of misinterpretation that can influence the results obtained from the review 
of the historical documentation (Stake, 1995). 
Thus, the decision to conduct semi-structured interviews with professionals and 
managers involved in the case studies, helped to provide triangulation by correcting errors 
and reducing uncertainties in the findings from the documentation of the case studies.  In 
this study, data collected from the questionnaire based interviews was also measured using 
non-parametric statistical analysis, in order to investigate by reduction the impact of PEST 
uncertainties on major projects and governance mechanisms most suited to manage them.  
This is discussed in Chapter Ten. 
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5.3 Selection of Research Approach and Design 
5.3.1 Rationale for a Case Study Approach 
The case study research approach is defined as an empirical question that examines 
a modern occurrence within its real life context when the confines between phenomenon 
and context lack clarity and in which a variety of evidence sources are used.  The case 
study method is deemed as the most suitable approach, when research questions of how 
and why are raised in formulating management strategy (Yin, 1989,1992). An in-depth 
assessment of case studies and effective use of the findings is necessary for real 
improvement in strategic management research. Such is the case with this research, which 
deals with why enhancements to project governance mechanisms are essential to 
strategically manage transactions hazards and property rights issues caused by political and 
economic uncertainties, and how these improvements can be made.  
Yin (1989) classified case studies as descriptive, explanatory or exploratory in 
character.  A descriptive case study records a particular action or series of actions, whilst it 
strives to provide an explanation of the strategy that resulted in a particular action and as 
such it is an analytical explanatory study.  An exploratory study, such as this research, goes 
a step further in order to provide a rationale for the underpinning strategy.  This research 
may be considered, therefore, to be a combination of all three, as it is a study of how and 
why particular governance mechanisms have been used for project transactions and how 
improvements can be achieved. 
The case study methodology has a distinct benefit when the researcher has modest 
or no influence over the research aim and distinguishes it from such strategies as 
experimental and action research, which demand researcher control or interference (Yin, 
1992; Stake, 1995).  Several researchers have stressed the advantages that longitudinal 
research (that conducted over time) has over traditionally focused methods that record 
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events at a given point.  This also allows for the inclusion of operational links and the 
analysis of corporate project management (Yin, 1992; Sanders et al., 2007).  Accordingly, 
the case study is uniquely suited to examining current events when pertinent actions cannot 
be influenced, thus allowing a current occurrence to be considered within its real-life 
circumstance, especially when the confines between observable fact and context are not 
clearly evident or when multiple bases of evidence are being used within an enquiry.  
The explicit importance and amalgamation of a context makes a distinction 
between the case study method from the experimental and the survey, with the latter 
seeking to release an occurrence from its context in order to curtail the number of variables 
to be examined.  A further key benefit of the case study method is the precise consideration 
of related factors and a large number of variables to which other methods may be 
insensitive to a greater extent (Yin, 1992; Bryman and Bell, 2007). Therefore, due to its 
comprehensive and versatile nature, as discussed above, the case study is viewed as most 
appropriate for investigating these multifaceted phenomena, such as the reasons for 
selecting a particular governance strategy for controlling international transactions in an 
industry symbolised by high uncertainty and continuous technological transformation (Yin, 
1992; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). 
5.3.2 Application of the Multiple Case Study Approach with Triangulation 
Selecting the appropriate case study design is most important when using this 
strategy, due to the effect of the design on the quality of research findings, and it often 
being influenced by the nature of the investigated phenomenon in relation to the number of 
units of analysis.  Four types of case study design have been proposed: single case 
(holistic), single case (embedded), multiple case (holistic) and multiple case (embedded).  
In relation to the single case design, it entails the use of one holistic case study, because it 
involves only one unit of investigation, but if it incorporates more multifaceted subunits, 
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the case study is deemed to be embedded.  However, multiple case designs include several 
case studies and if they necessitate several holistic cases in which each holistic case 
contains only one unit of analysis, it is considered holistic.  On the other hand, embedded 
multiple case designs consist of a number of embedded cases with each embedded case 
including numerous units of analysis.  Hence, a case study is termed holistic if only the 
comprehensive nature of a project is examined, but it is called embedded if it includes 
numerous units of scrutiny (Yin, 1989, 1992).  
Essentially, the single case study design is suitable when the case provides an 
essential test for conventional theory, the case represents an exceptional or unique event, it 
is a distinctive or archetypal case, or it provides a longitudinal or revelatory aim.  There are 
two major types of individual studies.  In multiple case studies, based on whether single or 
multiple units of investigations are involved, a pitfall that should be avoided by the 
researcher is paying too much attention to the subunits, and ignoring the greater holistic 
features.  However, the grounds for using multiple case designs are mainly derived from 
‘replication logic’, where each case study is regarded as a single investigation and the more 
cases that prove or disprove an existing theory, the more vigorous are the research 
outcomes.   
Hence, ‘replication logic’renders multiple case study designs more compelling and 
robust, since they are analogous to multiple scientific experiments.  However, each case 
must be carefully selected so that it either predicts similar results (literal replication) or 
produces contrasting results for predictable reasons (theoretical replication) (Yin, 1989, 
1992).  If the findings from an evaluation of all the cases turn out as predicted, then this 
offers convincing evidence for answering the research questions, but if cases produce 
contradictory results, then the theoretical propositions should be modified and retested with 
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a new set of cases.  Accordingly, this approach is a valuable tool to gain insight into how a 
business deals with complex project transactions.   
Multiple cases are more significant and compelling than the single case approach. 
In addition, triangulation provides the ethical requirement to confirm the validity of a 
process within a case study, also known as a triangulated research strategy.  This approach 
greatly strengthens the generalisation of the findings which may be achieved by using 
multiple sources of data and triangulation, which signifies the protocols used to ensure 
accuracy and alternative justifications (Yin, 1989, 1992; Stake, 1995).  
Based on the above literature findings, the conclusion was drawn that the multiple 
case studies triangulated by industry interview findings would be the most suitable design 
for this research.  In this case the principal aims of this were to mount a series of single 
investigations in which each study either proves or disproves the exploratory propositions 
to obtain the most vigorous research outcome possible.  This was done using replication 
logic and triangulation to make the research robust, to take data uncertainties into account 
as effectively as possible and to reinforce the external validity of the results. 
5.3.3 Case Study Research Design 
The research design selected actually determined the plan for the process of data 
gathering, analysis and interpretation (Yin, 1989, 1992).  The steps for this process 
involved (i) clearly defining the exploratory propositions and the research contextual issues 
and questions (see Chapter Four); (ii) selecting appropriate case studies; (iii) designing 
case study protocol to include ethical considerations, field procedures and interview 
questions; (iv) preparing the data collection plan; (v) evaluating the case studies in order to 
derive empirical findings and preparing the individual case reports, and (vi) carrying out a 
cross-case comparative analysis to formulate the findings and conclusions.  The logical 





Figure 5.2 - The Research Design Process 
(Source: Developed for this research by the author, based on Yin (1989, 1992)) 
	
Each case study was considered as an individual investigation providing the 
freedom to revise the questions being investigated for a particular case study.  This 
approach enabled comprehensive, dependable, valid and precise data to be obtained from 
the documentation review and the interview process (Sanders et al., 2000).  In practice, 
refinements to the closed questions evolved both during the discussions and when they 
were prompted by the interviewees’ answers to the open questions.   
When considering political hazards, semi-structured interviews were used 
extensively to identify their impact on the project transactions.  
5.3.4 Case Study Procedure 
A case study procedure was devised as follows:- 
• Formulation of the objectives of the investigation and issues and topics to be 
investigated.  All the studies were based on major oil and gas projects operating in 
host countries with varying levels of political and economic uncertainties. 
• Field investigations: including obtaining sources for data collection, both 
























• Case study questions vital to the research were the main focus as they remind the 
researcher of the data to be collected, and define the interview guideline questions. 
• Common format for each case study report for recording the narrative and the 
findings from the transaction costs economics perspective to support or refute the 
research exploratory propositions (Yin, 1989, 1992). 
The above procedure was used as the basis to carry out a comparative analysis of 
the three case studies to test the applicability of the research exploratory propositions.  The 
operationalisation of this comparative analysis is presented in the next section.  
5.4 Comparative Analysis of Case Studies 
5.4.1 Analytical Strategy 
As discussed in earlier sections, the research design chosen was multiple case 
studies triangulated by interview responses with industry personnel.  The principle 
criterion used to select the case studies was that they should be drawn from major projects 
carried out in host countries where the political context of government intervention and 
protection of property rights varied (i.e. High/Medium/Low).  In this case the selection of 
the three case studies was made mindful of the need to investigate complex major projects 
that involved a considerable number of transactions.  Additional intricacies of the selected 
projects arose from their high technological complexities, the large amount of personnel 
required to execute the project, the significant CAPEX, the lengthy lead times, and the 
intensity of uncertainty at the start of the project with regards to the expected outcomes due 
to demanding technical requirements. 
Having decided on a comparative multi-case study investigation, the analytical 
strategy was formulated with the guidance provided within the literature (Yin, 1992; 
Cresswell and Clark, 2002; Sanders et al., 2007).  The first step of this strategy was to 
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formulate the contextual issues to be analysed and for what reason.  This was followed by 
the collection and evaluation of the data gathered by contextual analysis to derive the 
findings to answer the research issues.   
Finally, the validity of the findings was examined.  Formulation of the objectives of 
the investigation and contextual issues vital to the research were the main focus, as they 
reminded the researcher of the data to be collected from the project documents and to 
define the interview questions.  The criteria for data gathering were that the data must be 
directly related to the impact of the variables of the enhanced TCE model on transactions.  
This was followed by evaluating, classifying, or coding this data in order to test the 
hypotheses developed.  Every effort was made to achieve this in a way that would not 
create bias in the results. 
In the selection of interview participants, purposive sampling was used by the 
researcher based on his knowledge of the industry and requirements of the investigations 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2005).  Consequently, the researcher exercised his judgement and 
experience to ‘hand pick’ project managers and other project professionals who had 
intimate knowledge of the projects which were the subject of the case studies.  It was 
deemed that these professionals were most suitable to provide the relevant information to 
support the data from the project documentation in order to develop the case study 
narrative.  All interviews were transcribed, checked for accuracy and duplicates produced.  
In an effort to ensure consistency, a common format was used for each case study report 
for recording the narrative, including the input of the interview responses and for 
evaluating the findings from the transaction costs economics perspective to support or 





5.4.1.1 Contextual Issues 
The impact of the following variables on the project transactions were defined as 
the contextual issues for the data gathering: 
1. Economic, technological and behavioural uncertainties.  
2. Asset specificity of the transactions. 
3. Host country political context, including: 
• State intervention in IOGC’s project execution arrangements, including the 
sanctioning of the projects.  
• The behaviour of the host country government and institutions on contract 
enforcement to safeguard property rights.  
• Increased demand for local content creating the need to form Joint Ventures 
with local partners.  
4. Mitigation measures and contingencies implemented by the IOGC management to 
complete the project transactions, to cope with the host country’s political hazards 
and property rights issues. 
5. The main issues involved in executing project activities with Joint Ventures with 
host country companies and with EPCI Contractors.  
5.4.2 Data Gathering 
The data gathering methods were in line with the guidance provided in the 
literature, that the case study documentation was the main method complimented by semi-
structured interviews.  A combination of these was used to constitute an inclusive approach 
to improving the excellence and soundness of the data by triangulation (Yin, 1992; Sanders 
et al., 2007; Cresswell and Clark, 2002).  For this, data was gathered from an analysis of 
project documentation and records, including contracts, project kick-off documents, project 
strategy reports, and monthly progress reports.  The details obtained from these projects 
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and related confidential documents were used to build up the narrative, corroborated by the 
responses of the interview participants (IPs).  This was another reason why triangulation 
was important for enhancing the validity of the data.  The semi-structured interview model 
was selected in reference to the survey approach and in an effort to triangulate the data 
gathered from project documents and record analyses.  The questionnaire-based semi-
structured interviews were held with industry personnel, including senior project managers 
who have been involved in strategy setting and execution of the FPSO projects in Nigeria, 
Angola and USA.  Consequently, the field investigation consisted of pre-arranged 
interviews based on a questionnaire (Appendix 1) with industry professionals listed in 
Table 5.4.  The interview questionnaire was discussed with the interview participants to 
highlight the aim of the study, relevance of each question to the research issues and how 
the results would be used (in a confidential manner) for the case study evaluations (Stake, 
1995; Sanders et al., 2007).  
In order to make the responses meaningful and consistent, a contextual analysis 
classification based on ordinal numbering was used to convert the qualitative data to a 
form of quantitative data for analysis.  This method is justified on the basis that the 
investigation is a comparative analysis of the case studies and is not an exercise to seek 
absolute values for the impact of the variables of the enhanced TCE model on transactions. 
In research, both quantitative and qualitative analysis uses labelling and coding of 
the data collected to develop a framework for analysis.  In the case of qualitative research, 
this method needs to be developed as there is no formal system for coding.  This leads to 
the need for content analysis for identifying and specific data coding for each qualitative 
research.  Context analysis enables systematic rule guided text analysis to provide some 
methodical strength of the quantitative analysis to the qualitative procedure (Mayring, 
2000).  As such, the context analysis was used in this research with mathematical 
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aggregation to transform basic qualitative evidence into a form of credible quantitative 
evidence which provides a framework for structuring and analysing the data (Remenyi et 
al., 2002).  This helped to ensure consistency in the analysis of the responses, as well as 
what may have been inferred or implied to draw the findings on the contextual issues of the 
research.  In order to utilise the contextual analysis, an ordinal measurement scale of 
High/Medium/Low was developed using the method for dimensioning of hazard levels 
presented in Table 1.1 (Chapter One). 
This measurement coding is presented in Table 5.3 and was explained to the 
interview participants (listed in Table 5.4) at the commencement of each interview to 
maximise the consistency in their responses to the questions. 
 
	
Table 5.3 - Measurement of the Impact of Variables on Transactions 
Context of Variable Dimensioning of Hazard Level 
Low (with an ordinal 
scale of 1)  
Defined as known risks – 
A priori probability. 
Medium (with an 
ordinal scale of 2) 
Unknown risks – A 
statistical probability. 
High (with an 
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Proven high level 





incomplete due to 
deficient 
specifications. 
Assets Specificity Standard design.  
Not site specific.  
No limitation of 
Contractors. 
Re-deployable. 
Significant design work 

















Context of Variable Dimensioning of Hazard Level 
Low (with an ordinal 
scale of 1)  
Defined as known risks – 
A priori probability. 
Medium (with an 
ordinal scale of 2) 
Unknown risks – A 
statistical probability. 
High (with an 





Impact of political 
hazards and 
opportunistic 
behaviour of the host 
government. 
Intervention of 
government limited to 
well-established 
regulations.   
Stable and known 
political conditions.  




potential for adverse 









by institutions.  







measures for the 
protection of property 
rights. 
Strong and independent 
judiciary.  Well 
established legal 
protection, for the 
industry. 
Established judicial 
system, may not have 
been tested by the 
industry and hence 
could be unpredictable. 
Established legal 
system but not 
independent or 






IP Project/Organisation position held   Experience 
(years) 
Input to relevant  
case study 
1 Project Director, Shell Expro (UK) >30 Nigeria 
2 Project Manager, Shell International >30 Nigeria 
3 Project Manager, Shell International >30 Nigeria 
4 Project Services Manager, Shell Expro (UK) >25 Nigeria 
5 Director, Risk Management, formerly Shell (UK) >25 Angola 
6 HSE & Risk Management, Shell International Ltd >15 USA 
7 Project Risk Manager, TOTAL E&P >20 Angola 
8 Project Services Manager, Total E&P >25 Angola 
9 Academic and Project Management Consultant >30 USA 
10 Ex-Vice President Halliburton Energy Services >35 USA 
11 Project Manager – several IOCs >35 USA 
12 Managing Director, Risk Management Consultants >30 USA 
13 HSE & Risk Manager, TOTAL A.S. >30 Angola 
14 Project Manager, TOTAL A.S. >25 Angola 
15 HSE & Risk Manager, TOTAL A.S. >25 Angola 
16 Risk Management Consultant, TOTAL A.S. >25 Angola 
17 Risk Management Consultant, TOTAL A.S. >15 Nigeria 
18 HSE & Risk Manager, TOTAL A.S. >25 Angola 
19 Project Flow Assurance Manager >15 Angola 
20 Risk Manager – Subsea Seven Limited  >20 USA 
21 Director, Risk Management, Consultants >20 USA 
22 Project Manager, Risk Management, Consultants >20 Nigeria 
23 Senior Consultant, Risk Management, Consultants >10 Angola 
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IP Project/Organisation position held   Experience 
(years) 
Input to relevant  
case study 
24 Local Content Management, TOTAL A.S. >20 Nigeria 
25 Director, Risk Management, ARC Consultants >30 USA 
26 Project Assurance Manager, TOTAL A.S. >30 Nigeria 
27 Project Services Manager, TOTAL A.S. >25 Angola 
28 Project Services Manager, Total E&P >30 Angola 
29 Corporate Audit – TOTAL A.S. >30 Nigeria 
30 Project Manager, TOTAL A.S. >30 Nigeria 
 
IP = Interview Participant identification 
The names and other details of the IPs are held by the researcher. 
 
The project cost figures, particularly the increases in costs of project transactions, 
were extracted from project records but could not be quoted.  Instead the estimates of these 
values confirmed by interview participants were used in the case study analysis to maintain 
the confidentiality of the organisations. 
 
5.4.3 Recording and Analysis of Data 
As stated earlier, the data collected from the project documentation was used to 
develop the narrative of the project transactions subject of the case studies.  The responses 
of the thirty interview participants listed in Table 5.4 were recorded, analysed and used as 
discussed in this section. 
1. Responses from all participants to the closedquestions in the questionnaire 
(Appendix 1)were entered into an Excel spreadsheet using the code High (3) / 
Medium (2) / Low (1) (reference – Appendix 5).  This spreadsheet has the 
necessary mathematical aggregation formulae built in to convert the responses 
into the average score of all the respondents to the particular questions.  The 
results are presented in Appendix 2 and were used to draw general conclusions on 
the impact of the contextual variables, as discussed in Chapters Six and Ten. 
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2. Summaries of the responses to the open discussion questions were grouped 
according to the host country of the case study in Appendix 3.  These responses 
were used to support the data collected from the project documentation to develop 
the narratives of case studies and for formulating the findings (Chapters Seven, 
Eight and Nine). 
Several individuals involved in projects bring together a larger pool of experience, 
knowledge and creative insights.  The synergy of individuals may make the overall quality 
of the input to the group judgement greater than the sum of the parts.  The role of juries, 
panels and cabinets to make judgements can be seen to be based on this premise (Ferrel, 
1985).  In this case the logic used is that a number of experts may combine in order to 
deliver an assessment superior to that which might be attained by merely accepting an 
individual recommendation.  In order to implement this method, the technique of 
mathematical aggregation can be considered to be the most suitable for combining 
individual judgements to substitute the quantitative methods (Ferrel, 1985; Goodwin and 
Wright, 1998).  In this context, with ordinal scales such as high, medium and low, it is the 
order of the values that is important and significant, even though the quantitative difference 
between each one is not really known (Goodwin and Wright, 1998; Grabisch et al., 2009).  
For example, as discussed in Chapter Seven and confirmed by the interview responses to 
closed question E1 (reference -Appendix 2), the relative political hazards in Nigeria are 
considered very high, but we cannot quantify how much higher than in Angola or the USA.  
Ordinal scales are thus typically measures of non-numeric concepts like happiness, failures 
and discomfort.   
 
In this case a credible way to determine central tendency on a set of ordinal data is 
to use the average value defined in percentage terms from an ordinal set as follows:  
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 Average Score = Total score of all respondents (30) x100 % 
   Maximum possible score (3) of all respondents (30) = 30 x 3=90 
 
(Source: Grabisch et al., 2009) 
The results for the average score for each interview question are tabulated in 
Appendix 5. 
5.4.4 Techniques for the Comparative Analysis 
In the process of comparative analysis, within-case analysis was the first analysis 
used for each case study, where written documentation and interview response data were 
examined in order to identify relationships between variables.  Detailed individual case 
study write-ups were prepared, summarising the history of the transactions and examining 
the data for matching the research questions and answers against the enhanced TCE 
conceptual model.  This was followed by comparative analysis of all the cases by 
evaluating, categorising the similarities and differences (in Chapter Ten).  The core 
available analytical techniques for such comparative analysis are pattern-matching, 
explanation-building, and time series analysis (Yin, 1989).  
In this research, the selection of the analytical techniques relied on the theoretical 
propositions that led to the choice of the comparative analysis of case studies.  As such, 
pattern-matching can be considered to be a very effective strategy for analysis, in 
comparison with an empirically based predicted and postulated outcome.  If the patterns of 
the findings of the case studies match, the validity of the study would be enhanced, even 
though the comparison between the predicted and the actual pattern might not possess any 
quantitative criteria.  As patterns begin to emerge, certain evidence may stand out as being 
in conflict with the patterns. In this case the judgement of the researcher, therefore, is 
required in the interpretation of the results (Yin, 1989).  Explanation-building is considered 
a form of pattern-matching in which the analysis of the case study is carried out by 
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building an explanation of the case.  Explanation-building is an iterative process that 
begins with a theoretical statement which is refined and the proposition revised, and then 
the process repeats itself from the beginning.  However, the technique is known to be 
fraught with problems, one being a loss of focus due to the iterative process and hence it 
may not be possible for the researcher to continuously bear in mind the direction of the 
research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  Time series analysis is a mathematical technique 
applicable in experimental analysis, but is not relevant to case study methodology that is 
based on evaluating events (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  Hence, time series analysis was 
not considered for this research.  As this research is intended to test the theoretical model 
with empirical evidence from multiple case studies, pattern-matching was considered to be 
the most suitable analytical technique for examining the findings of the field investigation. 
A choice had to be made between deductive and inductive paradigms with which to 
evaluate the evidence from the comparative analysis and to derive valid findings to answer 
the research hypotheses posed.  Deductive research is a study in which a conceptual and 
theoretical structure is developed which is then tested by empirical observation.  In this 
case, particular instances are deducted from general influences and hence it is referred to as 
moving from the general to the particular.  By contrast, inductive research is a study in 
which theory is developed from the observation of empirical reality; thus general 
inferences are induced from particular instances, which involves moving from individual 
observations to statements of general patterns (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  Based on these 
definitions, it was believed that this investigation would use the deductive model, as the 
conceptual and theoretical structures were developed from a review of the literature and 
tested against the field evidence derived from the findings of the case studies and interview 
responses.  From the deduction of the evidence, findings and conclusions of the research 
were formulated and are discussed in Chapter Ten. 
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5.4.5 Selection of Case Studies 
 In order to explore the applicability of the extended TCE model, three case studies 
were selected to represent the Zones A, B and C of political hazards and protection of 
property rights spectrum as illustrated in Figure 4.1. These three case studies are based on 
major offshore deep water oil and gas projects with similar scope and technical 
complexities.  The field investigation was based on evidence collected from the case 
documentation of these projects, complemented by results of semi-structured interviews 
with industry project management and technical specialists. These are major oil and gas 
projects carried out in Nigeria, Angola and United States of America (USA) and are 
presented in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine respectively.   
       As discussed in these chapters, each case represents different ex-ante dimensions of 
political hazards and enforcement of property rights.  These dimensions for the case studies 
were identified by evaluation of the data on the political and legal context of these 
countries presented in the following industry reports: 
• Wood Mackenzie Oil and Gas Africa Reports 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
• KPMG Oil and Gas Reports 2010, 2011 and 2012. 
 In the case of Nigeria, which had a mature oil and gas production industry, it was 
found that there was a high level of government intervention with selfish motives mostly in 
a blatant manner ignoring the constitution.  In addition, the judicial institutions did not 
provide an adequate form of protection of property rights for the foreign investors.  Thus 
this case study can be considered to be transactions carried out in a near authoritarian state, 
even though elections are held. Two main parties dominate the political arena and each 
behave in an authoritarian manner when they capture power.  
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In the case of Angola, oil and gas production became a major industry only in the 
past fifteen years.  Based on the past behaviour of the government towards the relatively 
young oil and gas industry, the IOGCs expected some degree of self-interested behaviour 
with stealth on the part of the government but not significant enough to impact the 
outcome of major project transactions.  An established judiciary system is present in 
Angola, but there have not been any known cases where IOGCs had to resort to legal 
redress to resolve contractual failures. The host country regime in this case study can be 
considered to be an authoritarian democracy.  On the other end of the spectrum, the USA 
has the oldest major oil and gas industry in the world. This industry is regulated by 
government Bills and Statutory Instruments and adverse intervention by the government in 
major projects is not an issue.  The enforcement of property rights is very strong, even 
though the costs of legal actions if required will be very expensive. In this case study the 
role of the state can be considered to be neutral.   
 Taking into consideration the above facts, the ex-ante scaling of political hazards 
due to host country government intervention and strength of the enforcement of property 
rights for the case studies selected are as shown in the matrix below in Figure 5.3.   The 
scaling of these parameters as low, medium and high for the case studies are the same as 
those presented in Figure 4.1.  As a result, the Gulf of Mexico USA can be considered as 
the bench mark case study for the comparative analysis to explore the applicability of the 




Figure 5.3 - Ex-Ante Dimensioning of Case Studies 
The case studies are presented in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine.  
The generic and common features of major offshore oil and gas projects, their 
execution and the challenges faced by them, are presented in Chapter Six. 
5.4.6 Behavioural and Ethical Considerations 
An important issue connected with the adoption of the research paradigm is the 
extent to which the researcher is, or can be, subjective or objective.   
The traditional assumption is that in science the researcher must maintain complete 
independence if there is to be any validity in the findings produced.  However, the 
phenomenological research paradigm is, by its very nature, subjective, since it necessarily 
requires the involvement of the real world-circumstances of the researcher.  It is accepted 
that such an approach requires the recognition of any influence or limitation, as this may 
have an effect on the conduct or findings of the research.  Additionally, phenomenological 
research inevitably involves subjectivity in its analysis and data interpretation (Miles and 




















However, this research is based on a positivist philosophy and the researcher, in 
spite of his long and close association with the oil and gas industry, made every effort to 
maintain objectivity during the research. 
In this research, ethical issues were also taken under consideration and respected, 
particularly in the data collection and interviews.  The most important consideration was to 
explain to the interview participants in detail about their input to the research and giving 
them the assurance of complete confidentiality and anonymity.  In addition, the researcher 
explained to the participants about the nature of the research project and how the findings 
and conclusions would be used to enhance the industry practices, still respecting the 
confidentiality assurance given to the interview participants.  Assurances concerning the 
right to withdraw from the process at any time, without having to explain the reasons were 
emphasised.  As a result, informed consent was obtained after fully advising participants of 
the proposed uses of the data, the identity of the researcher and his professional position, 
the participants’ roles, the degree of anonymity and confidentiality, the methods to be 
employed, and the anticipated length of interviews.  Finally, the researcher offered to 
communicate the findings of the study to the participants within the bounds of established 
ethical and confidentiality considerations (Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
 
5.5 Summary 
This Chapter has explained the alternative research philosophies and methods that 
were considered for the execution of research and field investigation.  It has also explained 
the justification and logic behind selection of the adopted methods, which were based on a 
positivist philosophy.  The research approach used is multi-method, with a combination of 
non-empirical method to develop the research propositions and empirical approach to test 
them.   
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The empirical approach uses qualitative methods and employs case studies as the 
primary research strategy.  This methodology of using a comparative analysis of multiple 
case studies was supplemented by interviews with selected industry professionals.  This 
approach provides an exploratory, longitudinal examination through the data gathered from 
the three case studies.  As a result, this approach was considered to be the most credible 
field investigation choice in order to justify the generalisation of the results.  The research 
is unbiased, in spite of the researcher being heavily involved in the oil and gas E&P 
industry.   
The alternative research philosophies and research methods were reviewed and the 






































Chapter 6 COMMON FEATURES OF AN OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS 
DEVELOPMENT 
	
6.1 Introduction and Objectives of the Chapter 
The literature reviews and theoretical arguments made in Chapters One, Two and 
Three were synthesised and integrated in Chapter Four to develop enhancements to the 
Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) Theory.  This is to manage the challenges of 
governing high value, complex, industrial projects executed across international borders.  
The internationalisation of project transactions as discussed in Chapter Three can cause 
new challenges in the form of potential opportunistic intervention by host governments and 
inadequate institutional arrangements for the protection of property rights of the 
organisations responsible for the execution of the project.  Exploratory propositions and an 
extended TCE model based on them were defined as to how the incorporation of political 
governance mechanisms will impact the predictive outcomes of the basic TCE model to 
cope with these new challenges.   
In order to test the applicability of the exploratory propositions and the extended 
TCE model, three case studies of major oil and gas projects carried out in different host 
countries were selected to represent the Zones A, B and C of ex-ante dimensions of 
political hazards and enforcement of property rights spectrum as illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
As explained in Section 4.5, these are case studies of projects carried out for Nigeria, 
Angola and the United States of America (USA) and are presented in Chapters Seven, 
Eight and Nine respectively.   
This Chapter summarises the overall scope, technical features and common practice 
of the execution of major offshore deep water oil and gas projects.  Common risks and 
uncertainties associated with the execution of these projects which are the subject of the 
case studies are also examined.  This chapter is provided to avoid repetitions within each 
	
	 131	
case study.  The increasing exogenous challenges in the form of political hazards faced by 
these international projects are also examined.  
This Chapter has been developed by the researcher from the project execution 
procedures used by TOTAL A.S. for the offshore oil and gas projects.  The researcher has 
participated as a risk management consultant for the execution of several of these projects.  
It should be noted that project cost data used are approximate values based on data from 
typical projects of this nature.  Reports from WoodMackenzie, KPMG, published in 
industry journals and papers presented at annual Offshore Technological Conferences 
(OTC), are all listed in the References section of this thesis and used to develop this 
chapter.  This is in order to protect the commercial and technical confidentiality associated 
with the projects presented in the case studies. 
The development of an offshore oil and gas field is usually carried out by a joint 
venture of two or more international oil and gas companies (IOGCs) with the host country 
national oil company (NOC).  The NOC owns the oil and gas reserves on behalf of the host 
country government.  These reserves are leased to IOCGs who conduct the exploration 
work in order to discover the reserves.   
The IOGC with the largest share of the leased reserves is normally appointed the 
field operator company (FOC) by the partners of the venture.  The FOC is responsible for 
the project execution activities from exploration to achieve first oil and gas and for 
subsequent production operations.  Even though the investment contribution by a NOC is 
minimal, it has significant authority, acting on behalf of the host government.  Hence, 
NOC has an overriding influence on project transactions, including approving the selection 
of the main EPCI contractors, which can be termed as a major strategic decision for project 
execution.  The activities of the main phases to operationalise an oil and gas field are: 
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1) The offshore exploration and drilling phase.  If oil and gas reserves are discovered 
in commercially viable quantities, the production and water injection wells are 
drilled and completed by the drilling contractor on a contract to the FOC. 
2) The development of the offshore field infrastructure to enable the production of 
first oil and gas.  This phase covers the technical and economic feasibility studies 
up to sanctioning the project.  The planning, preparation and execution of these 
project phases is made up of successive distinct stages which form the project life 
cycle.  The stages are interconnected and are carried out in a logical process.  The 
main stages of the life cycle are the formulation of the parameters of the project, its 
basic design, evaluation of the feasibility and execution once the investment 
decision-making activity has been completed.  This is followed by the engineering, 
fabrication, installation and commissioning of the systems and facilities to produce 
and transfer hydrocarbons from the wells to the shore (Barlow, 2000; Scott et al., 
2012). 
3) The operation of the field facilities for the production, processing and transport of 
oil and gas to shore in order to generate the revenue for the project returns. 
4) Decommissioning of the facilities to abandon the field and restore the site. 
The above phases and their typical durations are illustrated in Figure 6.1.  The 
decision point for the sanctioning of the project and the selection of the option for 
development is indicated by (D) in this figure.   The execution transactions required from 
the decision point ‘D’ to achieve first oil and gas, i.e. the activities as given in item (2) 





(Source: Developed by Researcher) 
Figure 6.1 - Oil and Gas Field Life Cycle 
 
Section 6.2 of this Chapter describes the main components of an offshore project.  
It describes the scope of the components and highlights the complexities involved.  In 
Section 6.3 the project activities required from the conceptual stage of the project to 
achieving oil and gas production from the offshore field are described.  For this purpose, 
the steps of the project life cycle are examined to demonstrate how the uncertainty and 
asset specificity associated with the transactions can vary over the duration of the project 
execution.  Section 6.4 examines how increasing industry and exogenous uncertainties can 































6.2 Main Components of an Offshore Oil and Gas Development 
6.2.1 Field Layout 
This section summarises the main components of an offshore deep water oil and 
gas field development using the example of the development of offshore fields Egina 
South, Egina Main and Preowei fields off Nigeria.  This data is presented in order to 
illustrate the scope, complexity, and the asset specificity nature of such a project.  Major 
offshore deep water oil and gas projects such as the Egina project, which extract, process 
and transport oil and gas from a deep water offshore field to a land terminal require several 
interconnected project components after the wells have been drilled (see Figure 6.2).  
Based on current practices in the industry for project execution and contracting strategy, 
the development is divided into the following components: 
• Subsea production system (SPS) comprising of production wellheads and 
manifolds. 
• Pipelines, umbilicals and risers (PUR) from SPS to a floating production storage 
and offloading (FPSO) unit. 
• The floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) unit contains the 
hydrocarbon processing facilities.  It also contains the facilities for the management 
of the field operation. 



























Figure 6.2 - The Components of a Deep Water Offshore Project 
	
The above components are illustrated and described in the following sections in 
order to appreciate their scale, their capital costs and the extensive engineering 
construction and installation activities required to operationalise them.  The components 
after completion are installed and integrated offshore to form the infrastructure to extract 
oil and gas and transfer them to the shore.  The overall field layout development project 
comprising of the above components is illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
 
 (Source: Egina Project, TOTAL A.S.) 
Figure 6.3 - An Offshore Integrated Oil and Gas Project 
In the case of the Egina development, as shown in Figure 6.3, the subsea network 
comprises two production loops connected to five manifolds with four slots to twenty 
production wells.  In addition, there are three water injection lines connected to 19 water 
injection wells to maintain the pressure in the subsea reservoirs.  Table 6.1 provides the 
typical characteristics of the design basis for an offshore oil and gas field development 
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Table 6.1 - Egina Design Basis 
Water depth at FPSO location 1480m 
Water depth range over production site 1150 – 1750 m 
Oil and gas Producer Wells 10 
Water Injection Wells 19 
FPSO Total Fluids Rate (Capacity) 420 kbd 
FPSO Oil Rate (Capacity) 208 kbopd (200 kbopd at plateau) 
FPSO Gas Processing Capacity 9.2 MSm3/d 
FPSO Crude Oil Storage Capacity 2,300,000 bbls 
FPSO Dimensions – Length x Width x Depth 320 metres x 62 metres x 27 metres 
 
The components of oil and gas field development illustrated are described in the 
following sections in order to appreciate their scale, their capital costs, and the extensive 
engineering construction and installation activities required to operationalise them.  The 
completed components after completion are installed and integrated offshore to form the 
infrastructure to extract oil and gas and transfer them to the shore.  The project transactions 
required to convert the basic engineering into an operational FPSO constitutes the scope of 
the three case studies.   
6.2.2 Subsea Production Systems (SPS) 
The SPS network is composed of drilling centres with hydrocarbon production and 
water injection wells.  Wells are drilled into the subsea reservoirs with oil and gas reserves 
and are ‘completed’ on the sea bed by ‘Xmas trees’ and associated control systems to 
manage the production flow of hydrocarbons.  In the case of the Egina development, the 
subsea network comprises two production loops connected to five manifolds with four 
slots to 20 production wells.  In addition, there are 19 water injection wells to maintain the 
pressure in the subsea reservoirs.  The components of the SPS system are, in most cases, 
standard items.  Any technical variations due to particular site conditions can be managed 
by technical specifications.  The contracts for these items are normally of the frame 
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agreement type and the transactions are managed by market arrangements.  Hence the 
technical and commercial risks associated with the SPS are mostly known and considered 
to be manageable by contractual arrangements. 
6.2.3 Pipelines, Umbilicals and Risers (PURs) 
PURs (as shown in Figure 6.4) are installed for the transfer of production fluids and 
water injection water between the subsea wells and surface production facility, the FPSO.  
The PUR package has inherently complex technical and manufacturing issues due to the 
technical challenges of deep water operations.  These challenges are flow assurance issues 
due to the formation of hydrates in the pipelines, and the stringent design and fabrication 
issues to be resolved to meet the required performance.  Hence, the design of the PUR 
package components and their method of manufacture have to be completely site specific, 
and several technical uncertainties have to be managed to ensure the correct functioning of 
the PUR systems to ensure assurance of the hydrocarbon flow.  In addition, the EPCI 
contractors capable of handling the design, fabrication and installation of the PUR are 




Figure 6.4 - Pipelines, Umbilicals and Risers 
The cost of the PUR package for a deep water project can be expected to be in the 
region of US $3.0 to $3.5 billion. 
 
6.2.4 Floating Production Storage Offloading (FPSO) Unit 
The surface production FPSO installation is a ship-like unit with topsides and a hull 




Figure 6.5 - A Typical FPSO of 200,000 BPD Processing Capacity 
The FPSO unit contains all the utilities and processing equipment required for 
processing the hydrocarbon flow directed from the wells.  The hydrocarbon flow is 
separated into oil, gas and water streams by the process systems.  The facilities for this 
include gas/liquid separation, gas compression, gas lifting, oil metering and a flare tower.  
These are located on the topside of the FPSO unit above the main and hull decks.  
Stabilised oil from the separation process is stored in the FPSO unit storage tanks within 
the hull.  The hull also contains water ballast tanks, machinery spaces, and equipment for 
mooring the FPSO unit to the seabed.  The water produced is treated and re-injected into 
the reservoir.  An accommodation block on the FPSO unit is provided for the personnel 
working and living on board, which can be up to 300 persons.  The FPSO unit design, 
particularly the topside process facilities and its mooring arrangement, are highly site 
specific and there will be design variations and uncertainties depending upon the 
	
	 140	
production capacities.  In addition, the number of construction contractors for large FPSO 
units are limited due to the size of the FPSO hull. 
An offshore oil terminal (OTT) system with moorings is located at a minimum 
distance of one nautical mile from the FPSO unit.  Oil offloading lines are installed to 
transfer oil from the FPSO unit to the OTT.  The oil is transferred from this OTT to shuttle 
tankers, which will then take the oil ashore.  Alternatively, a subsea pipeline from the 
FPSO to the shore can be used for this purpose.  Produced gas is partly used as fuel gas for 
the gas turbine driven power generation units (normally about 80 MW total capacity) on 
the FPSO unit.  The major part of the produced gas is exported through a pipeline system 
to an onshore terminal for refining.  The cost of a FPSO for a deep water project can be 
expected to be in the region of US $4 to $5 billion. 
6.3 Project Execution and Contractual Hazards 
6.3.1 Project Execution Activities 
The strategy formulation, preparation and execution of a project comprises several 
distinct stages, commonly collectively referred to as the project life cycle.  The concept of 
the project life cycle is very important in both theory and practice to understand how 
projects are executed and to identify causes of project failures.  Current practice for the 
execution of an offshore oil and gas project is to split the scope into the following major 
components or ‘packages’ for the purpose of engineering, procurement, construction and 
installation (EPCI) (Barlow, 1997; Olsen, 2005): 
• SPS – installation of wellheads and manifolds; 
• PUR from SPS to FPSO unit; 
• FPSO and associated mooring system; and 
• Tie-ins and transfer of oil and gas export to existing onshore facilities. 
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Standard practice in the Oil and Gas E&P Industry is to use the market 
arrangements and parcel out the management and execution of EPCI of the above major 
project components to major EPCI contractors (Olsen et al., 2005).  This approach is in 
line with the core competence philosophy that has underlined much modern management 
thinking (Porter, 1985).  In this case the belief is that firms differ substantially in terms of 
resource-endowment and capability and firms apply the principles of competitive 
advantage to their business.  It is a case of those players most suited to undertake an 
activity undertake it.  Within this model, the large oil and gas companies are focussed on 
overseeing the EPCI contractors to carry out the engineering and construction activities, 
using the principle of Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 If the oil and gas companies are sufficiently diligent prior to the signing of any 
agreements, then the types of contracts necessary to exercise effective control can be put in 
place.  In this situation the glue that has held these transactions together was the use of 
contracts as the main governance method.  Drawing up contracts for the major components 
of the international projects has now become extremely challenging because their 
execution involves relationship of contracts between the EPCI Contractor, the national 
government and the client organisation (Olsen et al., 2005).  There might be difficulties for 
the client organisations such as managing and monitoring the performance of a large array 
of autonomous actors who are involved in major projects (Emery and Trist, 1971).  
However, in spite of well-set objectives and diligently planned project execution activities, 
some project transactions fail to meet their objectives (Merrow, 2012). 
As discussed, major projects are composed of main EPCI contracts and each of 
these contracts will have several subsets of transactions.  The characteristics of frequency 
of ordering, asset specificity and uncertainty of these transactions can vary over the project 
execution phases (Olsen et al., 2005).  The literature suggests that as the project progresses 
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through the successive stages of the life cycle, commercial and technological uncertainties 
are reduced.  The argument for this, which is backed by industry experience, is that as 
more data becomes available, technical and commercial issues are progressively resolved 
and compliance is achieved with approval requirements of the regulatory authorities 
(Winch, 2002, 2008; Olsen et al., 2005).  In the same way, some of the smaller 
components which are not project specific can be redeployed if required and the multiple 
dependency between the participants become less, resulting in the asset specificity of such 
components decreasing over time (McKenna et al., 2005). 
A framework has been developed by the researcher using the concept of dynamic 
uncertainty and reducing asset specificity over the life cycle as discussed above.  This 
framework, as illustrated in Figure 6.5 is based on the logic that technical and commercial 
uncertainties decrease as the required knowledge and data to execute the project activities 
increase over time.  In this case, the area to the left of the s-curve highlights the data still to 
be acquired, i.e. uncertainty, whilst that to the right reflects what is known, i.e. certainty.  
The relative level of uncertainty at any particular point in the project life cycle may be 
thought of as the level of dynamic uncertainty on the project (Miller and Lesard, 2000; 





Figure 6.6 - Variation of Uncertainty and Asset Specificity over Project Life Cycle 
In Figure 6.6, the strategic phase activities include the engineering and economic 
feasibility studies, project scope definition, formulation of project execution strategy and 
sanction.   
This is followed by the execution phase of contracts for engineering, procurement, 
construction and installation (EPCI) of the major components.  In this phase the activities 
can be subject to uncertainties due to incomplete data on technical and commercial issues.  
When the EPCI contracts for main components are executed, data is still incomplete and 
the parties have to deal with known risks and some uncertainties.  The asset specificity of 
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the transactions will vary according to the specification and function of the component in 
the overall project infrastructure.  A demonstration of this is provided in Section 6.3.2.  
During this execution phase, it may be possible for some project components and services 
to be specified to take into account the known and quantifiable uncertainties (Olsen et al., 
2005).  
After the completion of the construction phase, the FPSO is towed to the offshore 
site and moored. The SPS and UFL components are transported to the offshore site and 
installed.  The interconnections between the FPSO, UFL and SPS components are made to 
form an integrated system by contractors commissioned by the IOGC.  Finally 
commissioning and start up activities are completed to achieve ‘first oil and gas’ by FOC’s 
operations personnel.  The execution of the EPCI contracts as explained above is 
summarised in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 - Execution of Project Components 
Project Component Activity Location of Activity Schedule 
FPSO Detailed Engineering (MS1) Europe 4 years 
SPS and PUR Detailed Engineering (MS1) Europe 2 years 
FPSO hull Fabrication and Construction 
(MS2) 
South Korea 2 years 
FPSO topside modules Fabrication and Construction 
(MS2) 
South Korea or other 
locations including home 
country 
3 years 
FPSO integration of topside 
modules and hull 
Fabrication and Construction 
(MS2) 
Normally South Korea 1 year 
SPS Fabrication (MS2) Europe 2 years 
PUR Fabrication and Construction 
(MS2) 
Europe and home country 3 years 
SPS, PUR and FPSO unit Offshore installation and 
commissioning (MS3 and MS4) 
Offshore site 1 year 
In all cases the project management, liaison with the host government and 
monitoring of the EPCI contractor’s performance are normally carried out by the IOGC’s 
project management teams based in all locations where the project activities are being 
carried out.  The variation of the uncertainties and asset specificities of the above 
transactions over the project execution phase, as discussed earlier, provides justification for 
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the selective use of governance mechanisms as proposed in Chapter Two. However, 
progressive reduction in uncertainty may not apply to unpredictability caused by political 
factors in the host country where the project transactions are carried out. 
6.3.2 Contractual Hazards and Governance 
The above project execution activities face several commercial and technical 
hazards that depend on a number of factors such as the extent to which the features of the 
project transactions are similar to previous ventures and the extent of the requirement for 
novel technologies to solve new problems (Williams, 1997; Atkinson et al., 2006).  At the 
initial stages project decisions have to be made on the execution strategy and the 
governance methods for the necessary transactions.  Also, the choice of the mode of 
governance for the project transactions has to take into account the hazards associated with 
the venture, by considering possible alternative scenarios (Winch, 2008; Scott et al., 2012). 
The high uncertainty and asset specificity associated with these project 
transactions, and the traditional practice of ‘turn-key’ contracts are vulnerable to delays 
because neither party can foresee all the future contingencies that may arise and hence the 
contracts are not sufficiently comprehensive and must be amended, causing further delay 
(Mintzberg, 1994; Scott et al., 2012). 
In addition, the contracts for the engineering, procurement, construction and 
installation (EPCI) are of about three to four years’ duration and need to allow for the 
technical and commercial complexities associated with such ventures.  In such cases the 
EPCI contracts can be incomplete as the scope and extent of allowances to cover for 
technical complexities and their consequences cannot be adequately quantified using 
historical data as the data can be significantly different between major projects.  An 
outcome of these shortcomings can be the difficulties in defining technical specifications 
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and operational requirements with sufficient accuracy as often the novel technology may 
be required for the operation of these major projects.   
As discussed in Chapters One, Two and Three, these execution difficulties can be 
compounded for international transactions.  This was found to be due to the high levels of 
political behavioural uncertainty and the pressure from host countries to increase local 
content (see Chapters Three and Four).  As such, there are significant increases in the 
political hazards and resultant economic uncertainties that threaten successful execution 
(Scott et al., 2012).  These issues can be compounded if inappropriate management and 
governance arrangements are used (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; McKenna et al., 2005; 
Mullins, 2013).  The governance mechanisms represented in the literature differ in their 
approach to managing economic and commercial transactions (Hart, 1988).  As the 
objective of the research is to extend the TCE model to predict governance mechanisms to 
manage host country political hazards, the focus must be on the transactions most subject 
to such hazards.   
In this context, the transactions for the FPSO compared to other transactions are the 
most vulnerable to host country political hazards.  This is because FPSO transactions are 
the most visible revenue generation activities with the potential for highest local content.  
As an industry project manager (IP11) stated “All other components of the production 
infrastructure are under water and are not seen by the beady eyes”. 
Before venturing on to the political hazards, the governance mechanisms that 
would be predicted by the basic TCE model to manage the EPCI activities for the FPSO 
are evaluated.  For this the components of the FPSO and activities to complete them are 
defined.  The commercial uncertainties and asset specificities associated with these 
components/activities for a FPSO are then determined from the records of similar projects, 
provided by the interview participants. 
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Then the predictions of the basic TCE model are used to select the most 
economising governance mechanisms, (i.e. Market, Hybrid or Vertical Integration) for the 
sub-transaction of each FPSO component.  The outcome is presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 - Prediction of Basic TCE Model 
Transactions/ 
Components 






FPSO Engineering and 
Design to define the 
technical requirements 
ED E High High VI 
Hull 
Tanks and Machinery 
DD SK Low Low MA 
FC SK Low Low MA 
Topsides Main Process 
Systems 
DD SK High High Hyb1 
FC SK Medium Medium MA 
Topside Utilities and 
Power Generation 
DD SK Medium Medium MA 
FC SK Low Low MA 
Flare Tower DD HOS Low Low MA 
FC HOS Low Low MA 
Minor Utilities DD HOS Low Low MA 
FC HOS Low Low MA 
Risers and Manifolds DD SK Medium Medium Hyb2 
FC SK Medium Medium Hyb2 
Accommodation Block DD SK Low Low MA 
FC SK Low Low MA 
FPSO Integration DD SK Med Med Hyb2 
FC SK Med Med Hyb2 
FPSO Mooring DD E High High Hyb1 
FC SK Medium Medium Hyb1 
Oil Export Buoy DD SK Medium Medium Hyb1 
FC SK Low Low MA 
Offshore Installation 
and Integration 
DD SK Medium Medium Hyb2 
IN OFF Medium Medium Hyb2 
Offshore 
Commissioning 
DD EU High High VI 
COM OFF High High VI 
Notes:  
Activities 
ED = Engineering and design before award of contracts for detailed design and fabrication 
FC = Fabrication and construction 
DD = Detailed design 
IN = Installation of the unit offshore 
COM = Commissioning of the installation offshore 
Governance Mechanisms 
MA = Market 
VI = Vertical Integration/Hierarchy 
Hyb 1 = Joint Venture – Hybrid with IOC dominance 
Hyb 2 = Joint Venture – Hybrid with EPCI dominance 
Locations 
EU = Europe 
SK = South Korea 
HOS = Home Country (Onshore/Dry docks) 




In the next section the increasing exogenous challenges facing the oil and gas 
international projects are examined.  This is as a prelude to the field investigation using 
three case studies and industry interviews to test the applicability of the extended TCE 
model. 
6.4 Main Hazards Facing an Offshore Oil and Gas Project 
6.4.1 The Project Risk Management 
In Chapter One it was discussed that the execution of major project transactions can 
be subjected to various levels of risks and uncertainties associated with the political, 
economic, sociological and technological (PEST) hazards (Barlow, 2000; Olsen et al., 
2005).  In several cases these hazards faced by the transactions cannot be avoided, but 
instead they must be identified and managed.  Thus the uncertainties and risks associated 
with the transactions, and the cost of managing them, must be taken into consideration in 
the selection of governance arrangements for the project execution activities, i.e. market or 
vertical integration or hybrid options. 
The oil and gas industry invests heavily in understanding, researching and 
evaluating the nature of the risks they face in project transactions.  They resort to extensive 
use of decision analysis and risk management techniques (MacMillan, 2000).  However, 
this does not seem to work, or works imperfectly, which poses the question of whether this 
failure is because of a lack of skill at assessing risk and uncertainty, or whether there is a 
more fundamental issue.  Research indicates that, in the case of oil and gas projects, risks 
are managed quite well, but uncertainty is not (Chapman and Ward, 2003; Olsen et al., 
2005).  
This thesis is developed on the proposition that there are conceptual and practical 
differences between impacts of uncertainties and risks and the way they have to be 
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managed by appropriate governance modes.  Thus a distinction needs to be drawn between 
risk and uncertainties facing major international oil and gas projects, which are the case 
studies for the research field investigation (see Chapter Five).   
For this purpose, the main technical and economic risks which are common to the 
three projects and subject of the case studies are identified and discussed in the next 
section.  Then in the following sections, the main exogenous uncertainties facing the 
international oil and gas industry are examined.  These uncertainties, as discussed later, are 
mainly due to the host country political context and can be considered to be applicable in 
varying degrees to the three case studies. 
6.4.2 Project Risk Management (PRM) 
Project risk is defined as an event or situation which will have a detrimental effect 
on the schedule, cost (CAPEX) performance of the outcome and revenue objectives of a 
project.  Each risk is characterised by its probability of occurrence (P) and its potential 
consequences (C) on a project’s transaction.  The industry project risk management (PRM) 
process is normally implemented in the following steps for each major project contract or 
transaction (MacMillan, 2000).  The process is executed by brainstorming sessions to 
capture the knowledge of individuals who have a close involvement with offshore oil and 
gas projects and also the documented evidence from other such projects, by using the 
experience of other such projects: 
• The identification of causes and occurrence of risks.   
• Evaluation, including sensitivity analysis of the consequences of identified risks. 
• Identification of risk reduction measures to be specified in the project management 




The above formal project risk management procedure is carried out for projects as 




(Source: Barlow, 2000 and Winch, 2002) 
Figure 6.7 - The Project Risk Management Process 
 
The causes of PEST hazards are: 
P = Political, including legal and statutory issues. 
E = Economic, including commercial threats. 
S = Sociological, including cultural and environmental issues. 
T = Technological, including logistics, communication and quality. 
 Risk control and mitigation measures identified are included into contracts to 
prevent cost or schedule overruns. The main risks, their consequences and measures to 
mitigate the consequences of a major FPSO project identified by the Risk Management 
Process facilitated by the researcher are summarised in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4 - The Outcome of the RMP for a FPSO Project 
Main Risks Consequence and Impact Mitigation Measures 
 
 
FPSO hull construction 
slot needs to be secured in 
a very competitive market. 
The FPSO manufacturing, 
at present monopolised by 
four international marine 




Shortage of fabrication capacity and 
limitations in engineering can cause 
escalation of FPSO CAPEX costs.  
This can also cause problems of delay 




Stringent contractual clause and 
technical specifications need to 
be included in the contracts to 
minimise CAPEX cost 
increases and delays. 
Engineering of critical FPSO 





























Main Risks Consequence and Impact Mitigation Measures 
Interfaces between FPSO 
topsides and hull storage 
tanks are complex and 
require careful 
management, as these two 
components are normally 
constructed in different 
yards. 
Performance of FPSO production 
systems can be impacted.   
Issues of delay, due to remedial 
measures to be implemented offshore. 
Stringent technical 
specifications included in the 
contract to prevent loss of 
performance and CAPEX cost 
increases.  Engineering of 
interfaces between the topsides 
interface engineering between 
the topsides and hull to be 
undertaken by the FOC. 
Technical interfaces 
between FPSO unit and 
PUR components may fail. 
In addition, hydrocarbon 
flow assurance issues 
associated with low 
reservoir temperature and 
high water depth need to 




Technical issues causing loss of 




included in the contract to 
prevent loss of performance 
and CAPEX cost increases. 
Interface engineering to be 
undertaken by the FOC.  Use of 
the existing and increasing 
worldwide experience to 
mitigate the risks associated 
with deep water reservoirs. 
Flow assurance engineering 
undertaken by the FOC. 
Failure of engineering and 
design work to meet the 
required stringent 
specifications. 
A major challenge faced by the project 
is that the design work will only be 
seen to be correct once the installation 
of the FPSO is complete.  Hence, the 
FOC’s commissioning logistics of 
70% onshore and 30% offshore may 
turn out to be extremely costly if the 
quality of the design and construction 
activities is defective.  Offshore 
remedial work can take three times as 
long due to the logistical issues of the 
limitation of facilities and technical 
expertise. 
Increased FOC guidance for the 
engineering and design to 
achieve a fit for purpose design 
in the first place. 
 
(Source: RMP outcome table prepared by Researcher for a TOTAL A.S. FPSO project) 
 
The data presented in Table 6.4 is equally applicable to all three case studies, which 
are offshore oil and gas projects with similar technical characteristics. The above findings 
on the main risks faced by FPSO projects and their consequences dictate that the complex 
transactions that can significantly impact the project outcome must be directed by the FOC.  
6.4.3 Challenges to Oil and Gas Industry Projects 
Having identified the main inherent technical risks faced by major international 
deep water FPSO projects, the attention now turns to the exogenous challenges faced by 
them, particularly due to the political context.  
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The major oil and gas industry projects represent large capital expenditure and long 
duration execution activities required to be carried out under conditions of extreme 
uncertainty due to the new challenges facing the industry (McKenna et al., 2005; Atrill, 
2000).  A main cause of this is the reduction in the new major oil and gas projects in 
traditional production regions in the United States and the North Sea between 2000 and 
2009. This has been replaced by increased activities and new projects in frontier deep 
water areas such as offshore of West Africa and the Asia-Pacific region.  The investments 
in these areas grew at rates ranging from 25 to 40 percent in 2000 to 2010 (KPMG Report, 
2012, 2013; Wood Mackenzie, 2012).   
Managing transactions in these frontier regions presents new challenges to the 
IOGCs as the behaviour of host governments in these countries can often be unpredictable 
with adverse consequences.  This will in turn impact on project transactions and can lead to 
significant schedule delays and capital expenditure (CAPEX) overruns (Mckenna et al., 
2005; Misund and Mohn, 2009; Wood Mackenzie, 2011, 2012). 
 Increased supply chain risks also occur for projects in these frontier regions. Host 
governments can demand that international partners use local suppliers to increase local 
content. The problem is that oil and gas companies do not have an established track record 
with the local companies to execute complex project transactions.  
This increase in the demand for local content necessitates more and more of the 
project engineering and construction activities to be carried out in the host country. Acute 
shortage of relevant expertise and limitations on the fabrication and construction capacity 
in the host country can cause additional CAPEX escalation and significant project delays 
causing E&P projects failing to meet their performance targets (McKenna et al., 2005; 
Wood Mackenzie, 2012; KPMG Report, 2013).  
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Extensive surveys of the international oil and gas industry have confirmed that at 
least forty percent of major international projects since 2005 have exceeded the original 
budget by twenty percent. In addition, more than fifty percent of these projects experienced 
more than ten percent completion schedule delay and/or experienced reduced operational 
reliability of the plant (McKenna et al., 2005; Wood Mackenzie, 2010, 2012).  These 
findings confirm the proposition in the literature that, in many instances, major projects 
have significantly exceeded cost and completion schedules due to the project execution 
process failing to anticipate and evaluate the impact of exogenous challenges and the 
complex commercial arrangements on project transactions (Ward and Chapman, 2003 
;Atkinson et al., 2006;).  
While the involvement of joint venture partners in unitisation (i.e. IOGC in 
partnership) help operators mitigate market risks, such partnerships clearly complicate 
execution due to conflicts of interest.  These new challenges to the execution of major oil 
and gas projects create significant problems in the form of additional risks and 
uncertainties for the IOC managing the project execution on behalf of the joint venture 
partners.  These include risks and uncertainties to be resolved in the dealings with the host 
country government during the project execution to resolve regulatory and commercial 
issues.  In the past, oil and gas companies have been strongly influenced by core 
competence philosophy and have focused on key value adding activities, outsourcing the 
remainder of the project execution activities such as engineering, fabrication, construction 
and installation.   
In this case the key to getting things to work is co-ordinating partners and 
contractors.   This requires the IOGC to clearly specify the mechanisms of governance and 
to specify contracts accordingly, taking into consideration the new uncertainties in addition 
to known risks (DeWit, 1998;McKenna et al., 2005; Olsen et al., 2005). In order to 
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examine the changing nature of the hazards faced by the oil and gas industry projects, the 
researcher carried out a comparative analysis of industry surveys carried out by 
Consultants over a period of ten years since 2005. 
The empirical evidence by the findings of surveys of the industry carried out by 
McKenna et al. (2005), Ernst & Young (2007, 2013) and Wood Mackenzie (2012, 2014) 
was used as the source to develop Table 6.5.  
Table 6.5 - The Main Hazards impacting Oil and Gas Projects 
Cause of Hazard Consequences and Impact on Projects 





Political constraints on 
access to reserves for 
extraction 
 
Control reserves from 
national oil companies 
Increasing government intervention for self-interest and 
worsening fiscal terms is a top threat driven by the macro-
environment. In some cases, this is a consequence of energy 
nationalism, although in others this might be due to political 
opportunism.  
Political constraints imposed by host country government on 
access to reserves are a significant threat to supply. It is felt 
that IOGCs that will win in the future may be those that excel 
in establishing political partnership deals and operating them 
on advantageous terms for the host country. 
Increasing control of oil and gas reserves from NOCs is a 
major strategic uncertainty that can cause property rights 
issues.  
Economic Hazards  
 
Escalation of development 
cost due to engineering 
and/or construction faults  
Operationally, the oil and gas sector faces severe problems to 
prevent escalation of CAPEX.  
The main cause is a lack of capacity in the fabrication and 
construction facilities and is compounded by increases in the 
price of raw materials, such as steel. 
Escalation of costs can be significantly higher for project 




Requirement for novel 
technology required 
compounded by limitations 
of human capital and 
technical expertise. 
Potential for failure of untested technology and severe 
shortage of required technical expertise. 
With the growing human capital and technical expertise deficit 
in the sector, the challenge of recruitment, development and 
deployment has become a significant strategic threat to the 
industry.  
As a result, the ability of the oil and gas production sector to 
expand sufficiently to meet future demand growth is 
questionable due to the shortage of required technical 
expertise and experience.  
(Sources: McKenna et al., 2005; Wood Mackenzie, 2010, 2012; Ernst & Young, 2011) 
 
 Table 6.5 shortlists the major hazards impacting the execution of major 
international offshore deep water oil and gas projects. The shortlisted hazards ranked in 
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order of their influence demonstrate the changing nature of the hazard faced by these 
projects. 
The consequences of the above hazards are considered for the three case studies 
presented in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine to determine how they impact the project. 
The host country political hazards and the behaviour of the institutions have now become 
the main hazards facing these projects overtaking the challenges of novel technology 
required to develop the deep water fields. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter presented the common features of an offshore oil and gas development 
project, the subject of the case studies for the field investigation.  The major 
componentsand the method of project execution are described to minimise their repetition 
in the case study chapters.  The main risks and uncertainties faced by the execution of 
these projects are identified by industry surveys.  Political hazards and institutional 
behaviour of the host country have now become the main hazards facing international oil 
and gas projects.  This confirms the propositions developed in Chapters One and Four 
about the new challenges to international projects, requiring the need for re-thinking the 
project management of these projects, with the incorporation of political governance. The 





Chapter 7 CASE STUDY 1 – AN OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT OFFSHORE 
NIGERIA 
	
7.1 Introduction and Scope 
7.1.1 Core Argument 
In Chapter Four, an extended TCE model for the selection of governance 
mechanisms for international projects and the exploratory propositions to test its 
applicability has been presented.  The extension was to address the impact of host country 
political and property rights protection hazards when transactions are carried out across 
national borders.  This case study is based on the EPCI transactions for a FPSO for a major 
offshore deep water oil and gas development in Nigeria (NOD).  The responsibilities for 
the development and operations of the NOD were assigned by the venture partners to the 
IOGC with the largest stake in the venture.  As discussed in Chapter Six, this IOGC, called 
the Field Operating Company (NOD FOC), was responsible for all project transactions.   
The cumulative responses to the interview closed question E1 (recorded in 
Appendix 2 and repeated below), provide evidence that the relative political and 
institutional  hazards in Nigeria are considered very high, compared to those of Angola or 
the USA. 
 
Table 7.1 - Potential Impact of Host Country Political Context 
 Factor Average Score 
E1.1 Nigeria 85% 
E1.2 Angola 72% 
E1.5 USA 40% 
 
This case study examines the applicability of the enhanced TCE governance 
mechanisms for project transactions carried out under conditions of high levels of political 
hazards caused by government intervention, and compounded by weak safeguards for 
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property rights.  Hence, this case study reflects the scenario given in Zone C of the matrix 
of government intervention (high/medium/low) versus enforcement of property rights 
(low/medium/high) presented in Chapter Four and repeated below. 
 
Figure 7.1 Political Hazards and Enforcement of Property Rights for Nigeria 
Nigeria has an established oil and gas (O & G) production industry with an 
abundance of hydrocarbons reserves and participation of several IOGCs in the extraction 
of these reserves.  Over the years, the political regimes have mastered the art of high level 
opportunistic intervention by stealth in the O & G industry.  Following the political lead, 
judicial institutions do not provide an adequate form of protection rights for foreign 
investors as the legal system is slow, partisan and expensive to access (Lawal and Lugman, 
2011).  Therefore, protection of property rights has become a serious concern for investors 
(KPMG, 2011).  In the case of Nigeria, we can expect the government to behave like the 
resident bandit, who would opportunistically plunder maximum possible benefits with little 




















creates the benefits (Olson, 2000).   Accordingly, by arbitrary actions, the government 
would strive to gain economics benefits beyond any ex-ante arrangements and to further 
the interests of groups providing it with its political support base.  An outcome of these 
actions, without any consultations with IOCGs, is the requirement for IOGCs to comply 
with increased local content in transactions (Wood Mackenzie, 2011).    
 However, there are limits to this adverse intervention and preferential treatment by 
the national government; the Nigerian government needs the oil and gas projects to 
succeed if the country is to continue to benefit from the oil and gas revenue.  On the other 
hand, the IOGCs are fully aware of the abundance of oil and gas reserves present in 
offshore Nigeria (Wood Mackenzie, 2011).  Thus, as explained by IP3, “This is a situation 
of a forced marriage in which neither party wants a divorce, due to the heavy financial 
gains each party stands to lose”.  In relation to the case of transactions, those being 
analysed in this case study are high value/high complexity activities, however, IOCGs 
operating in Nigeria need to compromise in terms of how they align their governance 
strategies, not only to the properties of the transaction, but also to the political context as 
discussed in Chapter Four.  As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, this situation will 
need the project’s economic governance to be complemented by political governance 
mechanisms as a means of mitigating the increased hazards caused by the behaviour of the 
host government and weak institutions.  Any adverse state intervention in transactions and 
increased demand for local content will impact the protection of property rights of the firm 
by impeding the efficient use of resources for productive purposes.  This needs the firm to 
select governance mechanisms in a non-transaction costs economising way.  The impact of 
both these political and institutional hazards, which constitute the intervening variables in 
the extended TCE model, is to shift the point at which it is efficient to use a market 
governance strategy for a given amount of asset specificity and uncertainty.  In addition, 
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the outcome of the specific hazards will increase the need for implementing specialised 
arrangements such as joint ventures with local firms.  In this case the logic of the situation 
would suggest that there is an even more pressing need for NOD FOC to resort to hybrid 
governance with an indirect form of vertical integration (IVI) for the main transactions of 
the Nigeria Offshore Deep-water (NOD) FPSO project. 
Therefore, executing projects in Nigeria meant that the IOGCs could not expect to 
be allowed the discretion to align their governance strategy in a transaction costs 
economising way.  In addition, the stringent requirements to use local design and build 
teams to carry out a number of significant parts of the contract meant there needed to be 
changes in how the transactions were managed.  In this case, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
the strategy to be utilised could expect an increase in the level of ‘indirect vertical 
integration’ both in political transactions and project transactions.  In some cases, this 
meant duplicating what was already being undertaken by the local providers. The 
execution of the NOD FPSO transactions (scope as summarised in Section 7.2) is 
examined to determine the applicability of the extensions to the TCE model for 
international transactions, as proposed by the research exploratory propositions. 
7.1.2 Data Sources 
NOD FPSO project documents were examined to collect the data to develop the 
narrative of the case study. As the contents of these documents cannot be divulged due to 
their confidentiality, the following multiple sources were used to corroborate and 
encompass the data collected from the project documents.  As such, these sources were 
used for the evaluation of the outcome of NOD FPSO transactions and to formulate the 
findings to provide justifications for the conclusions: 
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• Offshore Technology Conference (OTC) proceedings papers OTC 16680, OTC 
20249, OTC 20287, OTC 29287, OTC 20996, OTC 21336 and OTC 21858 on 
some of the completed Nigerian offshore projects.   
• Wood Mackenzie– Africa deep water oil and gas reports (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
and 2013). 
• KPMG reports on the oil and gas industry (2013). 
• TOTAL A.S. Presentation – Local Content Management in Nigeria, MCE 
Deepwater Development Conference, 28 March 2012, Paris. 
• Analysis of the responses of the interview participants (IPs) listed in Table 7.2 
(extracted from the complete list in Table 5.4) to closed and open questions of the 
semi-structured interviews used in this chapter as primary evidence. 
Table 7.2 - Interview Participants for NOD FPSO Project 
IP Project/Organisation Position Held   Experience 
(years) 
1 Project Director  >30 
2 Project Manager >30 
3 Project Manager >30 
4 Project Services Manager >25 
17 Risk Management Consultant, TOTAL A.S. >15 
22 Project Risk Management >20 
24 Local Content Management >20 
26 Project Assurance Manager >30 
29 Project Services Manager  >30 
30 Project Manager, TOTAL  >30 
 
The rest of this section summarises the scope of the NOD FPSO project and the 
contractual strategy used in line with the transactional characteristics.  In Section 7.2 the 
background data of the case study including causes of the specific hazards due to the 
political context of Nigeria and their impact on project transactions are examined.  From 
the outcome of this examination, the predictions of the extended TCE model for the 
transactions of the project are developed and presented.   
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In Section 7.3 the outcome of project transactions both in South Korea and Nigeria 
are discussed.  The requirement for increased NOD FOC participation in the transactions in 
the form of indirect vertical integration to implement hybrid governance is explained.   
Sections 7.4 and 7.5 examine the empirical findings to discuss the applicability of the 
enhanced TCE model to the NOD FPSO project and the validity of the research 
exploratory propositions.  The escalation of transaction costs resulting from the increased 
NOD FOC participation and use of political governance is tabulated to provide a 
measurement of the extension of the TCE model. 
7.1.3 Summary of the NOD Project Scope 
Technically, the components of the Nigerian Offshore Development (NOD) project 
(as illustrated in Figure 7.2), are similar to the other two cases considered in this thesis.  It 
is a major offshore deep water project to extract, process and transport oil and gas from 
remote subsea wells off Nigeria by pipelines to a moored FPSO.  The generic technical, 
commercial and project execution arrangements and the uncertainties associated with these 
projects were presented in Chapter Six. 
 
 
(Source: Offshore Technology, 2011) 
Figure 7.2 - Main Components of NOD 
 
As defined in Section 7.1.1, this case study covers only the transactions of the 
























FPSO by an Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Installation (EPCI) contractor.  
HXY, one of the major South Korean contractors, was awarded the EPCI contract for the 
FPSO. 
The FPSO is a monohull ship-shaped facility, anchored to the seabed by a station-
keeping mooring arrangement.  Process systems and utilities are provided on the FPSO 
topside to separate the hydrocarbon into oil, water and gas and then export them to shore.  
The FPSO hull contains stabilised oil storage tanks, water ballast tanks, machinery spaces 
and mooring equipment.  The FPSO hull is of a standard design and construction but the 
mooring arrangement for the station keeping of the floating FPSO is highly site-specific 
and there will be design uncertainties depending on the site conditions.  In addition, the 
topsides production systems and module designs are highly project-specific with design 
variations depending upon the hydrocarbon processing system (Offshore Technology, 
2011). 
The issue of physical asset specificity is also very high as the IOCGs and EPCI 
parties to the transaction invested in equipment and machinery involving specific 
capabilities due to product complexities. The human asset specificity was another 
important factor in that the major EPCI contractor was required to accumulate specific 
human expertise in an effort to construct and install the facility more efficiently than 
companies that do not possess such an asset (Wood Mackenzie, 2012). 
7.1.4 Contractual Strategy and Supply Chain 
The NOD project was the second of the FPSO deep water projects carried out in 
this region.  The first, Akpo, took seven years to execute and cost $7.2 billion. As Akpo 
had preceded the Petroleum Bill (2009), project management arrangements were different 
from the NOD, in that there was less government intervention and local content 
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requirements were limited to below 15% (Wood Mackenzie, 2011).  However, in the case 
of the NOD FPSO project, IP30 explained “We, (i.e. the management of the NOD FPSO 
project) benefitted from previous experience, but the problems we encountered were 
politically inspired intervention”.   The initial project budget had been $8.7 billion, which 
included estimated $4.0 billion for the FPSO and the total project execution timescale was 
to have been nine years.  In the first three years the NOD FOC undertook the basic 
engineering and award of contracts for the FPSO (Offshore Technology, 2013).  However, 
as pointed out by IP1, “These activities took longer because the Nigerian government 
authorities wanted to sanction all field development plans and contracts for the major 
project components”.  The second phase of detailed engineering and construction, from 
basic to finished design, lasted nearly four years.  The final phase, transporting the FPSO 
from Korea to Nigeria, assembling the final elements, towing the completed FPSO out to 
sea and installing it, took a further year and a half; a reflection of the challenges of 
installation at sea (Offshore Technology, 2013). Based on the FOC’s Project Management 
Procedure (Project Management Guide, TOTAL A.S., 2010) NOD FPSO transactions were 
divided into the following categories: 
1. Project management activities such as basic engineering, preparation and 
implementation of specifications for compliance was done by NOD FOC who also 
had to take control of the complex engineering of some key process systems, 
notably the oil and gas separation and the gas compression systems.  In addition, 
NOD FOC also handled all transactions with government agencies on regulatory 
matters as they required a high level of hierarchical intervention due to the political 
uncertainties. 
2. The EPCI contract for the FPSO awarded to HXY of South Korea included the 
hull, topside process modules for oil and gas separation, gas compression, utilities, 
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power generation, gas and export systems and their integration.  The EPCI 
contractor HXY was also responsible for the offshore installation. 
3. The detailed engineering of small and medium sized components, such as minor 
utilities, a flare tower, together with the oil export buoy, were fabricated in Nigeria 
by HXY on a joint venture arrangement with Nigerdock, a Nigerian company.  The 
integration of the FPSO topsides with the hull was carried out in South Korea, 
while the integration of the components fabricated in Nigeria was carried out 
shown in Nigeria. 
Figure 7.3 shows the supply chain process of a sequentially organised set of the 
above activities to convert the basic design to an operational NOD FPSO.  
 
 
(Source: Offshore Technology, 2013) 
Figure 7.3 - Supply Chain for the NOD FPSO 
The outcomes of these transactions are discussed in Section 7.3. 
	
7.2 Case Study Background, Issues and Expectations 
7.2.1 Main Specific Hazards 
Chapter Six has already presented the main components and transactions of a FPSO 
























This section addresses the causes and consequences of the hazards posed by the 
political context of Nigeria and the resultant challenges of executing major transactions in 
the country.   
The cumulative responses to the closed interview questions E1 and E2 recorded in 
Appendix 2 confirmed the main specific hazards associated with the NOD FPSO 
transactions.  As explained in Chapter Five, these responses were converted to average 
scores by mathematical aggregation. 
Political uncertainties caused by the unilateral opportunistic behaviour of the 
Nigerian government were considered high as compared to Angola and the USA.  This 
behaviour is empowered by the approval authority of the government for the sanctioning of 
the projects and awarding of major contracts, which can be of the order of $4 to 5 billion. 
Increasing demand for local content propelled by political motives requiring more 
transactions to be done by local companies was another major concern.  Also highlighted is 
the escalation of CAPEX and schedule of the major FPSO topside components due to the 
significant shortage of technical expertise and skilled management within the EPCI 
organisation to handle the design and construction of these components.  Causes for the 
above hazards, particularly politically motivated hazards, are examined in the next 
sections.  This examination is carried out using both primary and secondary evidence.  
Then, enhancements to the governance mechanisms advocated by the extended TCE model 
are predicted, in order to cope with the consequences of these hazards. 
7.2.2 Political Context of Nigeria 
Nigeria’s economy is based on hydrocarbon production with oil exports accounting 
for 97% of total export receipts, and contributing nearly 50% of its GDP.  Nigeria is now 
the sixth largest oil producer in the world and occupies the number one position in Africa.  
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Despite this, it remains a country with high levels of poverty and civil unrest. It is a major 
area of exploration and production for major international oil and gas companies (IOGCs), 
including Shell, Exxon Mobil, TOTAL, Texaco, Agip and Chevron (Wood Mackenzie, 
2008).   
The first and most obvious of Nigeria’s political peculiarities is associated with its 
stability, or rather, instability.  The country consists of a Muslim north, with 49% of the 
population and a Christian south, with 51%.  Historically, the reins of political power 
rotated with the ethnicity of the President.  However, in 2010 the sitting Muslim President 
died and was replaced by his Christian Vice President, causing political antagonism.  
Resources are disproportionately concentrated in the south, where a small number of 
oligarchs derive their wealth from the main export – petroleum.  Consequently, the 
politically disaffected, led by militant groups, are currently waging a campaign involving 
attacks on oil company installations and property together with a series of kidnappings.  
Between 2010 and 2012, there were more than twelve such attacks and these have had a 
major impact on the protection of assets and strategies for staff safety.  In this situation, 
IOCGs provide their personnel and installations with military protection, which is paid at 
exorbitant costs.  They also maintain secure “Fortress Camps” incorporating hotels, family 
housing, restaurants, schools and conference rooms (Wood Mackenzie, 2012,2014). 
Interview participant IP26 described these camps as “high security, luxurious prisons with 
good quality food and no restrictions on liquid refreshment”. 
This state of affairs can be attributed to the political and economic history of 
Nigeria since return to democratic rule in 1999.  The economic and social welfare activities 
implemented have not resulted in improving social services nor generated sufficient 
employment to reduce the level of poverty that characterises the lives of most Nigerians.   
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In this context, the revenue from the large reserves of oil and gas and other precious 
minerals available to successive Nigerian governments have not been used in the course of 
national development.  Instead, this windfall revenue in billions has accelerated the 
promotion of unbridled corruption and mismanagement of funds in the spending on 
industrialisation and implementation of infrastructure projects.  In addition, policies of 
poverty reduction and economic restructuring introduced have not worked to improve the 
economic situation of the poor in Nigeria.  Instead, poverty has continued to grow without 
dedicated intervention by the state to promote development (Kura, 2008; Wood 
Mackenzie, 2012). 
Most of the reforms that have been initiated so far have lacked depth in their 
conception while the regimes have also failed in their implementation.  Thus, the economic 
activities of the state only resulted in widening the inequality gap between the populations.  
The observation by the UNDP (2006) that in Nigeria “Poverty has become a way of life”, 
provides corroboration of the State’s failure in improving the living conditions of 
Nigerians.  The egoistic and habitually arbitrary decisions have resulted in the wasteful 
spending of oil and gas revenue rather than productive creation of wealth in Nigeria.  
Therefore, the economic development aspirations of Nigeria continue to be that of 
unfulfilled potential (Joseph and Kew, 2008; Kura, 2008).  In this matter IP3 was explicit 
about the level of corruption practised by the state institutions which was of gigantic 
levels.  He said “since the year 2000 more than $1 billion per year of funds from the oil 
revenue meant for infrastructure building for the industry were siphoned off to the pockets 
of leaders of the ruling elite and their loyalists and this is according to a statement made in 
2013 by the then Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria”.  In this context, a lament of 
IP4 was that “instead of providing the financial bastion for the implementation of 
development projects, the massive infusion of oil and gas income has generated corruption 
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and promoted patronage in the dispensing of favours”.  The main concern expressed by 
IP1 was that “our top management (of IOGCs) did not adequately consider the lessons 
from previous Nigerian projects about the ever increasing adverse political intervention 
that could adversely impact execution of the projects. Their attitude was that these are 
issues that can be managed by us behind closed doors with people who really matter”. 
In addition, there is a lack of political will to eradicate official and unofficial 
corruption among political actors.  After more than two decades of democratic rule, the 
ruling political groups have failed to implement programmes and policies to ensure the 
growth in the economy to benefit ordinary Nigerians.  This has created a growing 
inequality gap and continuing deterioration of public infrastructure.  Faced with increasing 
political unrest due to acute economic problems, the Nigerian government had to resort to 
measures to increase the revenue from the oil and gas industry (Joseph and Kew, 2008).  In 
this situation, based on experiences of the unilateral behaviour of the successive Nigerian 
governments, IP30 expressed his concern that “Consequences of new regulations can be 
tough as the government was avaricious with regard to obtaining more income from new 
oil and gas developments.I am sure that the government agencies armed with additional 
powers can be expected to implement new regulatory requirements in an opportunistic 
manner to benefit their political masters”.  In order to facilitate these near unilateral 
changes, legislation was introduced by the Nigerian government as discussed in the next 
section (Joseph and Kew, 2008; Wood Mackenzie, 2008, 2011). 
7.2.3 Increased Regulation of the Industry in Nigeria 
The oil and gas industry in Nigeria has become a challenging environment due to 
the ever increasing government intervention.  IP30 stated “our (i.e. IOGCs) lobbying of the 
Nigerian government to get reasonable terms was a case of water off a duck’s back”.As 
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explained by IP22“The political opportunism of the ruling elite was dictated by their 
desire for increased financial benefits.  This led to an increase in government legislation”.  
These legislations which were designed to maximise the benefits to the State include the 
Profit Sharing Contracts Act (2008), the Offshore Minerals Licensing Act (2001) and the 
Local Content Bill (2009).  In addition, a key piece of legislation, enacted by the Nigerian 
Parliament, is the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which significantly reformed the industry 
and affected the progress of the deep water oil and gas developments (Wood Mackenzie, 
2011, 2013; KPMG, 2013).   
These regulations are exercised by state run organisations, the principal one being 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which has around a 60% share in 
the upstream oil and gas sector profits through joint ventures with IOGCs.  In this 
arrangement IOGCs may recover their capital cost before the profit-share arrangement 
commences (Wood Mackenzie, 2011).  Apart from the NNPC, the National Petroleum 
Investment Management Service (NAPIMS) approves oil contract and tender processes 
and is charged with optimising government investments in the oil industry.   
The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) is the regulatory body of the 
government responsible for, and has the authority for, granting oil mineral licenses 
(OMLs) for the development of oil and gas fields.   
According to IP1 “All the new regulations were cunningly devised to increase the 
stronghold of the Government in the oil and gas industry and fleece as much as they can”. 
IP3 expressed the sentiment “There was no point in challenging the provision of these 
regulations.  We did not even think of resorting to legal action as the courts are an 
extension of the government”.  The industry reaction was that the cumulative effect of all 
these regulations is to increase the costs and schedule to obtain project sanctions due to 
increased bureaucracy.  In addition, such delays may also be due to the lack of in-house 
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expertise in the state institutions compounded by a lack of confidence in lower level 
authorities, since final approval must now go up the chain of command to presidential level 
(Wood Mackenzie Africa Reports, 2012, 2013). 
Earlier FPSO projects, such as Akpo, were executed at a time when local content 
(LC) was as low as 10% of the major activities.  These functions were primarily controlled 
and managed on behalf of the FOC companies by EPCI contractors, who awarded only 
minor contracts to local contractors.  The Local Content (LC) Bill enacted in 2010 initially 
required a minimum of 15% of the total cost of design and construction to rest with local 
suppliers, rising to 70% by 2013, while for Akpo FPSO the figure was 30%.  However, the 
contracts for the major NOD FPSO components, such as the hull and main topside 
modules, were allowed to be placed outside Nigeria due to a lack of local fabrication and 
dry-dock facilities.  This was on the condition that IOGCs execute the majority of their 
detailed engineering, construction and service contracts within Nigeria using local 
companies.  This would considerably increase the costs for activities, such as technology 
transfers, monitoring and training.  Such a move to increase the local content in 
transactions meant that FOC and EPCI companies positioning their operations in Nigeria 
for the long term experienced a long learning curve by forming alliances with local 
companies (TOTAL, 2012). 
For NOD FPSO, minor but essential components of the FPSO had to be fabricated 
locally, resulting in considerable differences in expertise and manufacturing facilities.  In 
this case, the EPCI contractor had to create joint ventures with local firms.  They had to 
invest capital to expand the skill base and production facilities which was a major concern 
for high value-added activities, such as fabrication of high pressure manifolds and piping 
(OTC Paper 20989).  IP1 explained that the direct impact of the PIB and LC Bills “was 
increased government meddling in the project execution activities, to the extent of 
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impeding utilising resources in the most economical ways using our management 
expertise”.   IP30 agreed with this with the sentiment “it was bloody frustrating as we had 
to make concessions and provide gifts (to the authorities) in order to progress the project 
activities”. In this context the main concern of IP4 was “the difficult protracted nature of 
our negotiations with the government authority failed to finalise the arrangements (i.e. 
property rights) between the government and NOD FOC for the FPSO transactions.  In 
this case, arrangements for efficient use of resources (i.e. property rights issues) were not 
fully finalised and even the arrangements agreed in principle turned out to be pipe 
dreams”.This can be construed to be an infringement of FOC’s rights to execute the 
transactions in a cost effective manner.  As pointed out by IP29 “There were many 
unresolved contractual issues caused by IOGCs’ reluctance to use the courts”. 
7.2.4 Impact of Project Execution Uncertainties 
Considering the political context, the impact of the technical and economic 
challenges facing the NOD is addressed, before predicting the governance mechanisms for 
the FPSO transactions.  The technical and commercial challenges and hazards faced by 
large FPSO projects were presented in Chapter Six.  In the case of the NOD FPSO, 
interview participants, particularly 1 and 22, stressed that the main execution failure can be 
caused by the South Korean EPCI taking on the contract without fully understanding the 
technical complications surrounding complex process systems and components of the 
FPSO.  IP22 pointed out that “all the South Korean EPCI contractors’ core expertise was 
construction of marine tanker vessels they are not sufficiently conversant with the complex 
technical requirements for the FPSO systems and also lacked the required expertise to 
execute the work”.  This was confirmed by OTC Paper 20996 that the expertise of the 
South Korean EPCIs in the design of FPSO topsides modules is very limited and this 
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activity is subcontracted to a European or USA company.  IP26 particularly stressed 
“Getting the topsides design and construction correct was the key to achieving the 
required performance of the FPSO”.  This was corroborated by IP3 who made the point 
that “We could not be sure whether the design and construction work done by HXY met the 
specifications until we started the commissioning activities”. IP29 explained “We could 
not award a turnkey (i.e. 100% Agency) contract to HXY for the complete FPSO due to 
their technical limitations”.  IP4 pointed out “We had to incorporate stringent contract 
clauses with rigid monitoring arrangements to manage this shortcoming”.  A main 
challenge to the transactions in South Korea, as articulated by IP4, was “the hand of the 
Nigerian regulatory authorities was evident even in South Korea in the form of obstacles 
placed in the approval process for the design and construction activities.  This was 
obviously to gain unjustified payments to remove the obstacles”. 
7.2.5 Predictions of the Extended TCE Model 
After examining the impact of the political, economic and execution hazards facing 
the NOD FPSO transactions, this section applies the logic of the extended TCE model to 
predict the governance mechanisms to cope with the impact of the intervening variables of 
the model, i.e. high political hazards and weak protection of property rights.  In this case, 
both the basic and the extended TCE models would predict NOD FOC should apply 
vertical integration for all the main transactions associated with the FPSO. 
This prediction is supported by the input from the interview participants 1 and 30 
(recorded in Appendix 2) that the political uncertainties are very high in Nigeria due to the 
government’s increasingly selfish behaviour. This revealed theneed for the FOC to handle 
the complete EPCI transactions to counter the political manoeuvring, regulatory issues and 
commercial problems to prevent escalation of costs and delays.  However, vertical 
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integration for the complete FPSO is not feasible as an IOGC orders an FPSO for Nigeria 
only once in about four years.  Therefore, it is neither commercially viable nor technically 
feasible to build fabrication yards in Nigeria to build the FPSOs (Wood Mackenzie, 2012). 
As illustrated in Table 6.3 (Chapter Six), a FPSO consists of several components 
requiring numerous transactions of varying levels of uncertainty and asset specificity.  In 
the case of NOD FPSO, these transactions will be subject to different levels of political 
hazards.  As such, the TCE basic governance model cannot be implemented in its pure 
form for this project to predict which transactions could be handled by market contracts 
and which would require additional safeguards in the form of vertical integration or hybrid 
arrangements.  As discussed in Chapter Four, the prediction of the extended TCE model 
will be a coalition of transaction governance mechanisms based on the proposition that the 
NOD FOC must perform the activities they can do best and use the market arrangements 
for transactions where that would deliver greater cost effectiveness and efficiency.   In this 
case, the following logic based on the extended TCE model needs to be used to predict the 
governance mechanisms for the different NOD FPSO transactions: 
a) NOD FOC should be responsible for project governance (i.e. providing direction 
and control, the political transactions with government authorities, primary 
engineering and the specifications for the complex components of the FPSO).  
b) In the case of the transactions carried out in Nigeria subject to high political 
intervention and high local content or transactions subject to high commercial 
uncertainty and asset specificity, it would be necessary for NOD FOC and EPCI 
companies to use hybrid arrangements.  This is to be in the form of joint ventures 
with high NOD FOC involvement in the design and fabrication of FPSO 
components subject to stringent performance specifications.  
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c) Hybrid form of governance can be dominated either by the NOD FOC or the EPCI 
contractor, depending on the characteristics of the particular transaction. 
Dominance and/or direct intervention by NOD FOC in transactions can be 
considered to be an indirect form of vertical integration (IVI) required from a TCE 
perspective to ensure the hybrid governance was as robust as a pure VI 
arrangement. 
d) Market arrangements can be used when the political hazards, uncertainty and asset 
specificity variables of the transactions are known and manageable.  
Application of the above logic based on the extended TCE model will lead to a 
coalition of governance mechanisms.  These mechanisms are required to be determined on 
a case by case basis depending on the uncertainty and asset specificity characteristics of the 
particular transactions and the extent to which they are subject to political hazards.  The 
next section evaluates the outcome of the NOD FPSO transactions to ascertain to what 
extent the governance mechanisms used were, or had to be, aligned with the predictions for 
the transactions based on the above propositions.  
7.3 Outcome of Project Transactions 
7.3.1 Project Transactional Relationships 
This section analyses the outcome of the transactions in order to determine what 
went right, the potential for failures based on the governance mechanisms used, and the 
remedial arrangements used by the NOD FOC to achieve contract completion.  The project 
transactions carried out for the NOD FPSO are grouped into three categories (see Section 
7.1.2) for the purpose of this analysis.  These categories are: project management and 
political governance, monitoring of EPCI contract activities in South Korea, and 
facilitating onshore and offshore project transactions in Nigeria.  
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Each category is considered to be subject to different forms of hazards.  The 
relationship arrangements and the ex-ante governance mechanisms planned for executing 
these transactions extracted from the project records are shown in Figure 7.4.  Until 2010, 
as shown in Figure 7.4, the responsibilities for the extraction of oil and gas field resources 
owned by the NNPC on behalf of the government lay with the FOC responsible for the 
development of the field and liaising with the Nigerian authorities for approvals and 
sanctions.  In this case of the NOD FPSO, the field operator company NOD FOC prepared 
the basic engineering, performance standards and execution plans.  As stated earlier, NOD 
FOC awarded the EPCI contract for the FPSO on a market arrangement to HXY, a South 
Korean company.  However, the organisational relationship arrangements and governance 
mechanisms required for the NOD FPSO project transactions had to change significantly 




Figure 7.4 - Pre 2010 FPSO Organisational Relationships and Governance Mechanisms 
After the introduction of the PIB and LCB legislation, the government, through the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), gained additional approval control.  In 
practice, this meant that the Field Development Plan (FDP) sent to NAPIMS and DPR for 
approval was subject to stringent compliance and had to include more detailed transaction 
information alongside the objectives of the project.  Changes meant there was the need for 
NOD FOC to increase lobbying and negotiations with these authorities.  This meant 
additional expenditure and led to further delays in obtaining approval for project execution 
approvals from NAPIMS, DPR and NNPC.  Furthermore, the basis for the design, 
fabrication plans and the programme for the offshore installation of the surface facilities 
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project components to be awarded by the NOD FOC was also subject to scrutiny and 
approval by DPR, NAPIMS and NNPC (Wood Mackenzie African Report, 2012; KPMG 
Nigeria Report, 2013). 
Both interview participants 1 and 29 said that, as they expected, the increased 
requirements of the PIB and LC Bills were enforced by the authorities in an opportunistic 
manner.  IP29 described the situation as “Authorities sitting on applications for licences for 
the development of oil and gas fields in the expectation of gifts for their help”. IP1 also 
pointed out that “these expectations were in spite of the lack of in-house expertise within 
these authorities to understand the complex technical and logistics details of the project 
plans”.  IP3 described the situation as “the introduction of the PIB and LC Bills was 
increased government meddling in our activities, causing an already slow and highly 
bureaucratic system to become near comatose”.In this context, a strong sentiment of IP4 
was that “the difficult and sometimes obstinate adherence to stringent requirements by the 
regulatory authorities was dictated by the political elite, who expected ‘what’s in it for 
us?’ rewards for their patronage for resolving issues”.  This situation was described by 
IP3, in desperation, as “the fish rots from the head”. 
The opportunistic government intervention to implement the clauses of the LC Bill 
caused a significant increase in concessions to local pressure groups and the need for 
providing conciliatory measures to keep them happy (Woodmackenzie, 2013).  In this case 
IP24 expected “the costs of transactions carried out in Nigeria to be higher than similar 
transactions we have carried out in Europe or South Korea”.IP24, who specialised in 
Local Content Management, explained “this was because the impact of the LC Bill was 
that we could not use our resources in a cost effective manner.  This was an infringement 
of our rights”. 
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IP2 and 24 confirmed that “the increased political and regulatory difficulties meant 
we (i.e. a NOD FOC project team) had to take responsibility for all dealings with 
government authorities and could not leave this to the local guys”.  This included 
preparation of all specifications and negotiations for project sanctions.  IP2 termed this as 
“high front-end loading”.  As IP3 confirmed, “The NOD FOC resorting to these measures 
(i.e. political governance mechanisms) instead of depending on local agents caused delays 
in obtaining government approvals for project sanctions, environmental permits and 
changes in design definitions of the FPSO”. According to IP30, “the outcome due to 
adverse political manoeuvring and interventions by the authorities meant the 
organisation’s arrangements for the NOD FPSO project transactions had to change 
significantly”. IP1 explained that there was “the need to complement the project 
management with the addition of political manoeuvring (i.e. political governance 
mechanisms) to cope with the demands and machinations of the ruling elite and their 
hangers-on”. These sentiments were endorsed by IP30, indicating that “in order to 
implement (political governance) measures to deal with the relationship difficulties with 
the government authorities, the NOD FOC had to rapidly increase the project management 
teams in South Korea and Nigeria with the addition of specialists in political negotiations 
and environmental affairs”. 
This arrangement was confirmed by IPs 3 and 24. IP30 confirmed “the additional 
expertise required had to be provided, at high cost, by expatriate personnel and this was 
reflected in massively increased transactions costs”.  IP1 summarised this situation as “the 
lesson for the IOCGs was that as uncertainty due to political involvement increased, so too 
did the cost of project execution”.  The above empirical findings confirm the theoretical 
proposition that it will be necessary to match commercial governance with a symmetric 
degree of political governance, with an emphasis on building cordial working relationships 
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with government institutions, in order to mitigate the new forms of hazards faced by the 
NOD project. 
7.3.2 Project Transactions Issues in South Korea and Nigeria 
Considering, the requirement for political governance, this section examines the 
problems that arose with the NOD FPSO engineering and construction activities and how 
they had to be managed.  The detailed engineering of the FPSO was carried out by HXY 
using subcontractors TEP (a French company) and a Nigerian company Nigerdock.  
According to the project records, an engineering team comprising of more than 400 
persons were based in Paris, South Korea and Nigeria.  Progress was slow due to the 
approval delays of regulatory authorities.  In this case, according to IP22, “the NOD FOC 
had to supplement their project team of about 130 persons by an additional 80 expatriate 
personnel to provide the necessary technical expertise and management leadership to deal 
with the Nigerian Regulators”. In addition, IP30 pointed out that “the NOD FOC retained 
a ‘shadow’ engineering team in Paris to provide the highly skilled expertise required to 
perform complex engineering and to transfer technology to the EPCI and JVs”. 
As stated earlier, the Nigerian government allowed the FPSO hull and topsides 
main modules to be constructed in South Korea due to the lack of local capability.  As the 
EPCI contractor lacked the required expertise to execute the work to handle the complex 
technical requirements for the FPSO systems, the NOD FOC had to incorporate stringent 
monitoring and approval arrangements in the contract with increased NOD FOC 
participation to prevent technical failures and fabrication faults.  As explained by IP22, 
“our main challenge was the politically motivated unjustified demands of the regulatory 
authorities (seeking financial gain) in the approval process and not the technical 
challenges”.  He pointed out that this led to a “near 50% increase in the size of the project 
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team based in South Korea to handle regulatory issues in addition to the technical 
problems”. 
It was necessary for the EPCI contractor for the FPSO to form a joint venture with 
the Nigerdock Nigeria plc.  This joint venture was responsible for the fabrication of some 
FPSO components and modules in Nigeria and for carrying out the integration of these on 
the FPSO at Nigerdock’s shipyard (Offshore Technology, 2012).The measures adopted by 
the NOD FOC and EPCI (at the NOD FOCG’s expense) for the activities to be completed 
in Nigeria were:  
a) To implement infrastructure upgrades to fabrication facilities at Nigerdock, and  
b) To establish operations support and associated infrastructure, such as procurement 
services, shore base to support operations, office accommodation, housing and 
logistics support services (OTC Papers 20287 and 20249). 
NOD FOC intervention in these activities in the form of management leadership 
and monitoring became necessary because of the fabrication process uncertainties and 
integration complexities which had been underestimated by the contractors (TOTAL, 
2012: OTC Paper 20287, OTC Paper 20249).  According to IP22, “we (NOD IOC) had to 
provide expertise to develop technical specifications and fabrication procedures to 
integrate the components fabricated in Nigeria with the FPSO; this intervention was 
required due to the very limited skill base and the differentials in the capabilities of the 
participants to transactions in Nigeria”. 
According to IP29, “one way in which we had to manage the issues of tehnical 
competency and relationship trusts associated with JV’s, was to make commercial 
concessions to minimise the opportunistic behaviour of the JV partners”.  IP24 agreed and 
said “these measures prevented the need for legal redress to ensure we did not experience 
contractual losses (i.e. to protect the property rights of the NOD FOC)”.  The downside, 
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according to IP24, was “it was necessary to nearly double the FOC project team with 
expatriate professionals, at enhanced wages and subsistence expenses, to obtain their 
services in Nigeria”.  IPs 1 and 4 agreed with the need for the implementation of these 
measures.  The point stressed by IP1 was that “these JVs had to be led and controlled by 
us (i.e. NOD FOC) in order to provide these companies with managerial expertise and to 
implement technology transfer in order to counter product complexities”.  In this case the 
sentiment of IP30 was that “we had no choice but to lead these JV organisations by the 
hand and it was a case of keeping a dog and doing the barking yourself”. 
Therefore, the measures implemented by NOD FOC to make the JVs (an outcome 
of the government demand for local content) to supply the required output turned out to be 
indirect vertical integration, in action.  Offshore installation of the FPSO was done by the 
EPCI contractor who possessed the necessary expertise and the large installation vessels 
for such marine work.  Final integration of the FPSO, UFR and SPS components and the 
commissioning of the complete system were carried out by the NOD FOC team with the 
assistance of the EPCI contractor.  This commissioning process was conducted on a 
vertical integration arrangement, as the management, procedures and the logistics were 
controlled by the NOD FOC team.  IP2 expressed his relief that “political meddling was 
absent in these offshore activities”. 
7.3.3 Increased NOD FOC Participation and Transaction Costs 
The changes in governance mechanisms and relationship arrangements that became 
necessary for the NOD FPSO transactions as discussed in Section 7.3.2 are illustrated in 
Figure 7.5.  In comparison with the pre-2010 arrangements, as shown in Figure 7.4, there 
were significant changes in the government mechanisms to be used. 
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 It can be seen from Figure 7.5 that significantly increased NOD FOC participation 
was required to ensure the functioning of the hybrid and joint venture governance 
mechanisms to complete the project transactions.  The governance mechanisms which had 
to be used (as recorded in project documents) turned out to be close to the predictions of 
using the logic of the extended TCE model given in Section 7.2.5.  As such, the strategy 
used was aligned with the theory in the following areas: 
• Interfaces with the government, NNPC and other institutions (Vertical 
Integration). 
• FPSO engineering (Hybrid with IVI). 
• FPSO construction: 
o Topside process modules (Hybrid with IVI). 
o Hull tanks and machinery (Market). 
o FPSO offshore moorings installation (Hybrid with IVI). 
o Fabrication and installation of the oil export buoy (Hybrid with IVI). 




Figure 7.5 - Post 2010 (NOD FPSO) Transactions Relationships and Governance Mechanisms 
Consequently, the post 2010 situation led to an increased management of 
transactions by the NOD FOC to implement political governance measures in addition to 
remedial measures required for the activities carried out in South Korea and Nigeria.  This 
inevitably resulted in significantly increased transaction costs (ΔTCE).  These transaction 
costs and efforts, recorded in terms of hours incurred to complete the project management, 
political governance, engineering support and monitoring of the EPCI activities, can be 













































































7.4 TCE Findings of the Case Study 
7.4.1 Empirical Findings on the Extension of TCE 
The NOD FPSO and facilities associated with it were installed offshore and 
commissioned to achieve primary oil and gas.  However, in order to achieve this all three 
groups of transactions, i.e. project management including political governance 
arrangements, the FPSO engineering, the construction in South Korea and transactions in 
Nigeria, had to be carried out in non-economising arrangements as evident from Section 
7.3.  In Section 7.2.5 the logic of the extended TCE model was used to predict the 
governance mechanisms for the different NOD FPSO transactions.  Application of the 
logic on the extended TCE model was used to predict the governance mechanisms.  These 
mechanisms need to determine on a case by case basis depending on the uncertainty and 
asset specificity characteristics of the particular transactions and the extent to which they 
are subject to political hazards.  
Both primary evidence (responses of IPs) and secondary evidence (from project 
documentation and industry publications) provided in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 confirm high 
levels of political hazards that materialised due to adverse government intervention in the 
execution of the NOD FPSO project.  The consequences of these hazards manifested in the 
form of excessive demands of the regulatory authorities (on behalf of the ruling elite) for 
financial ‘rewards’ in return for smoothing the path for the execution of the project 
activities.  
In addition, as postulated in Chapter Three, the property rights issues in the 
transactions were determined by the political process which was dominated by the 
government institutions having the prevailing influence on the outcomes.  In this situation 
NOD FOC had to cope with the cumulative impact of high political intervention and 
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adverse property rights issues which resulted in an ever increasing demand for local 
content in transactions.  These were beyond the reasonable expectations of the IOGCs.   As 
case study evidence presented in Section 7.2 shows, the NOD FOC ex-ante expectations 
did not include the need for political governance mechanisms to complement project 
governance in order to counter the ever increasing political hazards and institutional 
opportunism faced by the NOD project. 
In this case,changes to the arrangements for transactions with the government 
bodies were found to be necessary to manage the impact of the political and legal hazards 
that materialised. NOD FOC was forced to implement an early and deep liaison with 
government authorities throughout all project phases to complete the FPSO.  The NOD 
FOC had to implement political governance by providing direction and control for 
transactions with government authorities.  They also had to direct the primary engineering 
and the specifications for the complex components of the FPSO. 
The evidence of this case study supports the proposition made in Chapter Three 
that discussed when political hazards increase, economic actors have to incorporate in their 
calculations an analysis of political governance requirements in order to reconsider their 
current policymaking and the strategy for future transactions.  This was borne out by the 
fact that political governance was required to influence political authorities, directly by 
lobbying for relationship building, and by indirect means which included financial 
concessions (and contributions) to political institutions.  These formal and informal 
political governance mechanisms used by the NOD FOC in dealing with the institutions in 
Nigeria was in the form of ‘hierarchical organisation’ in TCE terms.   
In practice, this is a case of complementing the project’s economic governance with 
the addition of political governance mechanisms to cope with the demands and 
machinations of the “ruling elite and their hangers on” as described by IP2. 
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The evidence from the case study also highlighted the requirement to prevent 
inefficient use of resources (i.e. safeguarding the property rights) in complying with the 
statutory requirement for increased local content in transactions.  In order to ensure this, 
NOD FOC had to alter their normal production processes and project execution 
arrangements and resort to joint ventures (JVs) with local partners, which can be non-
economising arrangements.  They had no choice in the matter but to make these JVs work 
without incurring excessive expenditure in meeting the stringent local content 
requirements.  As shown by the evidence, the mitigation measure was to utilise hybrid 
governance mechanisms in the organisational arrangements of the joint ventures with 
Nigerian companies.  This was a strategic alliance in an effort to overcome negative 
economic, performance-related and cultural effects in the functioning of the JV 
organisation.  
In the case of all the transactions carried out in Nigeria, subject to high commercial 
uncertainty and asset specificity, the NOD FOC and EPCI companies had to use hybrid 
arrangements.  These were in the form of high NOD FOC involvement in the design and 
fabrication of FPSO components subject to stringent performance specifications.  These 
hybrid forms of governance were dominated by the NOD FOC depending on the 
characteristics of the particular transaction.  This dominant and direct intervention by NOD 
FOC in transactions can be considered to constitute an indirect form of vertical integration 
(IVI).  This was required from a TCE perspective to ensure the hybrid governance was as 
robust as a pure VI arrangement. 
Consequently, a key finding from the case study evidence is that these hybrid 
governance mechanisms in the operation of joint ventures required a high level of FOC 
participation.   This amounted to indirect vertical integration (dominant role) by NOD FOC 
providing the direction and control of the JV activities.  
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This dominant participation by the NOD FOC, including some duplication in the 
technical activities, increased the competency and relationship trusts within the JVs to 
ensure the successful completion of transactions.  As such, the case study demonstrates the 
need for relational governance aspects to be developed to ensure trust between partner 
firms and reduce opportunism. As can be expected, developing these relational aspects in 
Nigeria was painfully slow and required additional expertise transfer activities causing 
increased transactions costs. 
The TCE prediction is that market arrangements can be used when the political 
hazards, uncertainty and asset specificity variables of the transactions are known and 
manageable.  However, the case study evidence also highlighted the fact that transactions 
considered to be straightforward, such as the construction of the FPSO in South Korea, can 
go beyond the predictions of the basic TCE model when they become subject to 
interventions by a third party, i.e. the role of Nigerian regulatory authorities to promote the 
vested economic interests of the government.  
This case study provides overwhelming evidence for the conclusion that, in the 
case of international projects, the political context of the host country will have the 
overriding influence on the governance mechanisms required to minimise ex-post regret.  
This scenario requires an extension of the basic TCE theory, which focuses mainly on the 
rational features of a transaction and takes the role of institutions as neutral (as discussed in 
Chapter Two).In the case of this NOD FPSO case study, this extension of the TCE took the 
form of political governance mechanisms which included provision of economic 
concessions, lobbying and relationship building with the national political actors and local 
companies.  This supports the proposition made in Chapter Three, that political hazards 
impacting on international transactions creates the need for implementing specialised 
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political governance mechanisms in addition to generalised mechanisms for these 
transactions.  
Having reviewed the empirical evidence to support the theoretical arguments for 
the need for the extension of the TCE model for international transactions, the next section 
provides a measurement of the scale of this extension required for the NOD FPSO. 
7.4.2 Measurement of the Extension of TCE Model 
It can be argued that increase in transaction costs and increase in the effort required 
(measured in terms of hours expended to complete transactions), can be credible measures 
of the extension of the TCE model required to manage NOD FPSO transactions.  The 
results of these measurements can be used for comparative purposes with the other two 
case studies to answer the question as to the extent the strategy of political governance, 
plus ‘Indirect Vertical Integration’ had to be used to mitigate the ex-post regret.  The initial 
estimates and the final values for the hours and costs of transactions in Europe, South 
Korea and Nigeria were verbally provided (in confidence) by IPs 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 22, 24, 26, 
29 and 30.  The mean values of these estimates are recorded in Table 7.3.  The cost figures 
are presented in US million dollars (MD).  For this purpose the transaction activities are 
considered to be composed of project management, implementation of political governance 
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As recorded in Table 7.3, the increase in the overall FPSO transaction costs 
(ΔTCE) was approximately 30% of the initial budget, from $567 million to $729 million. 
The percentage increase in the transaction costs for NOD FPSO project management and 
political governance measures turned out to be 71% with an increase of 62% in the hours 
expended, which proved significantly higher than anticipated. The increase in the 
transaction costs in Nigeria for implementing the IVI measures required to ensure technical 
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performance of the completed FPSO and building relationship trusts in JV arrangements 
turned out to be 57% with an increase of 52% in the hours expended. 
These measurements, representing the extension of the basic TCE model argument, 
support the proposition that the relative political hazards created by the behaviour of the 
host country government and weak institutional regimes will determine the extent to which 
the project transactions have to be carried out in a non-economising manner.  Therefore, 
for the NOD FPSO transactions, these intervening variables of the enhanced TCE model 
shifted the point at which specialised governance strategy was needed for managing high 
institutional and political hazards.  The ex-ante prediction was use of vertical integration 
(V) for the pre-EPCI contract award and the market (M) for the post-award transactions.  
This changed to vertical integrationfor the pre-award transactions and for political 
governance.  Hybrid mechanisms with IVI and political governance were required for the 
post-award transactions.  This hybrid governance represented by HNIG had to be 
implemented at a lower level of asset specificity, as shown in Figure 7.6.  The resulting 








Figure 7.6 - Impact of High Political and Property Rights Hazards on Project Transactions 
 





Hence, from the in-depth analysis of this case study, the impact of the high political 
hazards created by intervention of the Nigerian regime and the weak institutions for the 
safeguarding of property rights in project transactions has been examined.  In this case the 
NOD FOC had to extend the governance mechanisms for the NOD FPSO project 
transactions as predicted by the extended TCE model.This had to be done by using 
political governance mechanisms to handle the high level of government intervention in 
transactions.  In addition, indirect vertical integration was required in order to manage the 
differentials in competences of the partners to the transactions.  Another conclusion from 
the NOD FPSO case study is that the basic TCE model, which is focused on outcomes of 
economic processes, must be extended to take into account the co-ordination of the 
production processes and the complexity of the product.  This is required particularly in 
situations where complex transactions have to be carried out when external uncertainties 
are high, such as opportunistic behaviour of the host country institutions.  Williamson’s 
(1990) focus is on the end product of the transactions, while taking for granted the 
production processes and resources required to produce the output.  This has hitherto made 
it difficult to visualise how product complexity and production uncertainties, caused by the 
use of inefficient suppliers due to the demand for local content, have to be managed.  
The unanimous verdict of the interview participants (as recorded in Appendix 2 and 
Chapter Ten) was that the problems caused by the intervention of the Nigerian government 
and its regulatory authorities completely overshadowed the challenges caused by technical 
and commercial issues for completing the NOD FPSO.  However, all the IPs were resigned 
to the fact that the IOGCs must live with these hazards if they want to secure future 
offshore mineral licences and exploit the vast hydrocarbon resources of offshore Nigeria.  
The main conclusion drawn from the NOD FPSO case study is that the extension of the 
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transactions economics model with political governance is inevitable to manage the 
impacts of high government opportunistic intervention compounded by weak protection of 
property rights protection.  The impact of these intervening variables for the NOD FPSO 
project is an increase in the project’s transaction costs due to the need to execute 




Chapter 8 CASE STUDY 2 - AN OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT FOR ANGOLA 
8.1 Introduction 
8.1.1 CoreArgument 
 Case study 1 examined the impact of project transactions subject to known high 
level of hazards caused by government opportunistic intervention compounded by weak 
property rights protection.  Case study 1 provides evidence that in countries with 
authoritarian regimes, the host governments can be expected to cause hazards in the 
execution of a major project if they resort to selfish behaviour. It also supported the 
proposition that the delineation and safeguarding of property rights are the outcome of the 
political process.  In this case, influential parties need to be sufficiently compensated to 
prevent adverse changes in the transactions that would cause potential economic gains 
arising from project investment to be at risk.  
This case study examines the applicability of the extended TCE governance 
mechanisms for the EPCI transactions for a FPSO for a major offshore deep water oil and 
gas development in Angola (AOD).  The responsibilities for the development and 
operations of the AOD were assigned by the venture partners to the IOGC with the largest 
stake in the venture.  As discussed in Chapter Six, this IOGC, called the Field Operating 
Company (AOD FOC), was responsible for all project transactions.   
The cumulative responses to the interview closed question E1 (recorded in 
Appendix 2 and repeated below), provide evidence that the relative political and 
institutional hazards in Angola are considered medium compared to those of Nigeria (high) 





Table 8.1 - Potential Impact of Host Country Political Context 
 Factor Average Score 
E1.1 Nigeria 85% 
E1.2 Angola 72% 
E1.3 USA 40% 
 
As per the dimensionalising provided in Section 4.2, Angola can be considered to 
be a authoritariandemocratic state compared to the Nigeria regime which is classified as an 
authoritarian state. Thus, in Angola there is the potential for adverse political behaviour 
with stealth due to economic opportunism. There is a growing history of opportunistic 
intervention by state institutions in projects. Hence, this case study reflects the scenario 
given in Zone B of the matrix of government intervention (high/medium/low) versus 
enforcement of property rights (low/medium/high) presented in Chapter Four Section 4.2 
and repeated below. 
 






















As discussed in Chapter Four, these “medium level” hazards can be assigned 
probabilities of occurrence by statistical and/or observed historical data.  In this case these 
risks can be evaluated and taken into account to plan the ex-ante arrangements for the 
project transactions.  The expectations are that there will be adequate checks and balances 
in the form of established institutional arrangements to minimise political hazards and 
access to legal redress to enforce contracts in place.  Even if these checks and balances are 
not institutionalised, they may materialise for strategic reasons due to economic necessities 
of the home country (Henisz, 2002).   
 In such case the firms may consider their major transactions to be subject to a 
medium level of political intervention which can be managed by some concessions to the 
government with acceptable, but possibly expensive, legal arrangements for safeguarding 
property rights.  In this case TCE would predict that increased use of markets can result in 
major transactions being executed more economically.  However, statistical data is based 
on known and/or observed data interpreted by judgement.  An unexpected development in 
such situations can be the practice of self-interest with guile by the state and its institutions.  
Any such adverse developments may not be anticipated ex-ante due to the bounded 
rationality of the participants and appropriate mitigations will not be evident until the 
circumstances materialise.  In such cases, more specialised governance mechanisms may 
be required to manage the impacts of self-interested behaviour with guile, which are not 
considered before the event.  The changes in the expectations of the risk levels are 
especially important for idiosyncratic transactions that involve high levels of investment in 
specialised human and physical capital, as is the case for an offshore deep water FPSO.  
The question then arises as to whether the existing (or available) checks and balances can 




 To test the above arguments, this case study of a FPSO project off Angola (AOD 
FPSO) was evaluated.  For these projects, the Angolan government’s authority is delegated 
to the national oil company Sonangol, who is responsible for the negotiations and 
agreements with IOGCs who are the partners for the project venture. In this context, 
interview participant IP14, a very experienced and astute Project Director, made the 
comments “the projects that we have completed in Angola have gone smoothly with little 
adverse interference by the government, and Sonangol have been very co-operative”.  
However, he added “the question is will this situation last, especially when the Angolans 
become more knowledgeable about oil and gas projects and possibly more avaricious of 
the rewards”.  IP27 added “we have not had any major contractual issues which affected 
our interests (i.e. property rights).  Anyway,the courts are slow to function; legal action 
would have been our last resort”.IP8 made the observation “before NOD project we had 
no problems with Sonangol or the government.  Our thoughts were will this amicable 
situation last for long?”. 
 In summary, this case study tests the validity of the economising governance 
mechanisms predicted by the extended TCE model for international transactions subject to 
medium level of political hazards and adequate levels of property rights protection.   
8.1.2 Data Sources 
 AOD FPSO project documents were examined to collect the data to develop the 
narrative of the case study.  As the contents of these documents cannot be divulged due to 
their confidentiality, the following multiple sources are used to corroborate and extend the 
data collected from the project documents: 
a) OTC proceedings papers OTC 20021, OTC 21075 and OTC 20201 on some of the 
completed Angola offshore projects.   
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b) Wood Mackenzie – Africa deep water oil gas reports for Angola (Wood 
Mackenzie, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). 
c) Offshore Journal (August 2010, July 2014). 
d) KPMG Reports on oil and gas industry (2011, 2012, 2013). 
e) Analysis of the responses of the interview participants (IPs) listed in Table 8.2 
(extracted from the complete list in Table 5.4) to closed and open questions of the 
semi-structured interviews, which are used in this chapter as primary evidence.   
Table 8.2 - Interview Participants for AOD FPSO Project 
IP Project/Organisation Position Held   Experience 
(years) 
7 Project Risk Manager, TOTAL E&P >20 
8 Project Services Manager, TOTAL E&P >25 
13 HSE and Risk Manager, TOTAL A.S. >30 
14 Project Manager, TOTAL A.S. >25 
15 HSE and Risk Manager, TOTAL A.S. >25 
18 HSE and Risk Manager, TOTAL A.S. >25 
19 Project Flow Assurance Manager >15 
23 Senior Consultant, Risk Management, ARC Consultants >10 
27 Project Services Manager, TOTAL A.S. >25 
28 Project Services Manager, TOTAL E&P >30 
 
 The rest of this section summarises the basic AOD FPSO project components and 
defines the contractual background for the transactions to be executed.  
 In Section 8.2, the background data of the case study including causes of the 
specific hazards due to the political context of Angola and their impact on project 
transactions are examined.  From the outcome of this examination, the predictions of the 
extended TCE model for the transactions of the AOD project are developed and presented. 
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 Section 8.3 examines the outcome of the project transactions due to the political 
hazards and the protection of property rights issues that materialised. The bargaining 
positions and actions taken by Sonangol, IOGCs and EPCI contractors to protect their 
economic welfare (i.e. property rights) and how these affected the transaction costs are 
discussed.  
 The evidence from the case study is analysed in Section 8.4 to ascertain whether 
adequate delineation of property rights was ensured, and what TCE governance 
mechanisms had to be implemented in order to manage any challenges caused by the 
Angolan government and the EPCI contractor.  Justification is provided as to why 
uneconomical transactions were carried out to complete the project transactions for the 
AOD FPSO to achieve first oil and gas.   
Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 8.5 as to what extent the evidence 
provided by this case study supports the research exploratory propositions. 
8.1.3 Summary of the AOD Project Scope 
 Technically, the components of the Angolan Offshore Development (AOD) project, 
as illustrated in Figure 8.2, are similar to the other two cases considered in this thesis. It is 
a major offshore deep water project to extract, process and transport oil and gas from 
remote subsea wells offshore Angola by pipelines via a moored FPSO to onshore.  The 
generic technical, commercial and project execution arrangements and the uncertainties 
associated with these projects were presented in Chapter Six. 
 
























 This case study covers only the Engineering, Procurement, Construction and 
Installation (EPCI) transactions to convert the basic engineering of the FPSO (done by 
NOD FOC) to an operational FPSO offshore Angola. 
 The FPSO, as in case study 1, is a monohull ship-shaped facility, anchored to the 
seabed by a station-keeping mooring arrangement.  Process systems and utilities are 
provided on the FPSO topside to separate the hydrocarbon into oil, water and gas and then 
export them to shore.  The FPSO hull contains stabilised oil storage tanks, water ballast 
tanks, machinery spaces and mooring equipment.  The FPSO hull is of a standard design 
and construction but the mooring arrangement for the station-keeping of the floating FPSO 
is highly site-specific and there will be design uncertainties depending on the site 
conditions.  In addition, the topsides production systems and module designs are highly 
project-specific with design variations depending upon the hydrocarbon processing system 
(Offshore Technology, 2011).   
 The issue of physical asset specificity is also very high as the IOGCs and EPCI 
parties to the transaction invested in equipment and machinery involving specific 
capabilities due to product complexities. The human asset specificity was another 
important factor in that the major EPCI contractor had to accumulate specific human 
expertise in order to construct and install the facility more efficiently than companies that 
do not possess such an asset (Wood Mackenzie, 2011). 
8.1.4 Contractual Strategy and Supply Chain 
 The AOD project was the third of the FPSO deep water projects carried out for 
offshore Angola.  The first two FPSOs took eight years to execute and each cost above 
$4.2 billion.  
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 IP7 explained that to some extent therefore “the NOD FPSO project benefited from 
previous technical experience, but its problems were compounded by increased politically 
inspired intervention in the project affairs which was not the case before”. 
 The initial AOD project budget had been $8.7 billion, which included an estimated 
$4.50 billion for the FPSO and the total project execution timescale was to have been nine 
years.  In the first three years, the AOD FOC undertook the front end phase in Paris, which 
included the basic engineering and award of the EPCI contracts for the FPSO (Offshore 
Technology, 2013).  
 However, as pointed out by IP1, “Much to our annoyance, the sanction of the 
project and award of the EPCI contract took longer than expected because the Angolan 
government authorities against our expectations wanted to approve all field development 
plans and contracts for the major project components”. 
Thus, the project execution phase of detailed engineering and construction, from 
basic design to the completed FPSO, lasted four and a half years.  The final phase, towing 
the completed FPSO out to offshore Angola and installing it, took a further year and a half; 
a reflection of the challenges of offshore Angola (Offshore Technology, 2013). 
 Based on the FOC’s Project Management Procedure (Project Management Guide, 
TOTAL AS, 2010) NOD FPSO transactions were divided into the following categories: 
4. AOD FOC handled all transactions with the Angolan government, Sonangol and 
other government agencies on strategic and regulatory matters as these involved 
sensitive political issues.  
5. Project management activities, basic engineering and preparation of specifications 
for EPCI compliance were done by AOD FOC who also had to provide direction 
for the complex engineering of the key process systems.  
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6. The EPCI contract was awarded to DW of South Korea for the complete FPSO on a 
market arrangement.  The FPSO hull topside process, utilities modules, a flare 
tower and the oil export buoy were all fabricated in South Korea.  The integration 
of the FPSO topsides with the hull and pre-commissioning were carried out in 
South Korea.  DW was also responsible for the offshore installation of the FPSO, 
oil offloading buoy and their moorings.  
 The supply chain process of a sequentially organised set of the above activities to 
convert the basic design to an operational NOD FPSO is shown in Figure 8.3. 
 
 
Figure 8.3 - Supply Chain for the AOD FPSO 
(Source: Offshore Technology, 2015) 
 
 The resultant outcomes of these transactions are discussed in Section 8.3. 
 
8.2 Case Study Background, Issues and Expectations 
8.2.1 Main Specific Hazards 
 Chapter Six presented the main transactions of a FPSO EPCI contract and the 
foreseeable risks and uncertainties associated with FPSO contracts, which are common to 
the three case studies. This section addresses the causes of the hazards posed by the 































transactions in the country.  The cumulative responses to the closed interview questions E1 
and E2 recorded in Appendix 2 confirmed the main specific hazards associated with the 
AOD FPSO transactions as follows:  
• A major cause for concern was the possibility that the Angolan government may 
become more opportunistic to reap more financial benefits from the vast 
investments in the oil and gas industry (Africa Report, 2011).  IP7 made the 
observation “I would not put it past the (Angolan) government to dictate the award 
of major contracts in return for benefits (from the contractors) to boost their 
dwindling funds”. In such a situation the onerous outcome would be the adverse 
awarding of the EPCI contracts. 
• Significant escalation of CAPEX and schedule of the major FPSO topside 
components can arise if the EPCI organisation awarded the contract does not have 
the complete technical expertise and FPSO experience to handle the design and 
construction of these components.   
 The impacts of the above hazards are examined by both primary and secondary 
evidence.  Then, enhancements to the governance mechanisms advocated by the extended 
TCE model are predicted, in order to cope with these hazards.  
8.2.2 Political Context of Angola 
 After Nigeria, Angola is the second largest African oil and gas producer in Africa 
and its economy is mainly dependent on the oil sector.  The long term future outlook is 
promising and growth was expected to reach 7.5% beyond 2013, buoyed by high oil prices 
and by the resumption of the government’s public investment programme.  It was 
described in the Offshore journal (July 2013) as a “golden decade for Angola’s deep water 
oil and gas”. 
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 It is a major area of exploration and production for major international oil and gas 
companies (IOGCs), including Shell, Exxon Mobil, TOTAL, Texaco, Agip and Chevron 
(Wood Mackenzie, 2011, 2013). 
 The political power is concentrated in the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de 
Angola (MPLA) led by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has ruled since 1979 and 
enjoys complete control over the political system. The political system as defined by the 
constitution of 1992 functioned in a relatively normal way.  The executive branch of the 
government composed of the President, the Prime Ministerand Council of Ministers. The 
legal system was based on Portuguese and customary law but was weak and fragmented.  
A Supreme Court served as the appellate tribunal; a Constitutional Court with powers of 
judicial review was never constituted despite statutory authorisation.  In practice, power 
was more and more concentrated in the hands of the President who, supported by an ever 
increasing staff, largely controlled parliament, government and the judiciary. The 
government of President Santos, in power for 35 years, has faced increasing criticism 
worldwide and in Angola for rampant corruption, lack of governance and authoritarian 
behaviour.  Although the 2012 elections ended in another victory for the MPLA, the 
government intensified repressive measures, restricting freedom of expression, association, 
and assembly.  The government targets outspoken activists and the police use excessive 
force to prevent peaceful anti-government protests (Wood Mackenzie, 2009, 2010, 2011; 
KPMG, 2011). 
 Angola’s oil and gas wealth has made the country an influential power in Africa, 
attracting business interests from all over the world with very little consideration for the 
country’s poor governance and human rights record.  In 2014, for the second time, Angola 
won a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and underwent its 
second Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council in October.  In 
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apparent anticipation of such high-level reviews of its human rights performance, in 
September 2013 Angola signed, but has yet to ratify, four human rights treaties. The 26 
year long civil war has ravaged the country’s political and social institutions.  Daily 
conditions of life throughout the country and specifically Luanda (population 
approximately six million) mirror the collapse of administrative infrastructure as well as 
many social institutions.  The ongoing grave economic situation meant any government 
support for social institutions was minimal.  Hospitals are without medicines or basic 
equipment, schools are without books, and public employees often lack the basic supplies 
for their day-to-day work. Despite the growth in revenue from oil and gas, there is a 
widespread lack of qualified workers and significant deficiencies in infrastructure, which 
act as major constraints to growth (Wood Mackenzie, 2009, 2010, 2011; KPMG, 2011). 
 However, the oil and gas revenue was used by the government to mitigate large 
social and economic challenges, just sufficient to prevent any major outbreak of violence 
or civil unrest (Wood Mackenzie, 2010; KPMG, 2011). In this context a point made by 
IP14 was that “It is reaching a stage that the Angolan government must act immediately to 
improve the living standards of the people”.  IP15 voiced the concern that “the oil and gas 
industry is the ideal cash cow for this and the government can milk our (oil and gas) 
industry not only by regulation but also by direct blatant actions”.  However, IP27 
expressed confidentially that “We do not expect the political hazards to reach the high 
levels being experienced in Nigeria”. 
8.2.3 Increased Regulation of the Industry in Angola 
 In 2003, the Angolan government introduced the Basic Law for Private Investment 
(Law 11/03), which stipulates the main requirements to be complied by foreign investors 
and also specifies the benefits to such investors.  These include provision for equal 
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treatment, offer of fiscal and custom incentives and simplification of the application 
process for projects. This law is implemented by the National Private Investment Agency 
(NPIA) and all foreign investments over $5 million must be approved by NPIA.  However, 
investments in the energy, diamond and financial sectors continue to be governed by 
legislation specific to each industry. 
 In this case directives issued by Ministries take precedence over this law even 
though the 2003 Investment Law was an attempt by the government to create a more 
investor-friendly environment (Wood Mackenzie Angola Reports, 2009, 2013).  In this 
situation, as IP7 said, “the Parliament Acts do not mean a thing as Ministry Directives will 
have the overriding authority over our (oil and gas) industry”. 
 In addition to the 2003 Investment Law, the other regulations in place are the 
Company Law and the Voluntary Arbitration Law. The first specifies the requirements for 
the incorporation of commercial companies in Angola. The second law provides the basic 
legal framework for the resolving of disputes outside of the legal framework. The Angolan 
government was considered unlikely to directly expropriate the assets of foreign investors.  
However, an industry concern was that potential for changes in the legislation and more 
stringent enforcement of existing laws poses some uncertainty about the execution of 
future major projects in Angola (Wood Mackenzie Africa Reports, 2010, 2011; KPMG 
Reports, 2012).  
 Another particular concern of the oil and gas industry is that Angola’s legal and 
judicial system lacks capacity and is inefficient; legal fees are high and most businesses 
avoid taking commercial disputes to court (Wood Mackenzie, 2011; KPMG Reports, 
2012).   These factors relating to the political and legal landscapes were confirmed by IP8, 
who also highlighted that “in practice we resolve contractual issues by resorting to 
compromise, at a cost to us”. 
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 It is well known that the Angolan government promotes the “Angolanisation” of 
companies and the greater use of Angolan suppliers for goods and services, but does not 
impose or enforce specific performance requirements on foreign investments (Wood 
Mackenzie Africa Report, 2011). In this situation, as IP5 said,“IOGCs have taken the 
initiative and are working with the government to establish more local sourcing 
requirements for the oil and gas industry”.  The oil service companies who provide 
services to the IOGCs are meeting these requirements by forming joint ventures with local 
Angolan companies, recruiting more Angolan employees, and substituting local products 
for imports.  In this manner, foreign companies can establish fully-owned subsidiaries in 
the oil and gas industry, and are frequently encouraged to take on local partners 
(Woodmackenzie, 2012). 
 Angola has basic property rights protection and the National Assembly adopted the 
Paris Convention for the protection of industrial intellectual property in 2005.  The licenses 
for the oil and gas exploration rights are granted for limited periods of time and only as 
partnerships between IOGCs and the Angola National Oil Company (NOC) which is 
Sonangol.  These licenses are normally granted for ten years.  The excessive proliferation 
of bureaucracy and regulations encourages corruption and malpractices.  In this case the 
complex arrangements and extended bureaucratic delays invariably encourage foreign 
firms to accelerate the project approval process by paying gratuities and facilitation fees 
(KPMG, 2010, 2011). 
 The common concern of the interviewees was that the government is increasingly 
exploiting the benefits of oil and gas revenues by imposing demands on the sharing of 
these benefits, without any established statutory instruments.  An example quoted by IP27 
was “there is always the potential for opportunistic intervention by government when 
awarding major contracts, each worth up to $5 billion”.  However, despite the increasing 
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political intervention, major IOGCs consider offshore Angola an extremely attractive 
proposition because of the vast amount of hydrocarbon reserves that can be exploited.  
They are therefore prepared to accommodate the occasional intervention of the Angolan 
government in their project transactions (Woodmackenzie, 2012; Offshore Journal, 2013).  
As explained by IP18 “The interventions by the government were not according to a 
planned strategy but sporadic actions to reap short term commercial benefits”. 
8.2.4 Impact of Project Execution Uncertainties 
 Having considered the political context, the impact of the specific technical and 
economic challenges facing the AOD project are addressed, before predicting the 
governance mechanisms for the FPSO transactions. Significant technical and commercial 
uncertainties faced by the AOD FPSO were similar to other offshore deep water oil and 
gas projects. In the case of the AOD FPSO, interview participants, particularly IP27, 
stressed that “the main execution failure can be caused by selection of a South Korean 
EPCI contractor who is not fully conversant in handling the technical complications 
surrounding complex process systems and components of the FPSO”. IP13 pointed out that 
“all the South Korean EPCI contractors whose core expertise is construction of marine 
tanker vessels are not fully conversant with the complex technical requirements for the 
FPSO systems and lacked the required expertise to execute the work”. 
 Thus the AOD FOC expected the performance of the selected EPCI contractor to 
be the main cause of any CAPEX escalation and delay in completing the FPSO to the 
required standard.  The project manager IP14 explained that “our strategy to manage this 
concern was to ensure that we prepared a robust design supported by complete technical 
specifications to guide the EPCI contractor”. 
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8.2.5 Predictions of the Extended TCE Model 
 Having examined the impact of the political, economic and execution hazards, 
facing the AOD FPSO transactions, this section applies the logic of the extended TCE 
model to predict the governance mechanisms to cope with the impact of the intervening 
variables of the model, i.e. medium level political hazards and acceptable level of 
protection of property rights (i.e. risk levels which can be assigned probability of 
occurrence by statistical data).  The prediction of the extended TCE model will be a 
coalition of transaction governance mechanisms based on the proposition that the AOD 
FOC must perform the activities they can do best and use the market arrangements for 
transactions where that would deliver greater cost effectiveness and efficiency.  As 
presented in Chapter Six, Table 6.3, a FPSO consists of several components requiring 
transactions of varying levels of uncertainty and asset specificity. 
 In this case, based on the potential challenges facing the AOD FPSO project, the 
extended TCE model would predict the use of vertical integration for the project’s front-
end activities in order to fully define the basic technical and commercial specifications, and 
for liaising with the Angolan authorities to obtain the necessary project sanctions.  
 Both the basic TCE model and the extended model would predict the use of the 
market for the rest of the FPSO transactions, including the following major components: 
• The detailed design of process and utility systems.  
• FPSO construction in South Korea. 
• FPSO moorings installation. 
• Detailed design and fabrication of the offloading buoy. 
• Fabrication of the flare tower, risers and manifolds. 
 Thus, in the case of the AOD FPSO, greater use of the market than in the Nigerian 
case study can be envisaged, as the technical and the commercial specifications formulated 
by the AOD FOC were expected to be complete enough to enable these transactions to be 
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executed efficiently.  However, there would be the need for hybrid arrangements with 
AOD FOC providing technical and logistics support to the EPCI for complex engineering 
and installation activities which can cause delays.  As it turned out, as stated by IP14 
“based on our project practice AOD FOC decided to execute the FPSO EPCI activities on 
a near ‘turn-key’ contract, except for the offshore commissioning of systems”. The 
commissioning of the production and utilities systems was to be managed by AOD FOC 
staff (such as interviewees 14, 15 and 19), who were responsible for the future of the AOD 
oil and gas facilities’ operations. 
 The next section considers the outcome of the AOD FPSO transactions in order to 
evaluate to what extent the governance mechanisms used were, or had to be, aligned with 
the predictions given in this section. 
8.3 Outcome of Project Transactions 
8.3.1 Project Organisation and Transactional Relationship 
 This section analyses FPSO project transactions considered in three main 
categories: project management, EPCI contracts activities in South Korea, and onshore and 
offshore transactions in Angola, which are subject to different technical and transactional 
hazards. The outcomes are examined, taking into consideration the IOC governance 
arrangements used, any revised measures implemented and their reasons. The relationship 
arrangements and the ex-ante governance mechanisms planned for executing the FPSO 
transactions extracted from the project records are shown in Figure 8.4.  
 The AOD FOC was responsible for the management of the extraction of oil and gas 
field resources owned by Sonangol.  
 In addition, AOD FOC was responsible for the development of the field and 
liaising with the Sonangol and Angolan authorities for approvals and sanctions (Wood 
Mackenzie, 2011).  According to IP14 “This proved to be more challenging for this project 
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than during previous Angolan projects due to the increasingly selfish behaviour of the 
government and their agents”. 
 The AOD FOC prepared the basic engineering, performance standards and 
execution plans for the tender bids for the EPCI contracts.  As discussed later, the AOD 
FOC was compelled by the Angolan government to award the EPCI contract for the FPSO 
on a market arrangement to DW, a South Korean company.  
 
Figure 8.4 - AOD FPSO Organisational RElationships and Governance Mechanisms 
 IP27 explained that “the AOD field development plan defines the execution strategy 
and hence has a bearing on the commercial issues.  It had to comply with stringent 
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include more detailed transaction information including sensitive cost data for the design, 
fabrication and offshore installation programmes of the project activities”. In the 
assessment of IP8 “We could sense increased opportunism on the part of the government 
and this significantly impacted the execution arrangements that we had planned”.  
According to IP18 “The increased compliance requirements meant additional expenditure 
in the form of commercial concessions and a delay of about a year in obtaining the 
sanctioning of the project development plans”.  These inputs from the IPs were confirmed 
by the project records that the IOC’s field development plans and project execution 
arrangements, formulated to optimise the use of their resources, were compromised by 
commercially adverse changes which benefitted the Angolan government.  This can be 
considered an infringement of the FOC’s property rights due to the increased economic 
opportunism of the Angolan government exercised through Sonangol. The IOC Project 
Manager IP14 lamented about the financial loss that “during the delay in the sanctioning 
process the project had to maintain its management and engineering teams so as not to 
lose our in-house expertise, which would have been extremely difficult to replace”. 
 The compliance and project sanctioning process also includes ‘signature fees’ paid 
by the AOD IOC and their partners to the host government. The value of these is subject to 
negotiation, depending on the concessions made by an IOC in their field development 
plans and project execution activities to the benefit of the government (Woodmackenzie, 
2013). 
 IP15 confirmed that “in reality, mainly due to the protracted negotiations to 
resolve the division of the oil and gas revenue and the award of the EPCI contracts, the 
AOD project sanctioning process took fifteen months instead of the expected five to six, as 
had been the case for previous projects”.  As the project records confirmed, in order to 
deal with these delays, the AOD FOC rapidly expanded its project management teams in 
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Paris and Angola.  This required, as a contingency measure, additional specialists in 
contract negotiations and commercial affairs to deal with the unexpected opportunistic 
behaviour of the Angolan government and Sonangol.  It was confirmed by IP8 that these 
teams were increased from 120 to approximately 170. Project Services Manager IP28 
stated “We could have run a chamber of lawyers as there were so many legal experts 
required to resolve the contractual terms and the selection of the EPCI contractors”.  
(This is discussed later in this section.) 
 The project documentation confirmed that the process to award the EPCI contracts 
took longer than expected because the Angolan government, who had the approval 
authority, intervened in dictating the award of EPCI contracts for the major project 
components.  As such, the award of contracts for the main project components including 
the FPSO became subject to mandatory approval by Sonangol. The FOC prepared, as they 
had for the previous projects, the bid documents and specifications for the tender process 
for awarding the EPCI contracts on a market arrangement for the main components of the 
AOD project.  
 IP14 confirmed “there was a lengthy and exhaustive tender process for the FPSO 
involving the four South Korean EPCI contractors including HI and DW”. According to 
IP28, “Based on the results of the stringent bid evaluation process, the AOD project 
management recommended the award of the FPSO EPCI contract to HI, together with a 
French engineering subcontractor. This combination had worked successfully for other 
FPSO projects executed by the AOD FOC”.  However, IP28 corroborated the account by 
IP14 that “A major unexpected development was that Sonangol, directed by the 
government, rejected the selection of the tender process for the award of the FPSO EPCI 
to HI. The contract award was dictated by Sonangol based on economic benefits to their 
advantage”. In this situation, acting on instructions from Sonangol, the AOD FOC had to 
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award the EPCI contract to DW, with an American company as their engineering 
subcontractor. 
 IP14 said that “The project team was quite devastated by this unfair contract 
award, despite the formal tender process and the technical specifications having been 
firmed up by the IOC with HI”.  He said “the AOD FOC IOC had to make significant 
commercial and technical compromises before awarding the FPSO EPCI contract to 
DW”.  The project records confirmed that the AOD FOC became very concerned about 
awarding of the EPCI contract to DW without resolving technical uncertainties, 
particularly the issues connected with the topside hydrocarbon processing modules and 
mooring arrangements.  In this situation, “there would a need for higher AOD FOC 
involvement than envisaged to resolve the increased commercial and behavioural 
uncertainties in the FPSO transactions”, according to IP23 and confirmed by IP28.  As in 
case study 1, this required the application of indirect vertical integration measures in the 
design and monitoring of the construction of the FPSO to meet the stringent technical 
specifications.   
8.3.2 Project Transactions in South Korea 
 The project records revealed that the AOD FOC was unable to impose all the 
technical requirements and contractual terms specified in the EPCI contract with the DW 
contract.  Similarly, DW had insufficient time to become completely familiar with the 
complex technical requirements and had not mobilised sufficient technical expertise to 
execute the work as they had underestimated its scope. The detailed engineering was 
carried out by the DW American sub-contractor with a project team of more than four 
hundred people in South Korea and Houston.  
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 IP28 pointed out that “because of the shortcomings of the DW contract proposal, 
we had to introduce additional provisions, both in the technical specifications and 
installation procedures for the FPSO”. The project documentation reported that 
engineering and construction progress was slow and the quality inadequate as DW had a 
steep learning curve. This was due to the inadequate clarification and resolution of the 
technical issues before contract award.  IP13 confirmed that “as contract execution 
proceeded, the AOD FOC became extremely concerned about the potential quality, 
technical failures and delays that could materialise due to DW’s inadequate 
performance”.  The outcome, according to IP27,“Resulted in the 130-person project team 
in South Korea being supplemented with an additional 80 expatriate personnel to provide 
the necessary technical and management leadership”.  According to IP15 “the AOD FOC 
personnel had to work with DW and convert detailed engineering into construction 
methods during the fabrication period. This amounted to implementing indirect vertical 
integration, as the complex technical activities had to be directly managed by the AOD 
FOC personnel”.IP27 described this intervention as “a rescue operation to prevent a 
‘debacle’”. 
 The AOD FOC also retained a ‘shadow’ engineering team to provide the highly 
skilled expertise required to perform the complex engineering for the topside process 
systems.  Consequently, the engineering management and quality control costs more than 
doubled.  
 The lesson learned is that if this remedial action had not been taken, there would 
have been defects in the construction of the FPSO requiring extensive rework (OTC 20123 
and OTC 20163).  Additionally, as confirmed by IP28 “There was a lack of contractual 
trust as this was the first FPSO contract executed by DW for the AOD FOC. It became 
necessary to make commercial concessions by relaxing some contractual terms and 
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providing incentives to minimise the opportunistic behaviour of the EPCI contractor who 
enjoyed the patronage of the Angolan government”. 
As pointed out by IP15, “In order to comply with the strategy to maximise the 
onshore pre-commissioning and commissioning of the FPSO, additional IOC personnel 
were required to manage these activities to help DW”. 
 The offshore installation was done as part of the AOD FOC contract with DW, as 
they possessed the necessary large installation vessels.  However, according to IP18,“The 
IOC had to provide the expertise to supplement the DW’s lack of technical expertise and 
operational resources in order to manage the complex tasks involved in installing the 
FPSO and UFR in offshore Angola, an area not familiar to DW”.  Final commissioning of 
the integrated FPSO to commence oil and gas production was undertaken by the AOD 
FOC with the assistance of DW.  This process was conducted as a virtual vertical 
integration arrangement, as the commissioning procedures and logistics were all 
formulated, executed and controlled by the AOD FOC.  
8.3.3 Increased AOD FOC Participation and Transaction Costs 
 The project documents confirmed that the relationship arrangements between the 
Angolan government, Sonangol, AOD FOC and DW (EPCI contractor) remained nearly 
the same as illustrated in Figure 8.4.  However, as discussed in Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2, 
significantly increased AOD FOC participation was required to implement the hybrid 
governance mechanisms to complete the project transactions.  The governance 
mechanisms which had to be used (as recorded in project documents) turned out to be not 




 As such, the strategy used was aligned with the predictions of the extended and 
basic TCE models for the following transactions:  
• Transactions with the government, Sonangoland other institutions (vertical 
integration). 
• Hull tanks and machinery (market). 
• FPSO offshore moorings and installation (market with IVI). 
• Fabrication and installation of the oil export buoy (market with IVI). 
  
 The strategy used was not aligned with the predictions of the TCE models for the 
following transactions: 
• FPSO detailed engineering (hybrid with IVI). 
• Fabrication of topside process modules (Hybrid with IVI) 
 In summary, the AOD FPSO was completed with an increased management of 
transactions by the AOD FOC to implement political governance mechanisms in addition 
to measures required to direct the technical and commercial activities carried out in South 
Korea and Angola.   
 This inevitably resulted in significantly increased transaction costs and effort 
measured in terms of hours incurred to complete the project.  These transaction costs 
consist of the costs for management, political governance, engineering support and 
monitoring of the EPCI activities.   
 The lesson learned is that an unexpected increase in the political hazards caused by 
selfish intervention ofthe host government led to the requirement to extend the governance 
mechanisms (i.e. the intervening variable) beyond the basic TCE model.  The causes and 
consequences of this extension of the TCE theory are given in the next section. 
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8.4 TCE Findings of the Case Study 
8.4.1 Empirical Findings on the Extension of TCE 
 The AOD FPSO and associated facilities were installed offshore and commissioned 
to achieve first oil and gas. In order to achieve this, all three groups of transactions, i.e. 
project management including political governance arrangements, the FPSO construction 
in South Korea and transactions in Angola, had to be carried out in non-economising 
arrangements.  As is evident from both primary evidence (responses of IPs) and secondary 
evidence (from industry publications) provided in Sections 8.2 and 8.3, it was not possible 
to rely on extensive market arrangements as in previous Angolan projects. 
 In Angola, as the economic pressures increased, the government resorted to blatant 
opportunism to exploit the benefits from the oil and gas projects.  IP5 pointed out that “the 
adverse government intervention could be attributed to the immaturity of the Angolan 
government in handling its relationships with the industry, and akin to killing the goose 
that lays the golden eggs”.It was confirmed by IP18 that “problems manifested in the form 
of excessive demands from the government authorities for financial ‘rewards’ in return for 
smoothing the path for the sanction of the project activities”. This forced the AOD IOC, as 
expressed by IP18, to implement “relationship building measures with the Angolan 
governmentrequiringunexpected additional resources for lobbying political leaders 
directly and indirectly”.  This is a situation when,contrary to ex-ante expectations, it was 
necessary to introduce increased political governance mechanisms to complement project 
governance in order to counter the unexpected increased political hazards and institutional 
opportunism (Woodmackenzie, 2011, 2012).  This evidence supports the proposition that it 
is necessary to implement mechanisms of political governance in the form of economic 
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and relationship concessions to address institutional-specific political hazards (Henisz and 
Williamson, 1999). 
 The evidence of this case study also supports the point that increased political 
opportunism caused by adverse changes in the economic and social climates can in turn 
alter the safeguarding arrangements of property rights.  As such, this finding (as with case 
study 1) supports the argument made in Chapter Four, that property rights allocation is 
determined and implemented by those participating in the transactions and reflects the 
conflicting economic motives and the relative bargaining strengths of those participants. 
As the Angolan government’s political opportunism increased, so too did the potential 
threat to FOC IOD’s property rights to execute transactions in an optimal manner. The 
outcome, as stated earlier, was DW being awarded the FPSO contract on the instructions of 
Sonangol, despite the fact that they were not the successful bidder. Thus, the existing 
arrangements for safeguarding the IOC’s property rights, a modulating variable previously 
perceived as acceptable, became ineffective because of this opportunistic behaviour. 
 A result of this adverse selection was that trust and lack of performance issues 
created by DW during the project transactions, alongside numerous commercial 
drawbacks, meant that relying on market governance would have led to an escalation of 
costs and schedule delays.  Hence, there was the need for FOC to resort to hybrid 
arrangements with indirect vertical integration to manage the performance and trust issues 
to limit the contractor’s capacity to create delays. Contrary to expectation, IOC had to 
resort to retaining control of the engineering of FPSO systems and providing direction for 
the FPSO construction and offshore activities. The implementation of these remedial 
measures by the IOC, in the form of contractual concessions and technical expertise 
support, had the beneficial impact of improving the working relationships and trust 
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between the FOC and DW and “ironing out” the initial disputes, as mentioned by 
interviewee 27. 
 In this case study of AOD FPSO, the property rights were determined and enforced 
solely by the Angolan government who displayed pre-meditated, selfish, opportunistic 
behaviour to exploit the benefits from the oil and gas projects. Therefore, the predominant 
market governance arrangements predicted for the AOD FPSO by the TCE model could 
not be implemented as the market arrangements required additional safeguards. Therefore, 
this case study demonstrates that the potential effects of political opportunistic behaviour, 
which were not evident before the event, can negate the corporate selection of governance 
arrangements causing adverse selection of the agent when market arrangements are used.  
 In summary, the opportunistic behaviour of the Angolan government caused delays 
in the project sanction and an infringement on the method of project execution leading to 
the adverse selection of EPCI contractor.   
 As a result, the transaction costs increased to cover the costs of implementing 
specialised governance mechanisms for the EPCI contract.  A measurement of this 
extension of the basic TCE model is provided in the next section. 
8.4.2 Measurement of the Extension of TCE Model 
 As for case study 1, the increase in transaction costs and increase in the effort 
required (measured in terms of hours expended) to complete transactions, are used as 
credible measures of the extension of the TCE model required for the AOD FPSO 
transactions to mitigate the unexpected increase in the political hazards. The estimates for 
the hours and costs of transactions in Europe, South Korea and Angola were verbally 
provided (in confidence) by IPs 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, 27 and 28.  The mean values of 
these estimates are recorded in Table 8.3.   
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 The cost figures are given in US million dollars (MD).  As in case study 1, the 
transaction activities are considered to be composed of project management, 
implementation of political governance mechanisms and the IVI activities for the AOD 
FPSO EPCI transactions.  
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As recorded in Table 8.3, the increase in the overall transaction costs (ΔTCEA) for 
the AOD FPSO was approximately 17% of the initial budget, from $607 million to $711 
million. The percentage increase in the transaction costs for the AOD FPSO project 
management and political governance measures turned out to be 28% with an increase of 
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30% in the hours expended, which proved significantly higher than anticipated.  As 
discussed in Section 8.3, this was due to the extra effort required for negotiations, lobbying 
and other political governance mechanisms that were required to cope with the increased 
opportunisms of the Angolan authorities. The increase in the transaction costs for 
implementing the IVI measures required to ensure technical performance of the completed 
FPSO and building relationship trusts in JV arrangements turned out to be 37% with an 
increase of 44% in the hours expended.  This highest percentage increase in the total 
transaction costs was dominated by the transaction costs in South Korea.  This was the 
result of implementing the IVI measures to ensure technical performance of the completed 
FPSO and building relationship trusts, in order to compensate for the shortage of expertise 
of DW in executing FPSO contracts. The case study findings provide evidence that the 
unexpected political hazards created by the opportunistic behaviour of the host country 
government and inadequate institutional regimes can result in the project transactions 
having to be carried out in a non-economising manner.  Thus, for the AOD FPSO 
transactions these intervening variables of the extended TCE model shifted the point at 
which specialised governance strategy was needed. The outcome was political governance 
and pre-contract award activities were done by vertical integrationwith indirect vertical 
integration mechanisms had to be implemented to ensure completion of AOD FPSO 
activities.  The implementation of this hybrid governance (HA) at lower asset specificity is 
illustrated in Figure 8.5.  The line HA represents the increased transaction costs of ΔTCEA 
for the AOD FPSO, representing a measure of the extension of the basic TCE that was 










 For the FPSO projects carried out in Angola before the AOD FPSO project, 
government intervention was minimal and there were no major concerns regarding the 
delineation of property rights.  As such, the case study of the FPSO project off Angola 
(AOD FPSO) examined the scenario where the host country political hazards and 
protection of property rights present were considered as “medium level” hazards.   The 
expectations were that there would be adequate checks and balances in the form of 
established institutional arrangements to minimise political hazards and access to legal 
redress to enforce contracts in place.  The extended TCE model predicted the use of 
vertical integration for the project’s front-end activities including political governance for 
liaising with the Angolan authorities to obtain the necessary project sanctions.  Both the 
basic TCE model and the extended TCE model predicted greater use of the market than in 
case study 1, as the expectations were that the complete technical and commercial 
specifications would enable the EPCI contract to be executed efficiently.   
 However, the ex-ante expectations of the levels of political hazards and the existing 
arrangements for the safeguarding of the property rights became ineffective.  This was due 
to the changed behaviour of the Angolan government resorting to self-interest to exploit 
the revenues from oil and gas production in order to overcome the economic and political 
problems in Angola.  Such practice of self-interest with guile by the government could not 
be anticipated ex-ante due to the bounded rationality of the participants and hence the 
appropriate mitigation measures did not become evident until the circumstances 
materialised.   
 The Angolan government overruled the EPCI contractor selected by AOD FOC 
and, for economic reasons, imposed a contractor of their choice on AOD FOC, whose 
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technical abilities did not match the task.  In this case study, the ex-ante expectations of the 
levels of political hazards and the existing arrangements for the safeguarding of the 
property rights became ineffective due to the changed behaviour of the Angolan 
government.  
 Adverse selection of the FPSO EPCI contractor created issues of inadequate 
competency, a lack of trust and the potential for delays.  As such specialised forms of 
governance were needed, as market arrangements alone were inadequate.  This required 
indirect vertical integration in the form of greater participation by the IOC in the 
transactions resulting in increased transaction costs.  The case studytherefore provides 
empirical evidence of the relationship between the modulating and intervening variables of 
the extended TCE model.  
 Increased government intervention and a reduction in the property rights safeguards 
resulted in transactions being carried out uneconomically as the market arrangements 
perceived before the event had to be augmented by remedial measures. 
 This case study thus provides evidence to support the proposition that property 
rights are determined through political processes and that political behaviour has an 
overriding influence on the governance arrangements required to deliver project success.  
This is in contradiction to the classic TCE theory of frictionless market where the host 
country government or the regulatory bodies are considered as neutral or even redundant to 
the execution of the transactions. The conclusion drawn from this case study is that an 
extension of TCE by political governance may be required, even for situations where the 





Chapter 9 CASE STUDY 3 – OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE GULF OF 
MEXICO 
9.1 Introduction 
9.1.1 Core Argument 
This research focuses on the academic challenge of developing an extension to the 
Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) theory, to predict governance mechanisms for high 
value, complex industrial projects executed across international borders.  This extension to 
the TCE addresses the impact of the political and institutional arrangements and the 
property rights protection issues of the host countries, where the project transactions are 
carried out.  In this case, the focus is on selection of appropriate governance mechanisms 
in an effort to provide the necessary dimensions of authority, decision-making and 
accountability for such international projects.  Case studies 1 and 2 provide evidence that 
countries with authoritarian regimes, when motivated by selfish interests, can be expected 
to cause hazards in the execution of the major projects.  These can manifest in the form of 
imposition of stringent regulations, implementation of excessive fiscal demands, threats to 
property rights and expectation of bribes to resolve the challenges of these demands.  
Evidence has been provided by these two case studies that this adverse behaviour of a 
country’s political institutions, causing hazards and constraints to transactions, requires the 
application of political governance, both in a direct or subtle manner.  Accordingly, selfish 
government intervention when compounded by relative weak property rights constrains 
firms’ capability to execute transactions in an economising manner. 
The subject of this case study 3 is a FPSO project in the Gulf of Mexico (GUM 
FPSO) off the USA coast with the technological hazards and characteristics of transactions 
similar to those of case studies 2 and 3.  The USA has a well-regulated mature oil and gas 
industry with minimum intervention by the government in project transactions.  In 
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addition, the institutions provide very high levels of protection of property rights.  
However, costs for legal enforcements, if ever the need arises, are extremely high and the 
proceedings protracted.   
The responsibilities for the development and operations of the GUM were assigned 
by the venture partners to the IOGC with the largest stake in the venture.  As discussed in 
Chapter Six, this IOGC, called the Field Operating Company (GUM FOC), was 
responsible for all project transactions.   
The cumulative responses to the interview closed question E1 (recorded in 
Appendix 2 and repeated below), provide evidence that the relative political and 
institutional hazards on transactions with respect to the oil and gas industry in the USA are 
considered low compared to those of Nigeria (high) or Angola (medium). 
Table 9.1 - Potential Impact of Host Country Political and Institutional Hazards 
 Factor Average Score 
E1.1 Nigeria 85% 
E1.2 Angola 72% 
E1.3 USA 40% 
 
As per the dimensionalising provided in Section 4.2, the USA is a democratic state 
compared to the Nigeria regime which is classified as a dictatorship and Angola which is a 
pseudo-democratic state.  Hence, this case study reflects the scenario given in Zone C of 
the matrix of government intervention (high/medium/low) versus enforcement of property 
rights (low/medium/high) presented in Chapter Four Section 4.2 and repeated below. 
 Hence, case study 3 examines the scenario represented in Zone A of the illustration 
Figure 4.2 (repeated below) where the political hazards and protection of property rights 





Figure 9.1 - Dimensions of Political and Property Rights Hazards for GUM FPSO 
The evidence from the case study is evaluated in order to determine whether the 
outcome of the project transactions (the dependent variable) was as predicted by the TCE 
model when the impact of the institutions on project transactions was considered to be 
neutral.  
9.1.2 Data Sources 
As for other case studies, GUM FPSO project documents were examined to collect 
the data to develop the narrative of the case study.  As the contents of these documents 
cannot be divulged due to their confidentiality, the following multiple sources (details 
listed in the References section of the report) are used to corroborate and extend the data 
collected from the project documents.  These multiple sources were used for the evaluation 
of the outcome of GUM FPSO transactions to formulate the findings to provide 





















1. Offshore Technology Conference (OTC) proceedings papers including: 
a. OTC20400 – GUM Development of Offshore Projects 
b. OTC21821 – Project Execution for GUM Projects  
c. OTC21878 – Management of Complex Offshore Projects 
d. OTC 21075 – Risk Mitigation in International Oil and Gas Projects. 
2. Wood Mackenzie– Gulf of Mexico Deepwater oil gas reports (Wood Mackenzie, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013. 
3. Offshore Technology, August 2010, July 2012, October 2013. 
4. KPMG Reports on oil and gas industry (2011, 2012, 2013). 
5. Analysis of the responses of the interview participants (IPs) listed in Table 9.2 
(extracted from the complete list in Table 5.4) to closed and open questions of the 
semi-structured interviews, which are used in this chapter as primary evidence.  
Table 9.2 – Interview Participants for GUM FPSO Project 
IP Project/Organisation Position Held   Experience 
(years) 
5 Director, Risk Management Consultants and formerly Shell Expro  >35 
6 Project Risk Manager, a major IOGC >30 
9 Academic and Project Management Consultant >30 
10 Ex-Vice President, Halliburton Energy Services >35 
11 Project Manager – several IOGCs >35 
12 Managing Director, Risk Management Consultants >30 
16 Project Risk Manager, a major IOGC >25 
20 Risk Manager – Subsea Seven Limited  >25 
21 Director, Risk Management Consultants >25 






The rest of this section summarises the basic GUM FPSO project components and 
defines the contractual background for the transactions to be executed.  In Section 9.2 the 
background data of the case study including causes of the specific hazards faced by the oil 
and gas industry in the USA and the GUM project are discussed.  Justification is provided 
for the prior expectation of the level of risks due to these variables.  Then the governance 
measures as predicted by the TCE model for the transactions are defined.   
Section 9.3 examines the outcome of the project transactions when the ex-ante 
expectations of the level of governmental intervention and the threat to the protection of 
property rights arrangements are both considered to be low (i.e. issues not impacting the 
transactions).  Section 9.4 examines the empirical findings to discuss the applicability of 
the TCE model to the GUM FPSO project and the validity of the research propositions 
concerning the selection of optimum governance arrangements. Justification is provided 
for transactions mechanisms found to be necessary to complete the project transactions for 
the GUM FPSO to achieve first oil and gas.  Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 
9.5 as to whether the evidence provided by this case study supports the research 
propositions presented in Chapter Four.  
9.1.3 Summary of the Project Scope 
The GUM field is located in the Mississippi Canyon, 125 miles south-east of New 
Orleans. It is the largest field in the Gulf of Mexico and lies at a water depth of 1900m, i.e. 
very deep water compared to earlier projects.  Technically, the components of the GUM 
project, as illustrated in Figure 9.2, are similar to the other two cases considered in this 
thesis.  It is a major offshore deep water project to extract, process and transport oil and 
gas from 25 remote subsea wells by pipelines to a moored FPSO, the largest floating 
installation not only in the Gulf of Mexico (GUM) but in the world.  The generic technical, 
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commercial, project execution arrangements and the uncertainties of these projects are 
presented in Chapter Six. 
 
Figure 9.2 - Components of an Offshore Oil and Gas Development in GUM 
 
According to interviewee 11, the GUM FPSO’s topside area is the “size of three 
football fields”.  It is packed with process systems and utilities to separate the hydrocarbon 
into oil, water and gas and to export a quarter of a million barrels of oil per day.  
The GUM FPSO is a monohull ship-like facility, anchored to the seabed by a 
station-keeping mooring arrangement.  The FPSO hull is of standard design and 
construction, but enhanced with additional water ballast tanks, machinery spaces and 
mooring equipment to meet the requirements for the deep water (Offshore Technology, 
2010).   The FPSO topsides systems and module designs are highly project-specific with 
design variations and uncertainties depending upon the hydrocarbon processing systems 
required to handle the extra-large production capacity from deep water.  The mooring 
arrangement for the station keeping of the FPSO is highly site-specific and there will be 
design variations and uncertainties depending on the GUM site conditions. Installation and 
commissioning of the FPSO in GUM deep water requires highly skilled and experienced 
personnel.  In relation to this deep water project, the FPSO and its mooring arrangement 
presented the highest cost element at about $5.4 billion out of a project total budget of $9.2 
billion.  It also contains high asset specificity because the end product is not re-deployable 
























GUM presented a novel challenge to the GUM FOC and the EPCI contractor (Offshore 
Technology, 2010). 
In addition, the issue of physical asset specificity is very high as the partner IOCGs 
and EPCI parties to the transaction invested in novel equipment and machinery involving 
specific capabilities due to product complexities.  The human asset specificity was another 
important factor in that the EPCI contractor had to accumulate specific expertise in order to 
construct and install the facility.   
The total GUM project execution timescale was eight years.  In the first three years, 
the GUM FOC carried out the activities for the basic engineering, preparation of tenders to 
obtain commercial bids, and award of EPCI contracts for the major components (OTC 
Paper 20400).  The project transactions for the engineering, procurement, construction and 
offshore installation (EPCI) of the GUM FPSO form the subject of this case study.  The 
supply chain arrangement for the GUM FPSO is presented in Figure 9.3. 
9.1.4 Contractual Strategy and Supply Chain 
In the first three years, the GUM FOC considered the front end phase in Houston, 
which included the basic engineering and award of the EPCI contracts for the FPSO, PUR 
and the SPS packages (Offshore Technology, 2014).  The project execution phase of 
detailed engineering and construction, from basic design to the completed FPSO, lasted 
four and a half years.  The final phase, towing the completed FPSO out to offshore GUM 
and installing it, took a further year, a reflection of the challenges presented by the site 
conditions in the GUM (Offshore Technology, 2013).  Based on the GUM FOC’s Project 




1.  GUM FOC handled the overall project management of strategic activities and all 
transactions with the government agencies on regulatory matters.  
2. The EPCI contract on a market arrangement for the complete FPSO including the 
hull, topside process and utilities modules and the oil export buoy awarded to JRM 
of the USA.  The integration of the FPSO topsides with the hull and pre-
commissioning were carried out in New Orleans by JRM, who was also responsible 
for the offshore installation activities. 
3. JRM awarded the contract for the construction of the hull on a “turn-key” 
arrangement to DW of South Korea. 
The supply chain process of a sequentially organised set of the above activities to 
convert the basic design to an operational GUM FPSO is shown in Figure 9.3. 
 
 
Figure 9.3 - Supply Chain for the GUM FPSO 
(Source – Offshore Technology, 2012) 


































9.2 Case Study Background, Issues and Expectations 
9.2.1 Main Specific Political and Economic Hazards 
Chapter Six presented the hazards and transactions for the main components of a 
FPSO EPCI contract and the foreseeable hazards associated with such transactions.  This 
section addresses the causes and consequences of the following specific hazards faced by 
the GUM FPSO project.  The cumulative responses to the closed interview questions E1 
and E2 recorded in Appendix 2, and the input from interview participants (reference 
Section 9.2.2) are used for this: 
• Any hazards that were caused to the FPSO transactions by political context of the 
USA.  
• Any demand for local content propelled by political motives requiring more 
transactions to be done by local companies.  
• Potential escalation of CAPEX and schedule of the FPSO and its mooring 
arrangements due to the stringent design and construction requirements for 
operating in a new frontier region (i.e. GUM deep water). 
The impact of the above issues are examined by both primary and secondary 
evidence to determine the extent to which they materialised and the governance 
mechanisms advocated by the TCE model in order to cope with the hazards that did 
materialise.    
9.2.2 Impact of Political Context on the Industry 
It is widely accepted (at least in the Western world) that the USA is one of the main 
leading democracies in the world.  This is despite the very transparent disparities between 
the various layers of its population.  The institutions and the legal system are strong. The 
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US oil and gas industry is very stable, mature and well regulated by legislation, such that 
there are no potential hazards due to government intervention (Wood Mackenzie, 2011; 
KPMG,2011).  As IP10 said “I have been an oil man all my working life and I have not 
experienced any problems with government meddling in our projects”.  This is supported 
by the input from IP9 that “the oil lobby is very strong and the (USA) government has 
always supported the industry to get bigger and more powerful”. As IP11 summarised 
“Our problems were not due to political or legal issues but due to the challenges of 
(FPSO) operating in the GUM, a new experience for us”.  Hence, the expectation is that 
there will be no requirement for political governance for GUM FPSO transactions. 
9.2.3 Regulation of the Industry in the USA 
Offshore production facilities in the United States provide a large portion of the 
nation’s oil and gas supply.  Offshore oil and gas production in the US Gulf of Mexico has, 
since the late 1990s, become a major source of oil and natural gas.  The western and 
central Gulf of Mexico, which includes offshore Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and 
Alabama, produces about 25% of the nation's oil and natural gas.   
Leasing and drilling on the federal offshore seabed is controlled by the US Bureau 
of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), previously 
known as the US Minerals Management Service (MMS).  BOEMRE issues leases through 
a competitive tendering process.  The oil and gas company offering the highest up-front 
payment to the government (called a bonus) wins the lease.  The government also receives 
a fixed annual rental based on the area for non-producing leases, and a percentage of the 
market value of any oil or gas produced and sold.  The leases expire after a set number of 
years, or continue however long the oil and gas are continually produced from the lease.  
As such, property rights issues between the IOCGs, the US government and EPCI 
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contractors are relatively very low compared to other oil and gas producing countries 
(KPMG, 2010; Wood Mackenzie, 2010, 2011).  In addition to the established regulation of 
the industry, in practice there is a high level of trust between the leaders of the IOCGs and 
the main EPCI contractors, built up over years of working together on oil and gas projects.  
The foundation for this trust was explained by IP24 as “most of the guys who run Mobile, 
Esso, BP (i.e. IOCGs), Halliburton, Bechtel, Worley, JRM (international EPCIs) have been 
buddies from the time they learnt about oil and gas at Texas A & M (University)”. 
9.2.4 Impact of Uncertainties on Project Execution 
Considering the political context, the impact of the technical challenges facing the 
GUM FPSO has been addressed, before predicting the governance mechanisms for the 
GUM FPSO transactions.   
Due to the ever-increasing demand for new reserves, the oil companies utilising the 
developments in technology have extended drilling and production farther and farther from 
shore, and into deeper and deeper water.  Currently, 72% of oil production in the Gulf of 
Mexico comes from wells drilled in water depths of 1000 feet (300 m) or greater.   Since 
the mid-1990s, sixty-five discoveries have been made in water depths greater than 5000 
feet (1500m).  Therefore, the development of GUM offshore deep water fields is relatively 
new and there are recurring technical challenges which are complex and significant enough 
to cause commercial hazards (Wood Mackenzie, 2009, 2010, 2011).  As indicated by 
interview participant 5, “We were knocking back the frontiers of technology”.  Deeper 
water fields (>1000 metres) also require novel technology to manage the technical 
uncertainties posed by hydrocarbon flow assurance issues.  
These uncertainties ranged from complex reservoir patterns and flow assurance to 
the significantly increased large scale topsides systems for hydrocarbon processing.  In the 
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case of GUM FPSO, these challenges are compounded by the need for stringent design, 
fabrication and operating requirements for station-keeping the world’s largest floating 
production unit in deep waters.  These issues are major challenges for the IOCGs and the 
EPCI contractors operating in the frontier region.  These technological challenges have 
been daunting for projects carried out before the GUM FPSO project and in several cases 
have resulted in significant cost escalations in the CAPEX of these projects (OTC papers 
20400 and 21821).  According to IP12, the significant uncertainties faced by the GUM 
projects were the “technical challenges to design and fabricate the components of the 
FPSO process systems and the station keeping (mooring) system to operate in the GUM”.  
In this context, IP10 pointed out that “We expected that extensive technological research 
efforts had to be undertaken to enhance the design activities and define the specifications 
to achieve a “suitable fit for purpose” end result for the largest FPSO in the world”. 
Installing the GUM FPSO correctly and efficiently requires highly precise and 
technically complex procedures involving large installation vessels. The major EPCI 
contractors in the USA have experience of the necessary installation procedures and have 
suitable installation vessels. However, installation and commissioning in a new deep water 
(GUM) region required the site issues to be addressed and resolved before contract award 
(OTC Paper 20400). 
Even if the engineering and EPCI contracts are near complete, delays and 
escalation of the costs can occur due to uncertainties created by design failures, 
compounded by an increase in fabrication costs because of rework and extended offshore 
commissioning.  Therefore, as forcase studies 1 and 2, it may only be after commissioning 
is attempted that any defects in the design work will become apparent (OTC paper 21821). 
In the USA, long-term contracts are commonly used in the oil and gas industry to specify 
the use of the market for the engineering, procurement, fabrication and installation 
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transactions (OTC paper 21821).  However, as explained by IP6 “In the case of the GUM 
Deepwater offshore project, such contracts and relationship arrangements can turn out to 
be often very costly time consuming solutions since we cannot envisage every contingency 
for complex technological issues that cannot be specified in a contract or even known”.  
This situation supports the proposition that the more complex the concept, the 
costlier it is for the principal to ensure that the agent is properly undertaking the 
appropriate activities.  As a result, the cost of writing long-term contracts in the industry 
depends on the complexity of the project activities which require both client and contractor 
organisations to undertake a large number of investigations (OTC 21821).  As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the difficulty for the principal is that once the contract has been signed, the 
agent’s action or effort cannot be observed (Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985). Therefore, 
as IP5 and IP14 pointed out, “Even though we (IOGC) have a long term strong trust with 
our contractors, it was not possible to use long term market arrangements in totality (i.e. 
in a ‘turn-key’ arrangement) for the GUM FPSO project”. 
9.2.5 Prediction of the Extended TCE Model 
Due to the high technical hazards, both the basic TCE theory model and the 
extended TCE model would both suggest that the GUM FOC must perform the activities 
they do best and go to the market for transactions that others can do more cost effectively 
and efficiently.  It means that the GUM FOC, in addition to being responsible for the 
project management and the transactions with government authorities, also has to provide 
front end engineering support and formulate the technical specifications for the complex 
components of the GUM FPSO to resolve the technical uncertainties due to site specific 
conditions.  This must be done before finalising and awarding of the EPCI contract.  
Alternatively, provisions must be made in the contract to accommodate subsequent design 
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variations due to the uncertainties which can be an impossible task (OTC 21075).   In this 
case, logic based on the extended TCE model would predict the governance mechanisms 
for the different GUM FPSO transactions, as follows: 
e) GUM FOC should be responsible for project governance (i.e. providing direction 
and control), transactions with government authorities and basic engineering.  
f) In the case of the transactions for the complex components of the FPSO subject to 
high technological uncertainty and asset specificity, it would be necessary for GUM 
FOC and EPCI companies to work in close collaboration.  This is to be in the form 
of integrated project teams for the design and fabrication of FPSO components 
subject to stringent performance specifications.  This GUM FOC participation in 
transactions can be considered to be an indirect form of vertical integration (IVI) 
required from a TCE perspective to ensure the hybrid governance was as robust as 
a pure VI arrangement. 
g) Market arrangements can be used for the rest of the transactions (such as the hull 
when the risks associated with the transactions are known and manageable). 
In this case both the basic and extended TCE models would both predict the use of 
hybrid governance (with FOC participation) for the following transactions that can be 
subject to technical uncertainties which might cause the EPCI contractor to fail to meet the 
performance targets: 
• Detailed engineering of the hydrocarbon processing systems; 
• Detailed engineering of the GUM station-keeping (mooring) systems; 
• Research and development of techniques to resolve the flow assurance and HP/HT 
process issues associated with the deep water fields;  





This in turn would lead to market arrangements being predicted by the TCE models 
for the rest of the transactions including: 
• Detailed engineering and fabrication of the FPSO hull (with the accommodation 
block and the machinery rooms) in South Korea and then towing it to the dry dock 
in Louisiana; 
• Fabrication and offshore installation of FPSO station-keeping moorings; 
• Fabrication of the process and utility modules and integration of these modules 
onto the hull in the dry dock in Louisiana; 
• Design, fabrication and offshore installation of the oil export buoy. 
Consequently, a higher level of market governance mechanisms for the GUM 
FPSO project transactions was possible compared to the transactions for the FPSOs in case 
studies 1 and 2.  
9.3 Outcome of Project Transactions 
9.3.1 Project Organisation and Transactional Relationships 
The previous section identified the hazards associated with the GUM FPSO 
transactions as mainly technological issues as political hazards were not an issue.  The 
predictions of both the basic and extended TCE models for managing these hazards turned 
out to be the same.  This section presents and analyses the outcome of the transactions 
based on the governance methods used, and the remedial arrangements used by the GUM 
FOC to achieve project completion.  For the purpose of this analysis, as for case studies 1 
and 2, the project transactions carried out for the FPSO are divided into three main 
categories of project management, the construction contract for the FPSO hull carried out 
in South Korea, and other FPSO onshore and offshore transactions in the USA.  It was 
found that these categories can be subject to different forms of technical and behavioural 
	
	 241	
hazards.  Therefore, the outcome for each was examined from the TCE point of view, 
taking into account the governance measures which the GUM FOC implemented, or 
revised measures they were compelled to implement and the reasons for these revisions. 
Project management activities turned out to be more challenging for the GUM 
FPSO project than for previous FPSO projects carried out in the USA due to the size of the 
FPSO and the site conditions.   These activities included developing and implementing the 
field development plans for the subsequent operations, liaising with the US government for 
approvals and sanctions.  In this process approval of the deep water development plans by 
BOEMRE was mandatory (Woodmackenzie, 2012).  However, as pointed out by IP6, 
“These activities did not turn out to be difficult or time consuming as there was a 
significant amount of co-operation and mutual help between all the parties to resolve the 
technical and legislative issues”. 
The GUM FOC prepared the basic engineering and contract specifications for the 
tender process for awarding the FPSO EPCI contracts on a market and agency arrangement 
(Offshore Technology, 2012).  The overall EPCI contract for the GUM was awarded to 
JRM after a competitive tender process.  This EPCI contract was a mammoth task as this 
was going to be one of the biggest offshore floating production installations in the world, 
with highly complex hydrocarbon processing systems to produce from some of the deepest 
wells in the GUM.  The FPSO weighed more than 50,000t and a displacement of 130,000t.  
The facility was designed to process 250,000 barrels of oil and 200 million cubic feet of 
gas per day.  ME Engineering of the USA was awarded the sub-contract to provide 
engineering and design services for the FPSO.  The contract for the 15,000 m3 hull was 
awarded to DW, an experienced South Korean contractor (Offshore Technology, 2012). 




Figure 9.4 - Organisational Relationships and Governance Mechanisms for GUM FPSO 
Historically, in the US oil and gas industry, there has been alignment between 
IOCGs and contractors with each trying to work out the best for both parties (Wood 
Mackenzie, 2011).   
As pointed out by IP9, “The GUM FPSO transactions were carried out in an 
environment where there was high mutual trust and all the companies involved are 
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projects”.  According to IP12 “In the case of the GUM project, it became evident that the 
challenge of developing the GUM deep water field was a new challenge for all of us” and 
IP14 confirmed this by adding that “A strong joint relationship with a high level of trust 
and open communication between the parties to the development was required to manage 
the challenges”. IP9 stressed that “A high level of front end technical loading was 
necessary from the GUM FOC and co-operation between all actors to resolve technical 
challenges”.   
As it turned out, commercial proposals were agreed between GUM FOC and JRM 
for using integrated joint project teams (OTC papers 20400, 21075).  IP2 confirmed that 
“Formation of integrated project management teams was the key to dealing with the 
complex and challenging technical issues to prevent CAPEX escalation and excessive 
delays.  We (the GUM FOC) had to expand the project management teams in the USA to 
facilitate the IPMTs”.  In addition, IP10 explained that “A team of specialists in deep water 
production and flow assurance had to be mobilised from the rest of the world”. 
9.3.2  Project Transactions in South Korea 
The construction of the GUM FPSO hull with the accommodation block and 
machinery rooms was carried out by DW in Korea who had proven capability with 
adequate fabrication capacity for major hulls.  Hence, the EPCI contractor RJM was able to 
award a ‘turn-key’ (100% agency) subcontract to DW for the fabrication of the GUM hull 
andtowing it to Louisiana.  There were no unexpected significant transaction issues 




9.3.3  Project Transactions in the USA 
The fabrication of the topsides modules with complex process systems (21,000 
tonnes) and their integration on the FPSO was carried out in Morgan City and Louisiana by 
RJM.  It has been found that the engineering contractor (ME) for the FPSO in the USA 
required guidance in technical expertise to handle the complex technical requirements of 
the hydrocarbon processing systems and deep water mooring of the FPSO.  Consequently, 
GUM FOC being extremely concerned about potential technical failures and delays due to 
inadequate expertise in the ME engineering team in deep water projects had to intervene 
with remedial measures (OTC paper 1821).  It was also found that during the contract 
execution, as confirmed by IP10,“Additional provisions had to be made both in the 
technical specifications and installation procedures for the FPSO mooring arrangements 
due to the challenges posed by the deep water”.  According to IP11, these issues meant 
that “There was a requirement for increased GUM FOC participation to prevent technical 
failures and fabrication faults with increased front end loading, in the form of providing 
technical and construction expertise”. 
As pointed out by IP6, “Our (i.e. GUM FOC) teams had to work with the JRM and 
ME teams to convert detailed engineering into construction methods during the fabrication 
period.  Therefore, our (i.e. transaction) costs increased due to the need to implement these 
additional measures and increased management controls to ensure contractual adherence 
and competency”.  Furthermore, on the basis of the experience gained from other projects 
in the GUM, integrated project teams were used with significant access to key resources 
and sharing key technical and project experience.  The outcome of the GUM FOC 
contribution in the form of front-end technical loading and facilitating integrated teams 
resulted in project transactions turning out to be successful (OTC paper 1821).  IP10 
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pointed out “We made extensive use of feedback from lessons learned by both us and 
RJM”.   
As such, it was ensured before and after, GUM FOC involvement throughout all 
project phases including building and maintaining collaborative liaison with government 
authorities and JRM (the EPCI contractor).  IP14 pointed out that “We set up integrated 
project management teams.  These specific arrangements required the allocation of an 
adequate and skilful staff (i.e. an increase in indirect vertical integration)”.  In addition, 
IP9 said that “an important lesson was the use of direct IOCG – EPCI – supplier long-term 
frame agreements for critical equipment” resulted in efficient use of resources.  Another 
lesson, according to IP16, was that “detailed project specification requiring high GUM 
FOC staff involvement was essential to ensure the required product detailing, i.e. high 
front-end loading”.  Despite the high technical challenges, IP20 pointed out that “There 
was adequate risk balance between JRM and us (the GUM FOC) and there was no 
inappropriate shifting of risks between us”.  As confirmed by IP21 “In this case, difficult 
tasks such as flow assurance modelling, obtaining environmental permits, changes in 
design specifications, and basic design definition were all managed by GUM FOC”. 
Due to the challenges posed by the GUM deep water field for offshore activities, it 
was obligatory to comply with the strategy to maximise onshore testing, pre-
commissioning, and commissioning.  For this, additional GUM FOC personnel had to be 
provided to support JRM teams (OTC papers 20400, 21075).  The construction equipment 
and materials for the hook-up and tie-in work were loaded and sea fastened onto the FPSO 
before the tow from the yard to the offshore site for installation by the EPCI contractor.  
This was on an agency contract basis with the EPCI contractor who possessed the 
necessary large installation vessels.  However, as pointed out by IP11 “we (i.e. the GUM 
FOC) had to provide technical expertise and operational resources to JRM to manage the 
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complex tasks involved with carrying out these installation activities in the GUM offshore 
field with adverse site conditions”.  Final commissioning of the integrated FPSO to 
commence oil and gas production was carried out by the GUM FOC team with the 
assistance of JRM.   
This process was conducted on a virtually vertical integration arrangement, as the 
commissioning management, procedures and the logistics were all formulated, executed 
and controlled by the GUM FOC team.   In summary, there was no requirement for 
specialised political governance mechanisms, but still a mixture of governance 
arrangements materialised for the GUM FPSO transactions and are summarised in Table 
9.3. 
Table 9.3 - Governance of Transactions for GUM FPSO 
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EPCI Mkt with 
IPMT 
EPCI Mkt EPCI Mkt 
With IPMT 
EPCI GUM FOC 
(VI) 
Location USA USA South Korea Dockyard GUM GUM 
Approval GUM FOC GUM FOC GUM FOC GUM FOC GUM FOC GUM FOC 
Monitoring GUM FOC EPCI GUM FOC EPCI EPCI GUM FOC 
Notes: 
EPCI = Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Installation Contractor 
Mkt = EPCI (Market) 
IPMT = Integrated Project Team 
A = Approval 
IVI = Indirect Vertical Integration 
	
IP10 stressed that the “integrated project management and engineering teams were 
the key contributors to completion of the GUM FPSO project without significantly 




9.4 TCE Findings of Case Study 
9.4.1   Empirical Findings on the Extension of TCE 
The AOD FPSO and associated facilities were installed and successfully achieved 
oil and gas production.  The GUM FPSO case provides evidence that international 
transactions can be carried out more economically when the impact of political hazards is 
low and the institutional arrangements to protect the property rights of investors are strong.  
This is due to the fact that specialised political governance mechanisms to handle adverse 
political intervention and concessionary contractual arrangements to protect the property 
rights were not required to be implemented, as was the situation for case studies 1 and 2.  
The empirical evidence from this case study supports the proposition that market and 
hybrid governance mechanisms can be implemented in an economic manner for the 
scenario of low level political hazards with robust property rights protection to achieve the 
optimum transaction costs. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, uncertainty is a multidimensional concept with 
political, legal, technological and economic hazards posing the main threats.  The evidence 
from the three case studies shows that these factors may have different impacts on a firm’s 
selection between different organisational governance mechanisms.  The GUM FPSO 
project required novel and untested technology to manage uncertainties due to operating in 
frontier regions, where the existing tried and tested engineering, fabrication and installation 
techniques were not adequate.  This created technological challenges and consequent 
economic impact on the project activities, thus making contracts incomplete and 
introducing market frictions above acceptable levels.  Hence, changes to the market 
governance were required in the form of front end loading and the use of integrated project 
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teams to compensate for the higher levels of technological hazards that had to be resolved 
to ensure project completion.   
As EPCI contracts were not fully complete, in order to manage the residual risks 
arising out of market friction, a degree of indirect vertical integration had to be 
implemented in the form of joint GUM FOC and EPCI contractor integrated project 
management teams (IPMT).  The empirical evidence discussed in earlier sections confirms 
that the implementation of these indirect vertical integration measures ensured that 
transactions did not drift out of alignment.  
In summary, there was an early and deep GUM FOC involvement with the EPCI 
contractor throughout all project phases.  These specific arrangements required an increase 
in the allocation of suitably qualified and experienced staff for the FPSO EPCI 
transactions, to provide the technical leadership and build the confidence of the EPCI 
contractor.  According to IP10 “These bonding arrangements for securing commitments to 
ensure trust prevented opportunistic behaviour by the participants and improved the 
project’s chances of success”.  Therefore, the successful completion of the project, 
meeting CAPEX, schedule and quality targets, was mainly due to the GUM FOC’s 
contribution to the front-end loading and the use of integrated management and 
engineering teams to manage the EPCI transactions.  
9.4.2  Measurement of Extension of the TCE Model 
The requirement for political governance was not necessary for the GUM project.  
There had to be increased intervention in the management of transactions by IOC to 
implement integrated project management teams and to provide front end loading for the 
engineering and construction activities.  This inevitably resulted in increased transaction 
costs (ΔTCE) and effort, which is measured in terms of the hours incurred to complete 
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these GUM FPSO transactions.  In this case, the total IOC transaction costs increased from 
$483 million to $566 million, an increase of $52 million.  The estimates for the hours and 
costs of transactions in Europe, South Korea and Angola were verbally provided (in 
confidence) by IPs 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 21 and 25.  The mean values of these estimates are 
recorded in Table 9.4.  The cost figures are given in US million dollars (MD). 
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The high level of trust and co-operation between the project participants kept the 
increase in the transactions costs to a bare minimum.   
The governance arrangements for FPSO project transactions were executed as 
predicted by the logic of enhanced TCE model in an acceptable economical manner.  The 
changes implemented in the form of indirect vertical integration resulted in an incremental 
transactions cost of about 4.5% of the initial transactions cost as presented in Table 9.4.  
Very experienced IPs 10 and 11 confirmed that “In the oil and gas industry this 
incremental cost (of <5%) for managing the transactions for a major offshore deep water 
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oil and gas production project can be considered to be an outstanding successful 
outcome”.  The variations in the transaction costs for the GUM FPSO compared to the 
predictions of the basic TCE model are illustrated in Figure 9.5. The line HUSA represents 
the increased transaction costs of ΔTCEU for the GUM FPSO, representing a measure of 








This case study examined whether there are any enhancements required to the basic 
TCE governance selection model for transactions carried out under conditions of minimum 
of government intervention and strong safeguards for property rights.  The GUM FPSO 
project provides evidence that there is no requirement to go beyond the predictive 
capabilities of the basic TCE model for the scenario of low level intervention with robust 
property rights protection (modulating variables) for managing transactions economically.  
The outcome of the case study of the GUM FPSO project was as predicted by the basic 
TCE model when the impact of the institutions on project transactions was considered to 
be neutral.   
The evidence from this case study also demonstrates that political hazards and 
weak property rights are not the only factors that may require firms to conduct 
uneconomical transactions by resorting to specialised arrangements with the EPCI 
contractors.  In the case of the GUM FPSO hull contract, which was not subject to external 
challenges, the market arrangements were found to be more than adequate to ensure that 
the transactions were executed in an economising manner.  Apart from the FPSO topsides 
and mooring, for the project transactions subject to high technological uncertainties that 
can create commercial hazards, there was a need to resort to hybrid arrangements in the 
form of integrated project management teams.  This was because the contracts for these 
components were incomplete due to the technical uncertainties and commercial 
concessions necessary to manage the transactions to prevent delays.  This supports the 
proposition that uncertainty is a multi-faceted concept extending beyond behavioural 
uncertainty considered in the basic TCE theory.  
The evidence from the case study does support the discriminating alignment 
hypothesis of TCE for predicting the economising governance mechanisms.  The 
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predictions based on the characteristics of the transactions sometimes favour hierarchy 
(vertical integration or in-house production) as an economic governance structure, and at 
other times favour markets or the intermediate mechanism of ‘hybrid’ arrangements 
between these two extremes if the transactions require increased flexibility.  In the case of 
international projects, when the host country political context does not come into play, it is 





Chapter 10 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTION 
10.1 Introduction and Summary of the Research 
10.1.1 Introduction 
 The objective of this research was to develop an extension to the transaction cost 
economics (TCE) theory to address the theoretical issues of predicting the governance 
mechanisms for major international projects and to explore its applicability.  This chapter 
concludes the research effort by initially bringing together in Section 10.1.2, the findings 
of the literature review to demonstrate the need for such an extension of the TCE model. 
This extension was found to require the incorporation of political governance mechanisms 
to cope with the challenges due to host country political hazards and issues connected with 
the protection of property rights of the investors.  This conceptual model, based on TCE, 
thus aligns the governance mechanisms with the economic and political characteristics of 
the international transactions.  
 Section 10.2 summarises the findings of field investigation on how different levels 
of political hazard are handled in international oil and gas projects, and if this is consistent 
with the TCE reasoning or whether an extension to the basic TCE model as proposed by 
this research is justified.This was achieved by a comparative analysis of three case studies. 
Section 10.3 explains that the contribution made to knowledge by this research supports 
the potential of an extension to the TCE model developed and explored with qualitative 
case research. This demonstrated a shift parameter to the basic TCE theory, which warrants 
further conclusive research to confirm the capabilities of extended TCE model to predict 
the governance mechanisms for major international projects. The implications of the 
research findings for the relevant literatures and recommendations for industry 
practitioners for rethinking project management are discussed in Section 10.4.  
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     The possible limitations of the research, proposals for further research, reflections and 
some concluding remarks on the research are then presented in Section 10.5.  
10.1.2 Summary of the Development of an Extended TCE Model 
 In addition to technical and operational complexities, the causes for failures of 
major projects were summarised as incomplete information on the future state of affairs 
causing non-quantifiable uncertainties, bounded rationality of the decision-makers and 
opportunistic behaviour of participants in transactions. In the case of international projects, 
additional challenges can be posed by the political context and the role of the judiciary of 
the host country. These identified causes of failures support the proposition for rethinking 
management of international projects to mitigate turbulence that emerges over the life of 
the project and to steer and harmonise the behaviour of the participants.TCE was found to 
address all the above causes of failures of transactions, more than other theories of the 
firm. Thus, the research focused on TCE to formulate a conceptual model for the 
prediction of the most appropriate governance mechanisms to align with the economic and 
political characteristics of the international transactions.  In this formulation, it was 
demonstrated that a coalition of governance mechanisms of market, vertical integration and 
a hybrid of the two were required for the successive phases of a major project depending 
on the characteristics of the particular project transaction.  
However, in addition to the micro-economic critiques of TCE, the main criticism of 
TCE is that it is based on the concept of self-enforcement and by sin of omission does not 
cover exogenous uncertainties due to political, economic or social developments in the 
host country that can impact transactions.A further criticism made of TCE is that its lack of 
consideration of the allocation and enforcement of property rights. This  can become a 
major concern, particularly if the role of the state in the transactions is not neutral.   
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The dimensions of the political hazards are defined in Table 3.1 as the nature of the 
host country regime, processes by which regulatory changes are introduced and how 
demand for local content requirements can increase due to political pressure. Protection of 
property rights is dimensionalised as the role of the state in initial allocation and 
independence and strength of the judiciary in enforcing measures for the protection of 
property rights. The dimensions of these hazards that directly impact the project 
transactions were scaled as low, medium and high. The proposition was developed that 
major projects carried out in countries with authoritarian democratic or authoritarian 
political systems can be subject to significantly higher hazards than those carried out in 
liberal democratic countries. These are due to opportunist intervention of the host 
government and inadequate protection of property rights due to a weak judicial 
system.Political governance mechanisms were identified to mitigate the consequences of 
these challenges. These mechanisms were construed to provide the required theoretical 
basis for extending the predictive capabilities of the basic TCE model to mitigate the 
consequences of these challenges. This coalition of TCE and political governance is based 
on the basic TCE proposition that the client firm must perform the activities they can do 
best and go to the market for transactions that can be done more cost effectively and 
efficiently by the market. 
The propositions (Ps) to explore the potential of the extended TCE model to 
manage the impacts of political hazards and property rights issues on major international 
transactions were defined as follows:  
 P1 – The relative hazards created by behaviour of the host country government and 
weak institutional regimes will affect governance of project transactions in a non- 
economising manner.  Such non-self-assuring exchanges cause the firm either to 
incur higher transaction costs due to the need to implement political governance 
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mechanisms for a given level of asset specificity, or to select higher vertical 
integration arrangements at lower levels of asset specificity. 
 P2 – Any adverse state intervention in transactions including increased demand for 
local content will affect the protection of property rights of the firm.  This will 
require the firm to select governance mechanisms in a non-transaction cost 
economising way, particularly if there are compelling political requirements to 
form joint ventures with local firms. 
In the basic TCE model, impact of inherent political context and institutional 
behaviour of the host country on transactions is considered to be neutral. The introduction 
of the variables of political hazards, enforcement of protection of property rights and 
political governance represent the extended TCE model for prediction of governance 
mechanisms as illustrated in Figure 4.5 and repeated below in Figure 10.1.   
 




























10.2 Summary of Findings of Field Investigations 
10.2.1  Comparative Analysis of Case Studies 
 This section summarises the findings of field investigation to explore the 
applicability of the extended TCE model to predict the governance mechanisms for major 
international projects.   
 The investigation is on how different levels of political hazard are handled in 
international oil and gas production projects, and if the approach used is consistent with 
reasoning of the basic TCE model or whether an extension as proposed by this research is 
justified.For this exploration, three case studies were selected to represent the Zones A, B 
and C of political hazards and protection of property rights spectrum as illustrated in 
Figure 4.1.  The scaling of these parameters as low, medium and high for the case studies 
is the same as those presented in Figure 4.1.  These are major oil and gas projects carried 
out in Nigeria, Angola and United States of America (USA) and are presented in Chapters 
Seven, Eight and Nine respectively. The scaling of political hazards and strength of the 
enforcement of property rights for the case studies selected are as shown in the matrix in 
Figure 4.6 and repeated below in Figure 10.2.  As a result, the Gulf of Mexico USA was 
considered as the bench mark case study for the comparative analysis to examine the 
applicability of the extended TCE model.  The findings of these case studies are based on 
project documentation, industry data and input from interview participants selected for 
their knowledge and extensive participation in oil and gas projects (see Chapter Five).   
 The approach used for this analysis was consideration of: 
• The nature of the political regime and institutional behaviour of the host 
country.  
• Ex–ante project management arrangements based on the IOC expectations.  
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• What materialised during the transactions.  
• The changes the IOC had to make to the governance arrangements. 
• Conclusions of the case study findings.    
 
Figure 10.2 - Ex-Ante Dimensioning of Case Studies 
10.2.2  General Findings of Case Studies 
	 Responses from the interview participants to closed and open questions in the 
Questionnaire (Appendix A1)presented in Appendix 2 are used to draw general 
conclusions on the impact of contextual variables and are summarised in this section. The 
responses from the interview participants were also used as primary evidence in Chapters 
Six, Seven, Eight and Nine. 
 A general consensus amongst interview respondents was that political context of 
the host country has an overriding impact on project transactions.  This can be a 
contributing factor in the failure of transactions to meet costs, schedules and quality 




















prediction that impact of host country opportunistic behaviour, weak protection of property 
rights and increasing demands for local content are the most significant hazards concerning 
the execution of project transactions across national borders. These responses also 
supported the view that it is impossible to draw up EPCI contracts to cope with 
government intervention in project transactions. This is due to the fact that data concerning 
potential hazards that can be caused by the host country regime is very limited before EPCI 
contractual arrangements are settled. In this situation, the use of subjective probabilities 
based on expert judgement was found to be useful in anticipating and managing political 
hazards to project transactions. 
 The outcome of the case studies and interview responses supported the proposition 
that governance mechanisms must be selected to align with the characteristics of the 
transactions to be managed, as proposed in Chapter Two (see Figure 2.4). 
 It was found from the interviews and case studies that project processes focused 
mainly on commercial and technical risks in defining the project specifications and 
contracts.  This meant that data on unpredictable institutional hazards could not be 
transferred from project to project.  Experienced interviewees believed that governance 
mechanisms based on the TCE model are required to be extended by political measures 
(i.e. governance) to manage impacts of the host country political hazards. In this context, 
interview participants considered the political uncertainties caused by unilateral 
opportunistic behaviour of the Nigerian government were high (score of 80%) compared to 
Angola and the USA.  In addition, the calculated opportunistic behaviour of the state 
bureaucracy  in Nigeria created significant time consuming challenges to obtain project 




10.2.3 Comparative Analysis of Case Study Findings 
Case study 1 
 Case study 1 examined the potential of the extended TCE governance for 
transactions carried out for the Nigeria FPSO. The expectations of the client firm NOD 
FOC was that it would be required to cope with a high level of political hazards caused by 
government intervention and by weak safeguards for property rights due to a legal system 
which was not neutral. NOD FOC depended on their traditional project management 
arrangements to obtain project sanctions, the FPSO engineering, the construction in South 
Korea and transactions in Nigeria. As case study evidence presented in Section 7.2 shows, 
the NOD FOC ex-ante expectations did not include the need for political governance 
mechanisms to complement project governance in order to counter the ever increasing 
political hazards and institutional opportunism faced by projects in Nigeria. 
 Both primary evidence (responses of IPs) and secondary evidence (from project 
documentation and industry publications) provided in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 confirm that 
high levels of political hazards materialised due to adverse government intervention in the 
execution of the NOD FPSO project.  The consequences of these hazards manifested in the 
form of excessive demands of the regulatory authorities (on behalf of the ruling elite) for 
financial ‘rewards’ in return for smoothing the path for the execution of the project 
activities. These were beyond the reasonable expectations of the NOD FOC.  Thus, as 
predicted by the extended TCE model, NOD FOC was forced to implement an early and 
deep liaison with government authorities throughout all project phases to complete the 
FPSO.  The NOD FOC had to implement measures to influence political authorities, 
directly by lobbying and relationship building, and by indirect means which included 
financial concessions (and contributions) to political institutions.  The formal and informal 
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political governance mechanisms used by the NOD FOC in dealing with the institutions in 
Nigeria were in the form of ‘hierarchical organisation’ in TCE terms.   
 In the case of all the NOD FPSO transactions subject to high commercial 
uncertainty and asset specificity, the NOD FOC and EPCI companies had to use hybrid 
arrangements.  These were in the form of high NOD FOC involvement in the design and 
fabrication of FPSO components subject to stringent performance specifications.  These 
hybrid forms of governance dominated by the NOD FOC in transactions can be considered 
to constitute an indirect form of vertical integration (IVI), as NOD FOC provided the 
direction and control of the joint venture activities. This situation required the project’s 
economic governance to be complemented by political governance mechanism as a means 
of mitigating the increased hazards caused by the behaviour of the host government and 
weak institutions. In this case, logic of the situation required an even more pressing need 
for NOD FOC to resort to hybrid governance with an indirect form of vertical integration 
(IVI) for main transactions of the FPSO project. 
 In conclusion, case study 1 provides strong evidence to support the proposition that 
in the case of international projects, the extension of the basic TCE model with political 
governance is inevitable to address the impacts of high political opportunistic intervention 
and weak protection of property rights protection.This extension of the basic TCE theory 
took the form of political governance mechanisms, which included provision of economic 
concessions, lobbying, and relationship building with national political actors and local 
companies. In the case of the extended TCE model, the impact of the modulating variables 
of political and property rights hazards faced by the NOD FPSO project led to an increase 
in the transaction costs (dependent variable) due to the need to execute the governance 
arrangements (intervening variable) in a non-economising manner.  
	
	 262	
Case study 2 
 Case study 2 of the FPSO project for offshore Angola (AOD FPSO) examined the 
scenario where the host country political regime could be classified as an authoritarian 
democracy. For the FPSO transactions carried out in Angola before the AOD FPSO 
project, known government opportunistic intervention was minimal and there were no 
major concerns regarding the protection of property rights. Thus, political intervention and 
protection of property rights were considered as ‘medium level’ hazards. Thus, both the 
basic TCE model and the extended TCE model predicted greater use of the market than in 
case study 1. The expectations were that the complete technical and commercial 
specifications would enable the EPCI contract to be executed efficiently.  However, the 
extended TCE model predicted the use of vertical integration for the project’s front-end 
activities. This included political governance for liaising with the Angolan authorities to 
obtain the necessary project sanctions, which turned out to be more difficult and time 
consuming than anticipated.  
During the transactions, the ex-ante expectations of the levels of political hazards 
and the existing arrangements for the safeguarding of the property rights became 
ineffective.  This was due to the changed behaviour of the Angolan government resorting 
to exploiting the revenues from oil and gas production in order to overcome the economic 
and political problems in Angola.  Such practice of self-interest with guile by the 
government could not be anticipated ex-ante due to the bounded rationality of the 
participants. Hence, the appropriate mitigation measures required did not become evident 
until the circumstances materialised. The Angolan government overruled the EPCI 
contractor selected by AOD FOC for selfish economic reasons and imposed a contractor of 
their choice on AOD FOC, whose technical capabilities did not match the task. This 
adverse selection of the FPSO EPCI contractor created issues of inadequate competency, a 
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lack of trust and the potential for delays.  As such, indirect vertical integration was 
required in the form of greater participation by the IOC in the transactions. This resulted in 
transactions being carried out uneconomically as the market arrangements perceived before 
the event had to be augmented by remedial measures. The case study therefore provides 
empirical evidence of the relationship between the governance mechanisms (intervening 
variable) and the impact of political hazards (modulating variable) of the extended TCE 
model.  
 As is evident from both primary evidence (responses of IPs) and secondary 
evidence (from industry publications) provided in Sections 8.2 and 8.3, it was not possible 
to rely on extensive market arrangements as in previous Angolan projects. This is a 
situation when, contrary to ex-ante expectations, it was necessary to introduce increased 
political governance mechanisms to complement project governance in order to counter the 
unexpected increased political hazards and institutional opportunism. The findings (as with 
case study 1) supports the argument made in Chapter Four, that property rights allocation 
is determined and implemented by those participating in the transactions and reflects the 
conflicting economic motives and the relative bargaining strengths of those participants. 
As the Angolan government’s political opportunism increased, so too did the potential 
threat to FOC AOD’s right to execute transactions in an optimal manner.   
 In this case study of AOD FPSO, the property rights were determined and enforced 
solely by the Angolan government who displayed pre-meditated, selfish, opportunistic 
behaviour to exploit the benefits from the oil and gas projects. Therefore, this case study 
demonstrates that the potential effects of political opportunistic behaviour, which were not 




Case study 3  
 Case study 3, the FPSO project in the Gulf of Mexico (GUM), examined 
governance arrangements that would be predicted by the TCE model for managing 
transactions economically for the scenario of ‘low level’ political intervention with robust 
property rights protection. The conclusion was drawn that there was no requirement for 
specialised political governance mechanisms, but hybrid mechanisms were still required 
for governance of the transactions.  This was because of high technical challenges for the 
design, construction, and operations of the FPSO presented by the offshore deep-water 
field. The eventual outcome of the post-contract EPCI transactions was that ex-ante 
governance mechanisms planned had to be complemented by hybrid governance in the 
form of integrated project management teams (IPMT) to ensure successful completion of 
project transactions. This supports the proposition that uncertainty is a multi-faceted 
concept extending beyond behavioural uncertainty considered in the basic TCE theory. The 
GUM FPSO project provides evidence that there is no requirement to go beyond the 
predictive capabilities of the basic TCE model to manage transactions economically for the 
scenario of low level of political hazards with robust property rights protection (i.e. 
modulating variables in the extended TCE model). 
10.2.4 Comparison of the Extension of TCE Model 
 It was proposed in Chapter Seven that the escalation in transaction costs and 
increase in the effort required (measured in terms of hours expended to complete 
transactions), can be credible measures of the extension of the TCE model required to 
manage the FPSO transactions. The results of these measurements can be used for 
comparative purposes to answer the question as to what extent the strategy of political 
governance plus indirect vertical integration had to be used to mitigate the ex-post regret in 
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each case study. The measure of extensions of the TCE model for the three case studies in 
terms of increase in transaction costs can be summarised as below:  
Table 10.1 - Comparison of Increase in Transaction Costs	
Case Study Political Hazards Protection of Property 
Rights 
% Increase in 
Transaction Costs 
1 – Nigeria FPSO High Low 30 
2 – Angola FPSO Medium Medium 17 
3 – GUM FPSO Low High 4.5 
 
	 The comparative extensions of the TCE model represented by the shift in the 
curves of the transaction costs are illustrated in Figure 10.3 below. In the figures, the lines 
M, H and V represent the market, hybrid and vertical integration for transaction cost curves 
as per the basic TCE model.  For case study 3 (GUM FPSO base case), the line HUSA 
represents increased transaction costs (ΔTCEU) to implement integrated project 
management teams as a hybrid governance mechanism. For case study 2 (Angola FPSO), 
the line HANG represents increased transaction costs (ΔTCEA) for implementing political 
governance for transactions with the Angolan government and IVI for the hybrid 
mechanisms for the EPCI transactions. This was to cope with the property rights issues due 
to the consequences of the adverse selection of the EPCI contractor, enforced by the 
Angolan government.  For case study 1 (Nigeria FPSO), the line HNIG represents increased 
transaction costs (ΔTCEN) to implement political governance mechanisms due to high 
adverse government intervention. The use of IVI in EPCI transactions was also required  to 
overcome problems caused by political motives, including the need to operate joint 




Figure 10.3 - Comparison of the Extension of TCE Model in the Case Studies 
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10.3 Conclusions and Contributions of the Research 
10.3.1 General Conclusions 
The research objective was to extend the predictive capabilities of the transaction 
cost economics (TCE) theory to predict the governing mechanisms for high value, 
complex, industrial projects executed across international borders. This research was of an 
exploratory nature and does not claim to have provided conclusive answers to the required 
extensions to the basic TCE model. However, support for the extension to the TCE model 
formulated has been demonstrated by this exploratory research using empirical evidence 
generated by findings of the field investigation. This was achieved by a comparative 
analysis of three industry case studies, which were subject to varying levels of political 
hazards, and executed in environments that had different levels of institutional controls and 
safeguards. The findings have provided evidence to support the research propositions for 
the basis of the extended TCE model to address the impacts of political hazards and 
property rights issues.  
 The findings of case studies 1 (Nigeria) and 2 (Angola) demonstrated that the 
relative hazards created by behaviour of the host country government and weak 
institutional regimes did affect the governance of project transactions in a non-
economising manner. In this case, higher transaction costs were incurred due to the need to 
implement political governance and hybrid governance (with indirect vertical integration 
arrangements) at lower levels of asset specificity. In both these case studies there was 
opportunistic adverse state intervention in transactions and compelling political 
requirements to form joint ventures with local firms. This required the firm to select 
governance mechanisms in a non-transaction cost economising way to protect the property 
rights of the firm.  
	
	 268	
     The findings of case study 3 (USA) provides evidence for the proposition in Chapter 
Four, that when the impact of political context and institutional behaviour of the host 
country on transactions is neutral, the basic TCE is applicable in totality to predict the 
governance mechanisms for the transactions. 
 The implications of the research findings for the main propositions used to 
develop   an extended TCE model (i.e.the causes of the failures of major international 
projects to achieve their targets), need for rethinking of project management, impact of the 
state on property rights and justification for political governance are discussed in Section 
10.4. 
10.3.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
 As discussed in earlier chapters, the basic propositions of TCE originate from the 
discriminating alignment hypothesis according to which transactions that differ in their 
attributes of asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty need to be aligned with 
governance mechanisms which differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating 
(mainly transaction cost economising) way (Williamson, 1981,1991).  The literature 
reviewed supports the argument that this can be considered as a micro-analytical 
proposition, even though TCE is considered an empirical success. More than 900 
contributions have been generated which support the central propositions of TCE.  
 In the context of research, the main criticism of the TCE proposition is that it is a 
static micro-analytical self-enforcing proposition, committing a sin of omission in taking 
the impacts of political environment and institutional arrangements as neutral. The focus of 
the basic TCE is on asset specificity and behavioural uncertainty with inadequate attention 
to the uncertainties that can be caused by the political environment and institutions of the 
host country.  
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          To counter these criticisms, Oliver Williamson introduced the ‘shift parameter 
framework’ in 1991, proposing the need for extensions of the TCE model to predict the 
optimal choice of governance arrangements in response to dynamics in the institutional 
environment (Williamson, 1991; Henisz and Williamson, 1999).  In addition, other 
academics proposed that complementary theories with an interdisciplinary approach are 
required to extend the universal application of TCE theory.In this situation, investigation is 
required to reveal how the impact of institutional arrangements, the multi-dimensional 
nature of uncertainty and property rights issues may lead to the need to formulate 
specialised governance mechanisms for international transactions. A requirement is to split 
external uncertainty into its components, to investigate which dimensions of uncertainty 
are relevant to the respective transaction(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Acemoglu, 2003; 
Dixit, 2007; Ruester, 2010; Foss and Klein, 2010; Caniels et al.,2012). 
 Based on the theoretical arguments formulated, this research has developed a 
conceptual model to address the requirement for a shift parameter of TCE by incorporation 
of political governance for the international project transactions. This extension of TCE 
provides an integrated approach to governance of international transactions without 
compartmentalising economic and political transactions as separate entities. Thus, this shift 
parameter framework extends the basic TCE model from the micro-analytical to the 
macro-analytical arena to predict optimal choice of governance mechanisms for major 
international transactions. 
 The empirical data generated provide evidence that political hazards of the host 
country institutions and property rights issues caused by conflicts between actors in the 
transactions were found to be the main causes of disturbances in the environment. The 
changes in response to dynamics of institutional environment shifted the costs of the 
governance mechanisms and therefore did have an impact on the optimal alignment of 
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transactions to institutional arrangements. The extended TCE model could be used as an 
option for the client organisations to optimise in both economic and political transaction 
costs, which is an important source of strategic advantage (Williamson, 1995, 2005). While 
the sort of discriminating alignment that mitigates contractual hazards is relatively well 
established, this research provides some insights into an analogous relationship for political 
transactions.  Arguments are developed for the need to align the relationship between a 
firm's ability to produce goods and services and to optimise on political and economic 
governance. For this, the research demonstrates that extensions to the basic TCE can be 
carried out with incorporation of political governance mechanisms such as lobbying, 
commercial concessions and negotiations to manage the impact of opportunistic political 
behaviour, which in turn can affect the property rights of the investors.  The research 
findings propose that the extended TCE model for international transactions needs to have 
three interactive dimensions: behavioural uncertainty and asset specificity characteristics 
of the basic TCE model, the impact of increasing political hazards and the strength of 
protection of property rights.  The interaction of these dimensions is illustrated in Figure 
10.4 below, using the findings from the three case studies.  
 















															D1 represents the NOD FPSO project where ∆TCEN represents an increase in 
transaction costs due to the high level of political governance and indirect vertical 
integration in EPCI transactions. This was required to manage the high level of political 
hazards and increased demand for local content.  
 D2 represents the AOD project where ∆TCEA represents transaction costs due to 
political opportunism with guile causing adverse selection of the EPCI contractor, 
requiring political governance and increased vertical integration in EPCI transactions. 
 D3 was the case of the GUM FPSO project in the USA where political governance 
was not required but integrated project teams (with indirect vertical integration) were 
required to manage the uncertainties due to technical issues. 
 The relative increases in the transaction costs were: 
  ∆TCEN = 30% for Nigeria FPSO project 
  ∆TCEA = 17% for Angola FPSO project 
  ∆TCEU = 4.5% for USA GUM FPSO project 
	
 Thus, we find that: ∆TCEN> ∆TCEA> ∆TCEU thereby supporting the proposition 
that transaction costs will increase with increasing political hazards and property rights 
issues.  In every case, a degree of indirect vertical integration in a hybrid form of 
governance was found to be required. This level of indirect vertical integration was found 
to increase as political hazards increased and/or protection of property rights became 
weaker.   
In conclusion, this research explored the potential to develop an extension to the 
TCE model and found that there was support for it. This warrants further conclusive 
research to extend the capabilities of TCE for the prediction of governance mechanisms for 




10.4 Implications of the Research to Literature and Industry Practice 
10.4.1 Implications to Relevant Literatures 
 This section examines the impact of the research findings on the arguments based 
on the relevant literatures used for the development of the extended TCE model for 
predicting the governance mechanisms for major international projects. The following 
arguments are supported by the empirical evidence generated by the research: 
1. The causes of failures of major projects identified support the proposition for 
rethinking management of international projects. The focus need to be on 
appropriate governance mechanisms, to provide necessary dimensions of authority 
and encourage an alignment of behaviours and objectives. In order to achieve this, 
a theoretical framework based on TCE is required for the prediction and application 
of the most appropriate governance mechanisms aligned with the characteristics of 
the transactions, taking into account host country institutional arrangements 
(Williamson, 1996; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Miller and Lessard, 2000; Atkinson et al., 
2006; Sanderson, 2012). 
2. In the case of international transactions, political and legal institutions generate 
rules and constraints that can shape the relative challenges to the economic 
performance of transactions in different countries (Acemoglu, 2003; Dixit, 
2007).Uncertainties can be caused, in particular to international transactions, by the 
political and legal environments of the host country (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; 
Chapman and Ward, 2003; Acemoglu, 2003).  
3. The role of opportunism in the context of TCE is that some participants to 
transactions might try to further their gains by their opportunistic behaviour, either 
with guile or with stealth, or more aggressively in a blatant manner.  In this case, 
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these participants are not transparent with their intentions and tend to take 
advantage of unexpected developments to the detriment of other participants to the 
transactions in order to enhance their own benefits (Winch, 2002, 2008; Dixit, 
2007).  The problem is that such opportunistic behaviour cannot be anticipated 
before contracts are agreed because it is not easy to determine who among the 
transaction participants are opportunists (Williamson, 1981, 1995; Hart and Moore, 
1999).  
4. The decline in the overall uncertainty and asset specificity over the project life 
cycle makes the case for a coalition of governance mechanisms for the transactions 
of a major project. Recent research into the use of a coalition of alternative 
governance mechanisms in complex projects, such as an oil and gas field 
development in Norway, supports this argument (Caniels et al., 2012).   
5. As major projects become increasingly international, it is inevitable that the 
effectiveness of existing management arrangements can weaken based on the level 
of political and legal hazards (Miller and Lessard, 2000). Political theory literature 
proposes that some political systems are more challenging to the firm than 
others.The proposition was that major projects carried out in countries with 
authoritarian democratic or authoritarian political systems can be subject to 
significantly higher hazards than those carried out in liberal democratic countries. 
These are due to opportunist intervention of the host country government and 
inadequate protection of property rights due to a weak judicial system (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994; Olson, 2005; Dixit, 2007; Kamrava, 2008; Scott et al., 2012).  
6. The interactions between the partners in a major project can be considered as a 
dynamic social network with differences in motivation and preferences among the 
participants causing increased issues regarding property rights. Evidence from the 
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case studies supports the proposition that property rights are determined through 
political processes and that political behaviour has an overriding influence on the 
governance arrangements required to deliver project success. This is in 
contradiction to the classic TCE theory of frictionless market where the host 
country government or the regulatory bodies are considered as neutral or even 
redundant to the execution of the transactions. The conclusion is drawn from case 
studies 1 and 2 that an extension of TCE by political governance may be required, 
even for situations where the political and property rights hazards faced by 
international transactions are considered to be manageable (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992; Libecap, 1986,1998; Olsen et al., 2005; Merrow, 2012).   
7. The findings of case studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that, in the face of political 
hazards and weak institutional regimes, there are significant limitations on using 
basic TCE governance arrangements for major project transactions carried out 
across national borders.  
8. The empirical evidence provided by the case studies and interviews supports the 
argument that a coalition of TCE and political governance mechanisms is required 
to cope with politically motivated hazards and the commercial and technical 
challenges of the projects.  It was found that in such cases, an inherent feature of 
such coalition of governance mechanisms is the need for an indirect form of 
vertical integration by the client organisation in addition to application of the 
political governance mechanisms.  The evidence generated by case studies supports 
the proposition that it is necessary to implement political governance mechanisms 
in the form of lobbying, relationship building and economic concessions to address 
institutional-specific political hazards (Henisz and Williamson, 1999; Olson, 2000; 
Dixit, 2007; Kamrava, 2008). 
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9. The extension of the basic TCE model by political governance mechanisms will 
naturally result in incremental transaction costs (∆TCE). However, the incremental 
transaction costs due to the introduction of indirect vertical integration and political 
governance need to be balanced against the organisation transaction benefits of 
completing the project activities without excessive costs (CAPEX) escalation and 
undue delays to meet the required performance standards. This proposition of 
mixing governance arrangements is supported by research carried out by Caniels et 
al. (2012), who based their research on a single case study in the oil and gas 
industry in Norway, where behaviour of political and property rights institutions is 
consistent and predictable.  The present research goes further by evaluating three 
case studies representing varying levels of political hazards and protection of 
property rights. Hence, it can be claimed that this research provides more credible 
evidence to support the argument that a coalition of alternative governance 
mechanisms need to be used when there are several inter-firm relationships in 
international transactions subject to political hazards (Dixit, 2007; Kamrava, 2008). 
	
											The case study evidence highlighted that the following issues, not adequately 
addressed by the basic TCE, need to be examined in future research efforts: 
1. All case studies demonstrate the need for relational governance aspects to be 
developed to ensure trust between partner firms and reduce opportunism. As can be 
expected, developing these relational aspects in non-democratic countries can be 
painfully slow and requires additional expertise in activities causing increased 
transactions costs. 
2. Another finding from the case studies is that the basic TCE model, which is 
focused on outcomes of economic processes, must be extended to take into account 
	
	 276	
the co-ordination of the production processes and the complexity of the product. 
Williamson’s (1991,1996) focus is on the end product of the transactions, while 
taking for granted the production processes and resources required to produce the 
output.  This has hitherto made it difficult to visualise how product complexity and 
production uncertainties, caused by the use of inefficient suppliers have to be 
managed.  
 
10.4.2  Implications for Industry Management  
 Before presenting the contribution made by this research to industry practice, some 
relevant observations from the performance of major international projects in the oil and 
gas industry are summarised. This is to provide an appreciation of the magnitude of the 
problem addressed by this research. Although there is much anecdotal evidence, published 
data is rare of projects that did not achieve their objectives of technical performance targets 
and economic parameters (Merrow, 2012).  This research found that international projects 
face significant political and institutional hazards and, as such, an explicit understanding of 
what is involved is essential for their competent management.  The reliance on EPCI 
contracts as simplistic approaches to complex issues can only lead to inevitable failure 
(Scott et al., 2012). It has been argued in this research that the underlying reason for failure 
of many projects to achieve their targets is the multifaceted nature of the political, 
technological and commercial hazards, which can result in over-estimating returns, or 
under-estimating the difficulties in executing project transactions. Therefore, the key to 
improving project execution efficiency is to consider not only the current ‘statutes-of-
nature’ but also the predictions of potential future events that can affect implementation of 
projects as planned (McKenna et al., 2005). 
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 Most of the participants in the oil and gas industry know of significant escalations 
of the CAPEX and excessive delays in meeting completion targets. A fact that is not 
considered as significant is that the failure to meet project targets is invariably publicised 
towards the middle or end phase of the construction activities. This is well beyond the end 
of the front-end phase of the project when the PEST hazards associated with project 
execution activities should have been identified and necessary measures to mitigate their 
impact built into the project execution plan and contracts for major project components 
(McKenna et al., 2005).   
In this situation, IOCGs seem to underestimate the impact of project uncertainties 
and hence the problem appears to be that they do not seem to have a comprehensive 
understanding of governance mechanisms required to manage them (KPMG, 2014).  In this 
case, strong evidence of underperformance by the industry is provided by an investigation 
carried out by Merrow (2012) who reviewed over a thousand international exploration and 
production projects whose CAPEX ranged from $1 billion to $4 billion.  The author 
revealed that many oil and gas projects failed to deliver the performance targets and that 
one in eight projects were disasters, where disaster is defined as the project failing on two 
out of the following three metrics: 
• >40% escalation of CAPEX beyond the estimated value. 
• >40% increase in the project execution duration to achieve production. 
• >15% loss of production of first year operability (i.e. quality and reliability of 
performance). 
 The finding was that over half of the biggest projects (CAPEX >$1 billion) were 
deemed disasters according to the above criteria.  In this scenario, the industry evidence 
from the interview responses and case studies (see Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine) 
demonstrates that the project management teams have for a considerable time resorted to 
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the practice of including contingencies in the contracts.  These are in the form of 
deterministic values to cover the escalation in costs and potential increase in the length of 
time for completion so that the risks identified can be addressed.  This approach results in 
an inadequate systematic evaluation of the host country political hazards, risks and 
uncertainties at the front-end of the project. This in turn leads to unjustified optimistic 
estimates being included in the contracts for major project components.  Thus, the 
contracts are drafted with exclusions and qualifications, as the project teams focus on the 
project risk analysis (see Chapter Six), possibly based on some unproven suppositions but 
not on host country political and institutional hazards.  Even very senior project managers 
such as interviewees 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 who were responsible for presenting the project 
economics and the project plans to the Board of Directors of IOGCs admitted that this 
practice was forced upon them due to the pressure from corporate management of partner 
IOCGs to deliver the projects.  
 The failure to recognise the host country political and institutional challenges 
results in the Board of Directors of IOCGs not being presented with the complete data on 
the scope and consequence of the project hazards and risks, especially the host country’s 
political hazards, the impact of which can be devastating.  Clearly, conventional project 
management techniques and EPCI contracts are no longer sufficient for today’s portfolio of 
major international oil and gas projects.  In this case, the traditional approach of using 
EPCI contracts is no longer adequate for managing project risks and uncertainties by 
allowing contingencies. This resech supports the proositions that a radical change is 
required in the project governance process for identifying and then addressing political and 
institutional hazards in the execution of major international capital projects. 
 Increased uncertainty and increased complexity of the international project 
execution activities, combined with a lack of experience at many levels within the IOGC 
	
	 279	
organisations can lead to a ‘Black Swan’ event – an apparently unexpected or unpredicted 
event that leads to adverse events on a much larger scale.  The ‘elephant in the room’ 
metaphor can be used to explain the corporate management neglect or disregard of the 
warning signals of the host country political and institutional issues. The elephant in the 
room, if ignored for too long, may trigger a Black Swan event (Taleb et al., 2009). 
 The increasing hazards to be addressed in project transactions must also include 
increasing levels of terrorism, labour disputes, data security and tax arrangemnts of the 
host countries.  Indeed, the strategic planning must account for a minimum life cycle of 
seven to ten years for the field development to be completed before first oil and gas.  As 
offshore oil and gas projects become larger, more complex, and more internationalised, 
greater involvement by IOGC Boards becomes essential in the governance of these 
projects.  Here the body of knowledge is quite limited and new ideas are needed for 
governance of these projects, as confirmed by the interview responses.  In this case, the 
lesson for the oil and gas industry is that host country political aspects and behaviour of 
institutions must be considered proactively by having a holistic approach to the application 
of political governance mechanisms, which can not only prevent losses, but can also bring 
unexpected benefits. 
In conclusion, the industry management need to accept that it is not always possible 
to formulate perfect project planning or draw up complete EPCI contracts for major 
international transactions.  This is due to the fact that data concerning potential hazards 
that can be caused by the host country regime and institutions is very limited, before EPCI 
contractual arrangements are settled. In this situation, the use of subjective probabilities 
based on expert judgement was found to be useful in anticipating and managing political 
hazards to project transactions. 
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10.5 Limitations, Further Research and Concluding Remarks 
10.5.1 Limitations of the Research 
Research findings from the case studies and interviews provide evidence to the 
proposition presented in Chapter Two that relational governance with mutual trust is not a 
substitute to the TCE model but is a significant complementary measure. The findings 
from the case studies supports the argument that mutual trust between participants of the 
transaction can help to reduce the level of indirect vertical integration required for major 
transactions.  This is an area for further research. 
 The field investigation of this research to derive empirical evidence concentrated 
on managing transactions only in the oil and gas production industry.  This can result in the 
criticism that the extended TCE model developed by this research is limited in its 
application for the prediction of governance mechanisms for international transactions for 
major projects in other industries and can lead to biased conclusions.   However, the 
objective of the research is to explore theoretical propositions developed and the potential 
of an extended TCE governance model for international transactions. The case studies 
were deliberately selected to represent projects of similar technical specifications and 
scope. This allowed for a comparative analysis of the impact of various levels of political 
and institutional hazards on the transactions of these projects. Thus, the findings of this 
exploratory research are sufficiently robust to contribute to knowledge and be of value as a 
foundation for further conclusive research. In addition, the extended TCE model 
formulated can be complemented by industry specific requirements to predict governance 
mechanisms to manage transactions in other industries. This is  particularly for those 
tranactions with high technical complexity and subject to hazards on an international scale.  
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         Another difficulty experienced by the researcher was the constraint in providing 
greater transparency of the data on costs and schedule of the case studies, due to the 
confidentiality issues.  However, there was no attempt to compromise on the ethical issues, 
and as such the anonymity of sources of the confidential data that had been used was 
maintained. 
10.5.2 Subjects for Further Research 
 All case studies demonstrate the need for relational aspects to be developed to 
ensure trust between partner firms to transactions in order to reduce opportunism.  The 
impact of relational aspects on TCE for the prediction of governance mechanisms for 
major international projects is a topic which needs to be researched.  
 Sociological and cultural factors can affect the selection of governance mechanisms 
for international transactions. In this research, sociological issues were considered briefly 
in the discussion of findings of the case studies and application of the project risk 
management process. The selection of governance mechanisms to mitigate the 
consequences of cultural and sociological factors on the execution of major international 
projects is a subject that would benefit from further research. 
10.5.3 End of the Research Comments 
 The research journey achieved its objective of developing a conceptual model to 
meet an academic challenge of formulating an extension to the predictive capabilities of 
transaction cost economics (TCE) theory. This extension addressed theoretical issues of 
governing high value, complex industrial projects executed across international borders. 
The extension of TCE was facilitated by the introduction of political governance and 




         The propositions developed to formulate the extended TCE model and its potential 
were explored  by field investigation using three case studies complemented by responses 
of interviews of experienced industry professionals. 
 The comparative institutional analysis of three case studies was carried out by 
comparing the outcome of the transactions, which were subject to varying levels of 
political hazards and institutional controls. This analysis demonstrated that relative hazards 
created by behaviour of the host country government and weak institutional regimes will 
have an overriding impact on transactions for major projects carried out across national 
boundaries. It was also found that a firm may have to select governance mechanisms in a 
non-transaction cost economising way, if there are compelling political requirements to 
form joint ventures with local firms.   
 The use of political governance mechanisms to extend the TCE model was 
overwhelmingly supported by experienced industry managers and professionals 
interviewed. The expectation is that the extended TCE model developed would greatly 
facilitate ex-ante selection of optimal governance mechanisms for international 
transactions by examining impacts of potential behaviour of the host country government 
and the institutions. 
 This research journey was expected to be academically challenging. The 
completion of this journey was facilitated by the clear signposts provided along the route 
by research supervisors. The interviews with the industry professionals to explain the 
purpose of the research and to obtain their valuable contributions turned out to be a very 
motivating experience.  
 This research effort, while being intellectually demanding, was an experience to 
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Appendix 1 - Questionnaire for Semi-Structured Interviews 
	
(A) Declaration of Confidentiality  
The information provided by the Respondents shall be used only for Research purposes. The 
names of respondents and the data provided will not be disclosed to other parties without the 
permission of the respondent. All responses will be treated as strictly confidential.  
This document is in two parts to meet two objectives. The first part comprises closed questions to 
record your response in an ordinal scale in order to estimate correlations between variables 
considered in the research programme. The second part contains open questions on specific 
scenarios and your responses will be used as input to the evaluation of the three Case Studies which 
form the basis for the research design.  
 
(B) Personal Data of Respondent  
Name:  _____________________________________________________  
Position: _____________________________________________________  
Organisation: _____________________________________________________  
Experience: The number of years’ experience in the Oil and Gas Industry  
B1 o 0-10 years 
B2 o 10-20 years 
B3 o 20-30 years 
B4 o>30 years  
In how many international projects have you participated in the past 10 years?  
q Five q Four q Three q Two 
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(C) Oil and Gas Industry Uncertainties and Risks  
The following five factors have been identified by surveys as the top uncertainties and risks which 
impact the execution of offshore oil and gas Projects. Please rank them in order of their impact on 
the Project execution. 
 Uncertainty Factor Rank 
1 = Lowest 
5 = Highest 
C1 Political uncertainties including opportunistic behaviour of the host country 
government. 
 
C2 Host Country demand for local content causing increases in engineering, 
fabrication, construction and installation costs and schedule delays. 
 
C3 Shortage of engineering, fabrication and installation capacities in the host 
country causing escalation of CAPEX and schedule 
 
C4 Failure of novel technology (required for frontier deep water regions).  
C5 Shortage of technical expertise and skilled project management.  
 
(D) Impact of Uncertainties on Project Execution  
How do you rate the impact of the following factors on the execution of Projects for the oil and 
gas field development?  
(D1) Impact of political uncertainties in the host country 
D1.1 Political stability of host country. q High q Medium q Low 
D1.2 Opportunistic behaviour of the 
Government. 
q High q Medium q Low 
D1.3 Changes in the Taxation regime. q High q Medium q Low 
D1.4 Strength of the Legislation structure to 
impose contractual terms. 
q High q Medium q Low 




(D2) Impact of market economic uncertainties on the costs and schedule of Project Components 
D2.1 Subsea Systems and Wellheads.  q High q Medium q Low 
D2.2 Pipelines and Risers. q High q Medium q Low 
D2.3 Offshore Production Processing 
Facility (Fixed or Floating). 
q High q Medium q Low 
 
(D3) Impact of Technological Uncertainties on Project Execution 
D3.1 Novel technology required. e.g. Deep 
Water 
q High q Medium q Low 
D3.2 Shortage of required technical and 
management expertise. 
q High q Medium q Low 
D3.3 Inadequate construction and fabrication 
capacity. 
q High q Medium q Low 
D3.4 Availability of skilled labour. q High q Medium q Low 
D3.5 Availability of Installation and 
commissioning of facilities. 
q High q Medium q Low 
 
(E) Potential Impact of Host Country Political Context  
(E1) How do you rate the impact of political uncertainties including behaviour of the host 
government in the following countries on Project transactions? 
E1.1 Nigeria q High q Medium q Low 
E1.2 Angola q High q Medium q Low 





(E2) How do you rate the demand for local content in the following countries impact the 
Engineering, fabrication, construction and installation activities for the Project Components? 
E2.1 Nigeria q High q Medium q Low 
E2.2 Angola q High q Medium q Low 
E2.3 USA q High q Medium q Low 
 
(F1) Impact of Asset Specificity on the Project Execution  
Asset specificity is defined as the site specific functional requirements (i.e. specific design) of the 
Project components. Asset specificity of a Project component is high if the Project component is 
highly site specific and the potential for re-use in other locations is low or negligible.  
How do you rate the asset specificity of the following components of an offshore deep water Oil 
and Gas Project? 
F1.1 Subsea Systems and Wellheads. q High q Medium q Low 
F1.2 Pipelines, Umbilicals and Risers. q High q Medium q Low 
F1.3 Floating Offshore Production  q High q Medium q Low 
 
(F2) Contracts for project components with high uncertainty  
In the case of a Project component (e.g. Floating Production Facility (FPSO) with high 
uncertainties, which type of Project execution arrangement would you choose? 
F2.1 Turn-Key Contract with technical and 
legal specifications (Client – Agent). 
q High q Medium q Low 
F2.2 High level of Client management of 
transactions (Vertical Integration). 
q High q Medium q Low 
F2.3 Hybrid/Joint Venture with 
Contractors. 




(F3) In the case of a Project Component with high asset specificity (e.g. pipelines, umbilicals 
and risers), which type of Project execution arrangement would you choose? 
F3.1 Turn-Key Contract with technical and 
legal specifications (Client – Agent) 
q High q Medium q Low 
F3.2 High level of Client Management of 
transactions (Vertical Integration). 
q High q Medium q Low 
F3.3 Hybrid/Joint Venture with Contractors q High q Medium q Low 
 
(F4) In the case of a Project Component with high level of local content, which type of Project 
execution arrangement would you choose? 
F4.1 Turn-Key Contract with technical and 
legal specification (Client – Agent) 
q High q Medium q Low 
F4.2 High level of Client management of 
transactions (Vertical Integration). 
q High q Medium q Low 
F4.3 Hybrid/Joint Venture q High q Medium q Low 
 
(G) Open Questions for Discussion 
(G1) – How did the relative political uncertainty created by the behavior of the host country 
institutional regime and weak contract enforcement to safeguard property rights affect the Project 
transactions? 
(G2) –Did the state intervention IOGC’s selection of Project execution arrangements mechanisms 
(due to increased demand for local content), require the IOC to select these arrangements in a non-
economising way, leading the IOC to incur additional transaction costs, due to the requirements to 
form Joint Ventures with local partners? 
(G3) – In your opinion, does the location or the host country in which the project operates appear to 
most affect project execution costs and duration?  
(G4) – When the project execution process is subject to high host country political hazardswhat 
contingencies were used to mitigate the impact of these hazards on the transactions?  
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(G5) – In your experience, to what extent were the uncertainties that pertain to political instability 
and bureaucratic obstacles were concerns for the successful completion of the Project execution?  
(G6) – What are the main issues involved in executing Project activities with Joint Ventures with 
host countries companies and with EPCI Contractors? 	  
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Appendix 2- Analysis of Responses from Structured Interviews 
The interview responses of  the participants listed in Table 5.4 are reported as follows: - 
1. Responses to close questions by all participants were used to calculate the average 
score using the technique given bellow in A 2.1. The results are given in section A 
2.2. 
2. Responses to the open discussion were grouped according to the host country of the 
case study and used as primary evidence for the evaluation of the case studies. 
 
A 2.1  Basis of the Analysis of the Interview Closed Questions  
The interview responses recorded in the Questionnaire and the questions (A) to (H) were 
entered into an Excel spreadsheet with the necessary formulae built in to convert the 
responses into average score of all the respondents for the questions. 
For questions (C) 
Average Score =    Total Score x100 % 
                  Maximum Score (= 30 x 5= 150) 
For questions (D), (E) and (F), 
Average Score =    Total Score x100 % 
                  Maximum Score (= 30 x 3=90 ) 
Several individuals who are involved in projects bring together a larger fund of experience, 
knowledge and creative insights.  The synergy of individuals may make the overall quality 
of the input to the group decision greater than the sum of the parts.  The creation of juries, 
panels and cabinets as ways of reaching decisions can be seen to be based on this premise 
(Ferrel, 1985). A number of experts may combine in order to deliver an assessment 
superior to that which might be attained by merely accepting an individual 
recommendation.  A review of these techniques indicates that mathematical aggregation is 
the most suitable for combining individual judgements to complement quantitative 




2.2  Results  
Oil and Gas Industry Uncertainties and Risks 
The following five factors have been identified by surveys as the top uncertainties and 
risks which impact the execution of offshore oil and gas Projects.  Please rank them in 
order of their impact on the Project execution. 
 Uncertainty Factor Average Score 
% 
C1 Political Uncertainties including opportunistic behaviour of the 
host country government. 
81 
C2 Host Country demand for local content causing increases in 
Engineering, Fabrication, Construction and installation costs 
and schedule delays. 
80 
C3 Shortage of Engineering, Fabrication and Installation 
Capacities in the host country causing escalation of CAPEX 
and schedule 
55 
C4 Failure of Technology including requirements for novel 
technology (for frontier deep water regions). 
42 







Impact of Uncertainties on Project Execution 
How do you rate the impact of the following factors on the execution of Projects for the oil 
and gas field development? 
 Factor Average Score 
% 
D1.1 Political stability of host country. 60 
D1.2 Opportunistic behaviour of the Government. 86 
D1.3 The Taxation regime. 60 
D1.4 Strength of the Legislation structure to impose contractual 
terms. 
65 
D1.5 Pressure for Increased local content. 80 
 
 
(D2) Impact of market economic uncertainties on the costs and schedule of Project 
Components 
 Factor Average Score 
% 
D2.1 Subsea Systems and Wellheads.  42 
D2.2 Pipelines and Risers. 72 






(D3) Impact of Technological Uncertainties on Project Execution 
 Factor Average Score 
% 
D3.1 NovelTechnology required.  
e.g. Deep Water 
75 
D3.2 Shortage of required Technical and Management expertise. 82 
D3.3 Inadequate Construction and Fabrication Capacity. 70 
D3.4 Availability of Labour. 60 
D3.5 Availability of Installation and Commissioning of Facilities. 70 
 
(E) Potential Impact of Host Country Political Context 
 Factor Average Score 
% 
E1.1 Nigeria 80 
E1.2 Angola 72 
E1.5 USA 40 
 
E2) How do you rate the demand for local content in the following countries impact the 
Engineering, fabrication, construction and installation activities for the Project 
Components? 
 Factor Average Score% 
E2.1 Nigeria 85 
E2.2 Angola 76 




Impact of Asset Specificity on the Project Execution 
Asset specificity is defined as the site specific functional requirements (i.e. specific design) 
of the Project components.  Asset specificity of a Project component is high if the Project 
component is highly site specific and the potential for re-use in other locations is low or 
negligible. How do you rate the Asset specificity of the following components of an 
offshore deep water Oil and Gas Project? 
 Factor Average Score 
% 
F1.1 Subsea Systems and Wellheads. 30 
F1.2 Pipelines, Umbilicals and Risers. 78 
F1.3 Floating Offshore Production Processing Facility.   75 
 
Contracts for Project Components with high uncertainty  
In the case of Construction of a Project component (e.g. Floating Production Facility 
(FPSO) with high execution uncertainties, which type of contract arrangement would you 
choose? 
 Factor Average Score 
% 
F2.1 Turn-Key Contract with technical and legal specifications 
(Client – Agent). 
40 
F2.2 High level of Client management of transactions. (Vertical 
Integration). 
65 






For the construction of a Project Component with high asset specificity (e.g. pipelines, 
umbilicals and risers), which type of contract would you choose? 
 Factor Average Score 
% 
F3.1 Turn-Key Contract with technical and legal specifications.  
(Client – Agent) 
40 
F3.2 High level of Client Management of transactions.  
(Vertical Integration). 
65 
F3.3 Hybrid/Joint Venture with Contractor. 75 
 
(F4) In the case of a Project Component with high level of local content, which type of 
contract would you choose? 
 Factor Average Score 
% 
F4.1 Turn-Key Contract with technical and legal specification.  
(Client – Agent) 
35 





Appendix 3- Analysis of Responses of Semi-Structured Interviews/Questionnaire 
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